Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. 3150-DEP
Dondero, J.
Appellant S.B. challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding of dependency (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300) and its dispositional order, contending that she was not adequately advised of her rights attendant to the jurisdictional hearing. We conclude the error, if any, was harmless and affirm.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Danielle B. was born to appellant in June 2008. Appellant has three older children, Brittany B., April B., and Benjamin B. The father of the three older children is Rodney B. Danielle’s father is Ronald B.
On July 22, 2009, the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) filed a dependency petition concerning Danielle. The petition alleged she had suffered serious physical harm and abuse. Specifically, the Department alleged that on July 19, 2009, while in the care of appellant, the child had “sustained a closed head injury with bruising and swelling on her forehead, and facial and right foot trauma.” The Department alleged that the child had also been brought to the hospital twice within the previous two weeks for facial trauma and for a bruise near her left ear. According to the Department, appellant was unable to provide an adequate explanation as to how the child’s injuries occurred.
Dependency petitions were also filed for the three older children. The petitions with respect to these children alleged that they were at risk due to the abuse of their half-sibling Danielle. (See § 300, subd. (j).). Those petitions are not at issue in this appeal.
The detention hearing was held on July 23, 2009. Appellant was represented by counsel. Also present were the two fathers of her children. Appellant waived reading of the petition and submitted on detention. The juvenile court ordered Danielle detained.
On July 24, 2009, Danielle was released to Ronald B.’s care. The section 319 initial petition hearing was vacated.
On July 29, 2009, the juvenile court set the jurisdictional hearing for August 19, 2009.
The Department filed its jurisdiction/disposition report on August 19, 2009. The report alleges that appellant’s then-husband, Timothy P., was responsible for inflicting Danielle’s injuries. The most recent injury occurred after appellant had laid her down in her crib for a nap. Timothy had been upstairs with the child when he reported she was injured and that some of the slats in her crib were broken. The Department recommended that the allegations of the petitions with respect to all four children be found true. It further recommended that the three older children be declared dependents of the court, and that the case concerning Danielle be dismissed with an appropriate exit custody order. The Department recommended that appellant not be provided with reunification services as to Danielle, as it was in the child’s best interest to be placed in the custody of her father.
At the August 19, 2009 hearing, appellant was again represented by counsel. The juvenile court found Danielle came within section 300, subdivisions (a) and (e). The court ordered the child placed with her father Ronald B. pursuant to an exit custody order, and dismissed the dependency proceeding. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant claims the juvenile court did not properly advise her of her rights at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing.
Although civil in nature and designed to protect the child rather than to prosecute the parent, dependency proceedings implicate the fundamental right of parents to care for and have custody of their children. Those rights, therefore, may not be interfered with without due process of law. (In re Monique T. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1376-1377 (Monique T.); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.534(k)(1), 5.682 & 5.684.) For example, rule 5.534(k)(1) provides that the court must advise the parent of the right (1) to assert the privilege against self-incrimination; (2) to confront and cross-examine the persons who prepared reports or documents submitted to the court and witnesses called to testify against the parent; (3) to use the process of the court to bring in witnesses; and (4) to present evidence to the court.
California Rules of Court, rule 5.682(b) requires the court in a jurisdictional proceeding to advise the parent of the right (1) to a hearing on the issues raised by the petition; (2) to assert the privilege against self-incrimination; (3) to confront and to cross-examine all witnesses called to testify against the parent; (4) to use the court process to compel attendance of witnesses on behalf of the parent; and (5) to have a removed child returned to the parent within two working days after a finding by the court that the child does not come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, unless the parent and the social agency agree that the child will be released on a later date. Rule 5.684 pertains to the procedures for conducting contested jurisdictional hearings.
The appellate court in Monique T., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 1372, considered the legal effect of a juvenile court’s failure to give the required advisements. In Monique T., the mother submitted the matter for a jurisdictional determination based on the petition and the detention report. (Id. at p. 1375.) At the detention hearing, she had waived the reading of the petition, advice of rights, and explanation of the proceedings. (Ibid.) Through counsel, she again waived reading of the petition at the jurisdictional hearing and the court did not advise her of the rights she would be giving up upon submission. The Court of Appeal concluded it was error for the court not to explain the mother’s rights to her as required by then California Rules of Court, rule 1449, and further the juvenile court erred in not obtaining her personal waiver of her due process rights. However, the reviewing court determined the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 1377.) The mother was represented by counsel at all times and she was under no pressure to waive her rights. Counsel had explained her rights to her. (Id. at p. 1378.) In addition, the evidence of the mother’s inability to care for her child was uncontradicted, and she did not indicate that she could have offered different or more favorable witnesses or evidence had she proceeded with a hearing. (Ibid.)
Unlike the situation presented in Monique T., here, the juvenile court complied with California Rules of Court, rule 5.534(k)(1) when it advised all the parents of their rights at the detention hearing held on July 23, 2009. Appellant was present at this hearing with her attorney. She was fully informed of her right to a hearing on the issues raised by the petition, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront and to cross-examine all witnesses and to use the subpoena power of the court to bring witnesses in on her behalf. While the court did not re-advise appellant of these rights at the jurisdictional hearing, as required by rule 5.682, we note the jurisdictional hearing was held less than a month after the detention hearing. Further, at the detention hearing, the court never suggested that the rights granted to her were temporary. Accordingly, we disagree with her counsel’s repeated assertions that she was “never” advised of her rights.
Appellant also argues that the juvenile court erred by not reading the petition to appellant at the outset of the jurisdiction hearing. While it is true that the court did not read the petition to her or seek her waiver at the jurisdiction hearing, the court did ask her at the earlier detention hearing if she had had an opportunity to review the petition. Her counsel indicated that appellant had reviewed the petition and that she waived further reading of it. Again, the jurisdictional hearing occurred less than a month later. Thus, the court would have been reasonable in concluding that appellant’s waiver was still effective. We further note that appellant was at all times represented by counsel and she does not assert that her attorney’s performance was deficient in any respect. Additionally, appellant agreed to the terms of the exit custody orders, which resulted in the dismissal of this dependency proceeding.
In any event, we find the juvenile court’s error, if any, to be harmless. Appellant’s briefs fail to indicate what she would have done differently had the juvenile court given her the appropriate advisements at the jurisdictional hearing. She names no witnesses she would have called, identifies no testimony she would have given and asserts no areas of cross-examination she would have pursued had the advisements been given. She does not specify what negative information she would have rebutted or contested had the court advised her of her rights. There was no indication she desired, contrary to her counsel’s indication, a contested hearing or that she disagreed with submission of the case upon the Department’s reports, nor was there any indication she desired a continuance to marshal facts to rebut the allegations of the petition. Further, appellant does not claim that she was under any pressure to waive her rights or that counsel did not explain her rights. We conclude that any error in failing to give her the standard advisements was therefore harmless.
We also note the record discloses substantial evidence to support each of the juvenile court’s findings. Subdivision (a) of section 300 provides for jurisdiction where there is a substantial risk the child will suffer serious physical harm inflicted non-accidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian. Subdivision (e) provides for jurisdiction where a child under the age of five has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by the parent, and the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the child.
The standard of proof required in a section 300 dependency hearing is the preponderance of the evidence. (§ 355.) We review the jurisdiction findings under the substantial evidence test. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) Under this standard of review, we examine the whole record in a light most favorable to the findings and conclusions of the juvenile court and defer to the lower court on issues of credibility of the evidence and witnesses. (In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733-734.) Just one incident and one witness’s testimony can support jurisdiction under section 300. (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.) We must resolve all conflicts in support of the determination and indulge all legitimate inferences to uphold the court’s order. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.) “ ‘The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.’ ” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1394.)
In the present case, the record fully supports the finding of jurisdiction. As the Department notes, section 355.1, subdivision (a), provides that where the juvenile court finds, based on competent professional evidence, that injuries sustained by a minor are of a nature that would not ordinarily be sustained except as the result of unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of a parent who has the care or custody of the minor, “that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300.” Medical records that were before the court document three separate incidents involving injuries sustained by Danielle under suspicious circumstances, thereby supporting a finding under section 300, subdivision (a).
Additionally, the Department’s jurisdictional report reveals that appellant admitted her daughter received severe injuries while in her custody and understood, at least by the time she was interviewed by the social workers, that her then-husband had to have been the perpetrator. She also initially lied to the police as to whether he was in the home when the child was injured in the crib, and later admitted she lied to protect him because she knew he had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Thus, the record establishes that Danielle also came within section 300, subdivision (e).
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders are affirmed.
We concur: Margulies, Acting P. J., Banke, J.