In re DaJiahonna, W.

Full title: IN RE DaJIAHONNA, W

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk Child Protection Session at Middletown

Date published: Apr 18, 2005

2005 Ct. Sup. 6557 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)

Opinion

No. F02-CP03-002819-A

April 18, 2005

MOTION TO REVIEW PERMANENCY PLAN

TAYLOR, JUDGE.

The court approves of the Permanency Plan, filed in Superior Court for Juvenile Matters (SCJM), 2th District, located in Norwalk, on 4/7/04, calling for termination of parental rights and adoption. The court will also adopt the factual findings and case histories as proven by clear and convincing evidence in the TPR trial.

1. The court finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to:

a. reunite each of the respondent parents with the child; and

b. to achieve the Permanency Plan.

2. This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that further efforts to reunify the child with either of the respondent parents are not appropriate.

3. This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that each respondent parent is either unwilling or unable to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.

The court overrules all objections to the Permanency Plan and any outstanding objections to the Motion to Maintain Commitment.

BY THE COURT,

C. Taylor, J.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

This memorandum of decision addresses a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition brought to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Ayesha D. (Ayesha) and Derrick W. (Derrick), the biological mother and father of DaJiahonna W. (DaJiahonna), born 5/2/03.

The court finds the following by clear and convincing evidence.

The history of the file reflects that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) has been involved with members of this family since 1996.

On 7/22/03, DCF received an anonymous report stating that Ayesha was physically abusing her two-month-old infant, DaJiahonna, and that Ayesha continued to actively abuse substances while caring for her child.

On 7/22/03, DCF social worker Marie Levesque met with Ayesha and DaJiahonna and reported that Ayesha had alcohol on her breath and had admitted to using alcohol that day. The Norwalk Police and the Norwalk Housing Authority informed Levesque that the police have had to respond to the home 3 times during the past month due to domestic violence issues between Ayesha and Derrick.

On 7/29/03, DCF social worker Anita Groballi had contact with Derrick's probation officer, Rhoda Williams. She reported that Derrick had been convicted of Possession of Narcotics and was on probation. She further reported that Derrick had been ordered to attend the Alternate Incarceration Program (AIC), but failed to follow through and was in violation of his probation. Ms. Williams told Groballi that, on 6/9/03, Derrick told her he had concerns for the safety of DaJiahonna due to Ayesha's alcoholism and that he often returned home to find Ayesha "in a drunken stupor, passed out and asleep," while the infant was in her care. Ms. Williams also indicated that, on 7/17/03, Derrick was found to be unconscious on South Main Street in Norwalk and was taken to the emergency room. When Derrick was released from the hospital, the discharge report recommended that he should "stop using cocaine."

On 7/29/03, Ayesha and Derrick were both arrested for Breach of Peace as a result of a verbal and physical altercation with each other. On 7/31/03, Groballi interviewed Ayesha's daughter, Janiah G., D.O.B. 1/14/97, who currently resides with her legal guardian and maternal aunt, Kathleen D-C. (Kathleen). During the interview, Janiah reported that she often spent overnights with Ayesha and that Ayesha has hit and punched her. Janiah's guardian verified that the child had once returned from a visit with Ayesha with a bruise on her back. Janiah reported that Ayesha used alcohol daily and that she had witnessed domestic violence between Ayesha and Derrick. Additionally, Janiah reported that Ayesha's son, James B. (James),² had been staying with Ayesha for the summer and that Ayesha also hit and punched James.

2 In the past, James B., was also known as James G. His father is also known as James G.

Groballi, along with Norwalk Police Officers Scully and Jager, made an unannounced visit to Ayesha's home and confirmed that James was present. When Ayesha returned to the home, she smelled of alcohol and admitted that she had been drinking.

On 7/31/03, DCF invoked a 96-hour hold on behalf of DaJiahonna and her sibling, James. The children were placed in DCF care.

On 7/31/03, after having been taken into DCF custody, James told Groballi that earlier in the day, Ayesha, who had been drinking alcohol, became angry, twisted his arm behind his back, and punched him on his shoulder and back.

On 8/1/03 in Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Second District, Norwalk (SCJM), DCF filed a Motion for an Order of Temporary Custody and a neglect/uncared for petition on behalf of DaJiahonna. The OTC was granted by the court (Mottolese, Sr. J.). The neglect/uncared for petition alleged that;

DaJiahonna had been denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally and that;

DaJiahonna had been permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to her well-being.

At the time of the issuance of the OTC, the court found that DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove DaJiahonna from her home. The court issued ex parte specific steps for the respondent parents.

On 8/6/03 in SCJM (Mottolese, Sr. J.), the OTC was sustained as to the respondent mother Ayesha. Derrick did not appear and was defaulted. New preliminary specific steps were issued for Ayesha, who also entered denials as to the neglect petition. In addition, the court ordered a psychological evaluation of Ayesha, who was represented by counsel at the time.

On 9/3/03 in SCJM (Mottolese, Sr. J.), Derrick did not appear to enter a plea as to the neglect petition and was defaulted.

On 11/5/03 in SCJM (Mottolese, Sr. J.), the respondent parties appeared in court. Ayesha, who was represented by counsel, entered a nolo contendre plea to the neglect allegation that DaJiahonna had been permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to her well-being. The court accepted the plea and a canvass and, after having adjudicated DaJiahonna neglected, committed her to the custody of DCF until further order of the court.

On 3/10/04 in SCJM, DCF filed a TPR petition as to DaJiahonna. DCF alleged abandonment as to Derrick, failure to rehabilitate, and no ongoing relationship as to both respondent parents and failure to rehabilitate with a prior termination as to Ayesha.

On 4/7/04 in SCJM, DCF filed its Motion to Maintain Commitment (MMC) and its Motion to Review Permanency Plan (MRP). The Permanency Plan (PP) recommended TPR and adoption, as well as a finding that further efforts to reunify DaJiahonna with either Ayesha or Derrick were not appropriate.

On 4/7/04, the respondent parties appeared with counsel in SCJM (Mottolese, Sr. J.) in reference to the TPR petition. Both were advised of their rights and entered pro forma denials.

On 5/26/04 in SCJM, DCF filed a motion for a psychological evaluation of the parents and an interactional evaluation of DaJiahonna.

On 6/16/04 in SCJM, Ayesha, through counsel, filed her objections to the PP.

On 6/16/04 in SCJM, Ayesha, through counsel, filed a motion for visitation.

On 6/23/04 in SCJM, the court (Mottolese, Sr. J.) granted the state's motion for a psychological evaluation.

On 6/23/03 in SCJM, the court (Mottolese, Sr. J.) granted Ayesha's motion for visitation and ordered that DCF allow her to visit DaJiahonna once per week. The court also granted the MMC and consolidated the PP hearing into the TPR trial.

On 7/6/03 in SCJM, DCF filed a motion for relief to modify visitation.

On 7/26/04 in SCJM, the court (Mottolese, Sr. J.) granted the state's motion for relief to modify visitation, indicating that visitation would occur with Ayesha for 2 hours every 2 weeks. The matter was referred to Superior Court for Juvenile Matters-Child Protection Session, located in Middletown (CPS), for trial.

On 12/28/04 in CPS, counsel for the respondent father Derrick filed a motion to withdraw his appearance.

On 12/29/04 in CPS, DCF filed a motion for disclosure of records.

On 1/13/05 in CPS, this court denied Derrick's counsel's motion to withdraw his appearance, without prejudice. The court indicated that the motion could be renewed on the 1st day of trial, provided that notice was sent to his client in accordance with Practice Book.

On 1/19/05 in CPS, the court (Crawford, J.) granted the State's motion for disclosure of records.

On 2/7/05 in CPS, DCF filed a motion for judicial notice.

On 2/8/05 in CPS, this court granted the State's motion to take judicial notice of the court file, limited to pleadings, petitions, motions, summaries of facts, specific steps, transcripts and court memorandum not related to any judicial pretrials or case status conferences.

This court granted Derrick's counsel's motion to withdraw his appearance.

This court granted the State's oral motion to default Derrick at 10:00 A.M., then commenced trial on the TPR petition.

The trial was continued until 2/10/05 and was concluded that day.

For the reasons stated below, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the TPR issues against Ayesha and Derrick and in favor of the petitioner State of Connecticut and DCF.

This court has jurisdiction over the pending case. Notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book. No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of this child.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court has reviewed the neglect and TPR petitions and the exhibits, which included the TPR social study and its addendum. The court has also reviewed the various motions which are the subject of this trial and has taken judicial notice of the record.³ The court has utilized the applicable legal standards⁴ in considering the evidence and the testimony of trial witnesses. Upon deliberation, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial.

3 In addition to the items mentioned above of which the court took judicial notice in response to the granting of the State's motion, the court also took judicial notice of the specific steps, the pleadings and court memorandum not related to any judicial pretrials or case status conferences. The court did not review any status reports, social studies or evaluations not otherwise entered into evidence as full exhibits.

4 "It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine . . . In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 316, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001)." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).

The court found Derrick in default on 2/8/05 for failing to appear and participate in the TPR trial. The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence which included the evidence of the social worker and the respondent mother, that Derrick had actual notice of the TPR trial. Pursuant to CGS § 46b-121(a) and Practice Book § 32a-2, establishing that juvenile hearings are essentially civil proceedings, the default against Derrick effectively admits the truth of the petitioner's material allegations. Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732-33, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) (respondent in child support proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings "is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition"); see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000). This admission satisfies the petitioner's obligations; however, the court will review the evidence submitted by the petitioner concerning Derrick.

AYESHA (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL, SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION) CT Page 6563

Ayesha was born in Norwalk on 11/27/77 to Cheryl F. (MGM) and Horace D. (MGF). She was raised in Norwalk. She reported that her father lived with the family until she was seven years old. Upon his leaving the home, he maintained contact with her on a daily basis. Ayesha is the youngest of three children born to MGM. MGM died of lung cancer in 1997 and MGF died of a terminal illness in 1999. Ayesha's oldest brother, Horace G. (Horace), resides in Georgia and does not maintain contact with her. Ayesha however, remains in close contact with her brother, Terrance F. (Terrance), who continues to reside in Norwalk.

Ayesha was raised in Roodner Court, a public housing complex in Norwalk known for its high crime rate. She reported that, while growing up, she experienced many physical and verbal altercations. Ayesha attributes her current issues to the stressful lifestyle she endured while growing up in the chaos of Roodner Court. Despite her difficulties associated with her neighborhood, Ayesha reports to have experienced a happy childhood and positive relationships with her immediate family members.

Ayesha reports having had positive relationships with her immediate family members.

Ayesha reported that when she was 14 years old, she was increasingly involved in verbal and physical altercations. At 14 years old, she was arrested for an assault charge following a dispute in Roodner Court. At 16 years old, she reported that she began drinking alcohol regularly. Ayesha reported that both of her parents had issues with alcoholism when she was younger.

Ayesha attended the Silvermine and Naramake Elementary Schools in Norwalk. She reported that she initially attended Silvermine and then transferred to Naramake. Ayesha attended elementary and high school in Norwalk and reported that she received average grades. Following her transfer to Naramake, she began to experience behavioral problems (non-compliance and disrespect towards her teachers). In reference to her behavioral problems, Ayesha acknowledged that she was simply "acting up" and did not place the blame on her former teachers.

Ayesha's problems in the classroom continued through middle school and high school. Ayesha attended Nathan Hale Middle School for three years and Norwalk High School for one year. After one year at Norwalk High School, she entered Briggs High School in Norwalk, an alternative education vocational school. Ayesha reported to have done relatively well at Briggs and graduated in 1996.

On 01/8/96, at the age of seventeen, Ayesha gave birth to her first child, James. On 5/16/96, she was arrested and charged with Assault in the 1st Degree, Reckless Endangerment in the 2nd Degree and Risk of Injury to a Child as a result of James having been severely physically abused when he was three months old and while in her care. The infant was examined and was found to have the following injuries:

2 skull fractures

severe intra-craneal bleeding

fresh fractures of the left clavicle

healing fractures of the right clavicle

healing fractures of ribs ##4, 5, 6 and 7, on both sides of the body.

At the time James was hospitalized at Yale-New Haven Hospital (YNH), he had to be placed on a ventilator and was in critical condition. His attending physician at YNH opined that his skull fractures were caused by a single, non-accidental event and were life-threatening in nature. The physician further opined that, as of 4/26/95, James' chances of survival were 50%, and, if he did survive, he would have permanent brain damage.

On 1/14/97, Ayesha gave birth to her second child, Janiah.

On 10/31/97 in Superior Court, Geographical Area Twenty, Norwalk, Ayesha was convicted of the following offenses and was sentenced to the following jail terms:

Assault in the 1st Degree 3 years to serve, execution suspended after the service of 18 months and 3 years probation Reckless Endangerment in the 2nd Degree 1 year to serve Risk of Injury to a Child 1 year to serve, concurrently. In 10/98, Ayesha was released on parole. In 4/99, Ayesha was remanded to the custody of the Department of Adult Probation (APO). She remained on probation until 4/01.

Ayesha never regained custody of James or Janiah. Ayesha's parental rights as to James were terminated in 1998 and James was adopted by his paternal aunt. Janiah has been in the care of her maternal great-aunt since infancy and guardianship was transferred to her via the Probate Court.

Ayesha reported that she began working in the retail business and held several different jobs until 9/02 when she learned she was pregnant with her third child, DaJiahonna. Ayesha is currently working part-time through a temporary agency. She testified that she received financial assistance from her brother. She is also receiving Section 8 housing assistance.

During an intake evaluation at Connecticut Renaissance (CR) on 9/7/04, Ayesha admitted that the longest period of time that she has been employed at a full-time job was 3 years.

Ayesha reported that she met DaJiahonna's father, Derrick, while out at a social gathering in 5/02. She reported that they quickly developed a relationship and she became pregnant in 8/02. She stated that, early in their relationship, he would help her financially and described their relationship as having been "good." Ayesha explained that during the 2 months of their relationship, she was unaware of Derrick's substance abuse issues until one of her family members informed her. She stated that she was unwilling to listen to her family's concerns and that she continued to remain in the relationship.

At the trial, Ayesha testified that she was no longer involved in a relationship with Derrick.

Ayesha currently resides in an apartment in Monterey Village in Norwalk.

Ayesha has a reported substance abuse problem which dates back to when she was 16 years old. She admitted alcohol abuse at that time. At the trial, she testified that she considered herself an alcoholic and a drug abuser, having abused marijuana, cocaine and PCP.⁵ During an intake evaluation at CR on 9/7/04, Ayesha admitted that, at the time of DaJiahonna's removal, she was consuming alcohol to excess.

5 Phencyclidine, commonly known as PCP, is a hallucinogenic street drug.

DCF referred Ayesha to Project Reward (PR) for substance abuse treatment, anger management counseling and parenting classes shortly after DaJiahonna was taken into custody. She participated in substance abuse assessment there on 8/18/03. At that time, Ayesha denied being an alcoholic or a drug addict. She admitted past cocaine use but indicated that she could "stop whenever I want to." PR diagnosed her as being alcohol and cocaine dependent and recommended on-going treatment, and Ayesha began intensive outpatient treatment there on 8/22/03.

Ayesha was not compliant with substance abuse treatment at PR. She failed to attend the program as required on 9/4/03, 9/9/03, 9/31/03, 10/16/03, 11/3/03, 12/2/03, 12/4/03 and 12/5/03. She failed to attend PR as required 3 times in 1/04.

In 2/04 and 3/04, her attendance improved with only 1 unexcused absence. However, she was suspended from the program from 3/15/04 through 3/26/04 due to a positive screen for alcohol on 3/5/04 and for appearing for a psychiatric evaluation on 3/3/04 under the influence of alcohol.

Ayesha failed to attend the program as required on 4/26/04, 5/25/04, 6/1/04, 6/11/04, 7/29/04 and 7/30/04.

While in PR, Ayesha continued to abuse substances. She tested positive for PCP as follows:

8/18/03, 8/21/03, 8/25/03, 8/28/03, 9/3/03, 9/5/03, 9/8/03, 9/11/03, 9/15/03, 9/18/03, 9/22/03, 10/14/03, 10/16/03, 10/20/03, 10/27/03, 10/28/03, 11/6/03, 11/7/03, 11/10/03, 11/14/03, 11/17/03, 11/20/03, 11/21/03, 11/24/03, 12/1/03, 12/18/03, 12/19/03, 12/22/03, 1/8/04, 1/9/04, 1/12/04, 1/26/04, 1/27/04, 1/29/04, 1/30/04, 2/2/04, 2/3/04, 2/5/04, 2/9/04, 2/13/04, 2/17/04,

Ayesha submitted a hair sample on 3/12/04 that tested positive for PCP.

On 12/5/03, Ayesha denied PCP use, but admitted alcohol use. Subsequently, in 1/04, she admitted having used both on New Year's Eve.

Ayesha tested positive for cocaine on 9/15/03 and 9/18/03. She tested positive for alcohol on 10/3/03, 11/7/03, 11/17/03, 11/24/03, 3/5/04, 5/21/04 and 7/27/04.

In 1/04, PR recommended that Ayesha go to inpatient substance abuse treatment. At the time, she agreed, and completed intakes at both Connecticut Valley Hospital (CVH) and McDonough House. She failed to follow up and had to repeat the intake process at both places on 1/26/04. By 2/13/04, she had indicated that she would not attend inpatient treatment, claiming that she would lose her apartment as a result. However, she also refused to allow DCF, McDonough House or PR to assist her in maintaining her housing while in inpatient treatment. At trial, Ayesha's testimony confirmed both.

Ayesha was referred by PR for a psychiatric evaluation by Family and Children's Agency (FCA) on 12/10/03 but failed to attended it. She was re-referred and attended the evaluation on 3/3/04. The psychiatrist, Keith A. Lepp, M.D., indicated that Ayesha smelled of alcohol and described her insight and judgment as being impaired by her apparently still somewhat intoxicated state. He further opined that the results of the evaluation were inconclusive at best as a result of her apparently being "hung-over."

On 3/8/04, PR confronted Ayesha with the information concerning alcohol use by Dr. Lepp, which she denied. On 3/12/04, she admitted drinking alcohol 3 times during the past week. As a result, PR suspended her from the program for 2 weeks.

On 9/2/04, PR discharged Ayesha from their care, indicating that she had received all the benefits that she could from PR. She was referred to outpatient treatment at CR.

On 9/7/04, Ayesha underwent an intake assessment at CR, where she was diagnosed with alcohol abuse and PCP abuse and placed into outpatient treatment. At the time of her intake, Ayesha submitted to a hair test which was positive for cocaine and benzoylecgonine.⁶ A urine test done at the same time was negative.

6 A metabolite of cocaine.

Ayesha failed to attend groups as required, as of 11/04. She indicated that she was having employment and transportation problems. DCF responded by providing her with bus tokens. She also failed to submit to a hair test at CR in 12/04.

In 1/05, DCF referred Ayesha to FCA for individual counseling. However, Ayesha failed to make an appointment for an intake assessment with them. At trial, Ayesha testified that she had failed to do so because she had forgotten. She testified that she had called FCA on the day prior to her testimony and had been placed on the waiting list there. She also testified that she had an appointment with CR, for the day after her testimony, to return to group therapy.

In 10/03, Ayesha reported to DCF that she was injured in a car accident and that both Ayesha and the driver had been drinking prior to the accident.

DERRICK (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL, SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION)

Derrick, a resident of Norwalk, was born on 3/25/74 and was raised primarily by his mother, Mary W. (PGM). His father, Rodney W. (PGF), was incarcerated as of 9/18/04. The oldest of 3 siblings, Derrick's brother Rodney was also incarcerated as of 9/18/04. He also has a sister, Darlene, as well as 2 half-brothers. Derrick reported to the court-ordered evaluator, Dr. Jeffrey Cohen, that he did not maintain contact with his family When DCF took DaJiahonna into custody in 7/03, Derrick had been residing with Ayesha in Monterey Village in Norwalk. For several months after DCF involvement, Derrick's whereabouts were unknown.

Derrick has resided in Danbury in the past.

Derrick attended school in Norwalk. He indicated that he had been placed in special education classes primarily for behavioral problems, indicating that he fought with others frequently. He stated that he was a C student who never failed classes and never attended summer school. He stopped attending school in the 11th grade. He recalled being suspended from school for fighting. Derrick indicated that, as a result of his behavioral issues at school, he attended the Child Guidance Center and noted that he was given Ritalin as a child. He indicated involvement with the Juvenile Court for drug charges. As a result of trafficking in drugs, he was placed in Long Lane School at 12 years of age and remained there for approximately 2 1/2 years. After release, he was placed at the VTAM residential substance abuse treatment program for 1 year.

Derrick attended Brien McMahon High School in Norwalk, but was placed in Long Lane and VTAM. After release, he was placed in Briggs High School, but then left school when required to attend summer school in order to graduate. After leaving school, he resumed trafficking in drugs.

Derrick reported to Dr. Cohen that he has spent almost 17 years of his life in and out of some type of correctional facility. He claimed, "I just get harassed by the local police."

Derrick has an extensive criminal record. He has been convicted of Criminal Mischief in the 3rd Degree, Sale of Narcotics, Violation of Probation (2 cts.), Possession of Narcotics (2 cts.), Disorderly Conduct, Interfering With A Police Officer, Criminal Impersonation, Failure to Appear in the 2nd Degree, Operating Under Suspension, Failure to Appear in the 2nd Degree and Use of a Motor Vehicle Without the Owner's Permission. As of 2/8/05, Derrick had a pending case in Superior Court, Geographical Area Twenty, Norwalk, for Criminal Trespass in the 1st Degree, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia within 1500' of a School.

Derrick reported that he enjoys all kinds of liquor, particularly beer, vodka, wine coolers and cognac on the rocks. He stated to Dr. Cohen that he usually doesn't drink to excess but that he has had at least one blackout. He denied having any alcohol-related seizures. He stated that he has sniffed cocaine, but never smoked or injected it. He claimed that cocaine makes him "mellow" and that it does not make him aggressive. He denied injecting heroin and trying marijuana; however, he admitted to APO during an intake in 4/03 that he used alcohol, cocaine and marijuana. He denied use of pain killers and prescription medication. He has admitted attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings. He was not actively involved in the AA program, as of 9/04.

Derrick was incarcerated from 9/11/03 through 9/10/04. The clear and convincing evidence indicates that, during this time, he failed to utilize any Department of Corrections (DCC) substance abuse programs such as Tier One, NA or AA.

In 2003, Derrick was referred to CR for substance abuse treatment by APO. The clear and convincing evidence indicates that he failed to attend. Additionally, DCF referred him to CR for a scheduled substance abuse evaluation on 8/5/03, but he failed to attend that evaluation as well.

Derrick requested two visits with DaJiahonna since she entered DCF care in 7/03. The first visit occurred in 11/03 while Derrick was incarcerated. He then requested that the next visit be delayed until he was transferred to a new correctional facility. The second visit occurred in 2/04. He also visited her in 8/04. While incarcerated, Derrick had a total of 5 visits with DaJiahonna.

Derrick saw his daughter during the interactional evaluation with Dr. Cohen on 9/11/04. He also visited her, unannounced, with Ayesha on 2/4/05.

Derrick was released from incarceration in 9/04 after a year of incarceration. DCF has made numerous attempts to contact him to offer him treatment, services, and visitation with DaJiahonna; however Derrick has failed to contact DCF. As of 1/27/05, he responded but once to DCF entreaties since his release from prison. In 10/04, DCF social worker Nadine Losquadro spoke to Derrick by telephone. At that time, he agreed to meet with her to discuss treatment recommendations and visitation. However, he failed to meet with or contact Losquadro. She did not see him until 2/4/05.

DAJIAHONNNA (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL STATUS OF THE CHILD AS REQUIRED BY CGS § 45a-717(e)(1).)

DaJiahonna was born on 5/2/03 at Norwalk Hospital to Ayesha and Derrick. Birth records from Norwalk Hospital obtained by DCF do not indicate any problems or complications with DaJiahonna's birth.

DaJiahonna is currently placed in a DCF non-relative foster home. The clear and convincing evidence indicates that she is doing well in that placement. DaJiahonna's foster mother (FM), who testified at the TPR trial, reported to DCF that DaJiahonna has a happy disposition and she cries only when she is over-tired. FM testified that DaJiahonna had no major issues aside from a language delay. Birth to Three completed an assessment of DaJiahonna on 10/20/03 and reported that she is developmentally on target and therefore ineligible for Birth to Three services. DaJiahonna is being monitored by the Ages to Stages program.

On 11/04/03, a multidisciplinary evaluation was conducted and some concerns were noted that included DaJiahonna's high muscle tone and tremors of her extremities. The multidisciplinary evaluation recommended a neurological evaluation to rule out cerebral palsy. This evaluation was conducted on 4/6/04 and did rule out cerebral palsy.

At the time of the written update to the TPR social study, DaJiahonna was up to date with immunizations and was monitored by her pediatrician for slightly elevated lead levels.

DaJiahonna was moved to a legal risk foster home on 10/18/04. FM testified at trial that she wishes to adopt DaJiahonna if she is free for adoption. On 9/3/04, DCF's Permanency Planning Team approved FM as DaJiahonna's prospective adoptive parent. There are no other children in the home.

DaJiahonna attends pre-school. The clear and convincing evidence indicates that she is developing appropriately and is often observed to be active, responsive, happy, affectionate and verbal.

On 8/9/04, Dr. Cohen evaluated DaJiahonna and wrote the following:

Due to her young age and lack of language development skills, I was unable to determine if she is capable of expressing emotional feelings. DaJiahonna again appears with limited attachment skills. Her facial expressions were somewhat bland and did not appear to be interactive on the date of examination . . .

I am in concurrence with the need for this child to be followed by the "Ages and Stages Program." She appears to have limited range of speech, poor interpersonal contact and muscle tone difficulties. Hopefully, this toddler will not have further developmental delays but certainly presents as an at-risk youngster.

DaJiahonna calls both Ayesha and FM "mommy." Ayesha visits her daughter twice per month.

RELATIVE RESOURCES CT Page 6572

Ayesha identified a maternal cousin, Leslie A., as a potential placement resource for DaJiahonna. Leslie is not within three generations of DaJiahonna and therefore did not qualify for a relative license. DCF completed a special study license for DaJiahonna and was to present her study to the Permanency Planning Team (PPT) along with other legal risk/pre-adoptive studies as a potential placement.

Derrick identified his mother, PGM and/or his sister Darlene as potential placement resources for DaJiahonna. Neither was approved by DCF. PGM had a past DCF history due to substantiations of abuse and neglect of her own children. Darlene was not approved as she resided with PGM.

Both PGM and Darlene visit with DaJiahonna on a monthly basis and are supervised by DCF.

SIBLINGS

The court incorporates, by reference, all other findings made in this decision concerning DaJiahonna's siblings.

James was born on 1/8/96 to Ayesha and James G. DCF became involved in James' life in 4/96 when he was three months old as a result of serious and life-threatening injuries he suffered. His injuries resulted in a jail term for Ayesha.

Ayesha and James G.'s parental rights of James were terminated in SCJM on 1/15/98. James was adopted by a paternal aunt who remains his present caretaker.

Janiah was born on 1/14/97 to Ayesha and James G. while Ayesha's criminal case concerning James was pending. Janiah has been in the care of her maternal great-aunt since infancy and guardianship was transferred to her via the Probate Court. As of 7/03, James and Janiah were visiting with Ayesha and were staying with her for extended periods.

Derrick has another daughter, Ashley S., who lived with her mother in Danbury. As of 4/15/03, Derrick had not seen her since the beginning of 2002. He was paying $2.00 per year for child support at the time.

ADJUDICATION CT Page 6573

On 11/5/03 in SCJM (Mottolese, Sr. J.), the court found, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that DaJiahonna had been neglected. After having adjudicated her neglected, the court then committed her to the custody of DCF. The court is next called upon to determine whether the petitioner has met its burden of proving the allegations presented by the pending TPR petitions. Practice Book § 35a-3. "Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights . . . exists by clear and convincing evidence." (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863; cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903 (2000); see also In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469-70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).

In the adjudicatory phase of these proceedings,⁷ the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to 3/10/04, the date upon which the TPR petition was filed.⁸ With regard to the allegations of failure to achieve rehabilitation, no on-going parent-child relationship and failure to achieve rehabilitation with a prior termination brought against the respondent parents, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial.⁹ Upon review, the court has determined by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exist as to both respondent parents.

7 "Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the four grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in [§ 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds."(Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn.App. 102.

8 Practice Book Sec. 35a-7 generally provides that "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment."

9 "Despite Practice Book § 33-3(a) and case law regarding termination proceedings generally, we have determined that with regard to termination petitions brought under § 17a-112(c)(3)(B), the trial court may, in the adjudicatory phase, properly consider facts and events that occur after the filing date of the petition in determining whether a respondent has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of that statute. See In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, ( 763 A.2d 83) (2000)." In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 763 A.2d 1024 (2002). Events occurring after the date of the filing of the TPR petition are particularly relevant to the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230. As to no on-going parent-child relationship, with regard to the allegations of no on-going parent/child relationship, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial for adjudicatory purposes. See Practice Book § 35a-7 (commentary).

LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing that such efforts are not appropriate."¹⁰ § 17a-112(j)(1). In this context, "[r]easonableness is an objective standard and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn.App. 547.; see also In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2002).

10 "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 245, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., supra, 53 Conn.App. 372. Only "reasonable" efforts are required as "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).

In this case, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent parents and to maintain contact with the respondent parents.

The clear and convincing evidence presented in this case indicates that Derrick was incarceratedduring part of this case.

The State proved by clear and convincing evidence that DCF offered to provide or provided the following services to the respondent mother Ayesha or that the following services were provided to her by other agencies:

DCF: Case management services Transportation

Visitation

Psychological evaluations with Dr. Cohen

Psychiatric evaluations with Dr. Lepp

Referrals for substance abuse evaluation and treatment at PR and CR parenting classes

anger management classes

Referrals for inpatient substance abuse evaluation and treatment at McDonough House and CVH were made by PR

Anger management, parenting and psychiatric services have been made available through PR

Anger management treatment and individual counseling were made available through FCA

The State proved by clear and convincing evidence that DCF offered to provide or provided the following services to the respondent father Derrick or that the following services were provided to him by other agencies:

DCF: Case management services

Transportation

Visitation

Psychological evaluation with Dr. Cohen

Referrals for substance abuse evaluation and treatment at CR

Counseling services at FCA

The court would also note that, pursuant to C.G.S. § 18-81, the Commissioner of Correction, not DCF, is responsible for providing "treatment, vocational and academic education" programs to individuals such as Derrick when they are incarcerated.

DCF fulfilled its obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify Derrick with his daughter when he was incarcerated by providing practicable and appropriate visitation at his place of incarceration.¹¹ See In re Roshawn R., supra, 51 Conn.App. 56-57. Obviously, DCF was unable to provide additional services while Derrick was in custody of DOC.

11 Generally, while a respondent parent is imprisoned, DCF is effectively excused from providing reunification services other than visitation. See In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56-57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1995). For a review of Superior Court cases applying this rule see In re Destiny Q., Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, Child Protection Session, Docket No. U06-CP98-002230-A (November 19, 2001, Levi, J.).

Based on the clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances present in this case, the court finds that both Ayesha and Derrick are still unable to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). Ayesha has yet to demonstrate any lasting sobriety or more than marginal insight into her substance abuse, while Derrick refused to undergo any substance abuse treatment. Their serious substance abuse issues, as well as Derrick's criminal recidivism and its concomitant periods of incarceration, have prevented either respondent parent from establishing a record in the community regarding their individual abilities to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. In re Amelia W., 62 Conn.App. 500, 506, 772 A.2d 619 (2001); see In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 350, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002).

The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that further efforts at reunification would no longer be appropriate for either of the respondent parents with regard to DaJiahonna.

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite each respondent parent with their child.¹² In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn.App. 547; see also In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 480-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001).

12 "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariah S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 255. Only "reasonable" efforts are required because "[i]t's axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.) In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 476.

At the time of the issuance of the OTC on 8/1/02 in SCJM (Mottolese, Sr. J.), the court found that DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from her home.

Based on the clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances present in this case, the court finds that each of the respondent parents are either unwilling and/or unable to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. § 17a-112(j)(1). In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348.

This court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that further efforts at reunification would no longer be appropriate for either respondent parent with regard to DaJiahonna.

STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION AS To AYESHA PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE-CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)

The petitioner State of Connecticut and DCF alleges that Ayesha's parental rights should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).¹³ As DaJianhonna has been adjudicated neglected, the critical issue for this court is whether this respondent has achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render her able to care for the child. Applying the requisite legal standards,¹⁴ and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of CGS § 17a-112(p),¹⁵ the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

13 CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to the parent of a child who "(i) has been found by the . . . Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the paint pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child."

14 "Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112) refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court . . . to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 573 (1999). "[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77(2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).

15 Section 17a-112(p) establishes that the provisions of CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) "shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Ayesha has yet to achieve a sufficient "level of rehabilitation . . . which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her child's lives]." In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. See In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665. First, the credible evidence in this case, presented through the TPR social study, exhibits and witnesses' testimony at the TPR trial clearly and convincingly establishes that Ayesha has not achieved CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. The court credits the DCF reports and the testimony which showed that Ayesha has been unable to achieve her rehabilitation.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha's issues are those of substance abuse, mental health, anger management, domestic violence and parenting deficits.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that specific steps were originally ordered for Ayesha ex parte at the time of the issuance of the OTC on 8/1/03. (Mottolese, Sr. J.) On 8/6/03 in SCJM (Mottolese, Sr. J.), preliminary steps were issued for the respondent mother and she signed them on the same date.

Keep all appointments set by or with the Department. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced and unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has essentially complied with this step.

Keep child's whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney, and the attorney for the child.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has complied with this step.

Participate in parenting, individual and family counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha did complete parenting and anger management programs at PR. However, Ayesha failed to complete substance abuse treatment at PR and CR. She also failed to schedule an intake evaluation at FCA for individual counseling.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF

The clear and convincing evidence shows that in-home support services were not offered to Ayesha as DaJiahonna was placed in care on 7/31/03. Due to Ayesha's lack of progress with treatment services, DCF did not refer her for in-home support services in reference to the reunification program.

Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha failed to complete this step. DCF referred Ayesha to Project Reward (PR) for substance abuse treatment, anger management counseling and parenting classes shortly after DaJiahonna was taken into custody. She participated in a substance abuse assessment there on 8/18/03. At that time, Ayesha denied being an alcoholic or a drug addict. She admitted past cocaine use but indicated that she could "stop whenever I want to." PR diagnosed her as being alcohol and cocaine dependent and recommended on-going treatment and Ayesha began intensive outpatient treatment there on 8/22/03.

Ayesha was not compliant with substance abuse treatment at PR. She failed to attend the program as required on 9/4/03, 9/9/03, 9/31/03, 10/16/03, 11/3/03, 12/2/03, 12/4/03 and 12/5/03. She failed to attend PR as required 3 times in 1/04.

In 2/04 and 3/04, her attendance improved with only 1 unexcused absence. However, she was suspended from the program from 3/15/04 through 3/26/04 due to a positive screen for alcohol on 3/5/04.

Ayesha failed to attend the program as required on 4/26/04, 5/25/04, 6/1/04, 6/11/04, 7/29/04 and 7/30/04.

While in PR, Ayesha continued to abuse substances. She tested positive for PCP as follows:

8/18/03, 8/21/03, 8/25/03, 8/28/03, 9/3/03, 9/5/03, 9/8/03, 9/11/03, 9/15/03, 9/18/03, 9/22/03, 10/14/03, 10/16/03, 10/20/03, 10/27/03, 10/28/03, 11/6/03, 11/7/03, 11/10/03, 11/14/03, 11/17/03, 11/20/03, 11/21/03, 11/24/03, 12/1/03, 12/18/03, 12/19/03 12/22/03, 1/8/04, 1/9/04, 1/12/04, 1/26/04, 1/27/04, 1/29/04, 1/30/04, 2/2/04, 2/3/04, 2/5/04, 2/9/04, 2/13/04, 2/17/04.

Ayesha submitted a hair sample on 3/12/04 that tested positive for PCP.

On 12/5/03, Ayesha denied PCP use, but admitted alcohol use. Subsequently, she admitted using both on New Year's Eve.

Ayesha tested positive for cocaine on 9/15/03 and 9/18/03. She tested positive for alcohol on 10/3/03, 11/7/03, 11/17/03, 11/24/03, 3/5/04, 5/21/04 and 7/27/04.

In 1/04, PR recommended that Ayesha go to inpatient substance abuse treatment. At the time, she agreed, and completed intakes at both Connecticut Valley Hospital (CVH) and McDonough House. She failed to follow up and had to repeat the intake process at both places on 1/26/04. By 2/13/04, she had indicated that she would not attend inpatient treatment, claiming that she would lose her apartment as a result. However, she also refused to allow DCF, McDonough House or PR to assist her in maintaining her housing while in inpatient treatment. At trial, Ayesha's testimony confirmed both.

Ayesha was referred by PR for a psychiatric evaluation by Family and Children's Agency (FCA) on 12/10/03 but failed to attend it. She was re-referred and attended the evaluation on 3/3/04. Dr. Lepp indicated that Ayesha smelled of alcohol and described her insight and judgment as being impaired by her apparently still somewhat intoxicated state. He further opined that the results of the evaluation were inconclusive at best as a result of her apparently being "hung-over."

On 3/8/04, PR confronted Ayesha with the information concerning alcohol use by Dr. Lepp, which she denied. On 3/12/04, she admitted drinking alcohol 3 times during the past week. As a result, PR suspended her from the program for 2 weeks.

On 9/2/04, PR discharged Ayesha from their care, indicating that she had received all the benefits that she could from PR. She was referred to outpatient treatment at CR.

On 9/7/04, Ayesha underwent an intake assessment at CR, where she was diagnosed with alcohol abuse and PCP abuse and placed into outpatient treatment. At the time of her intake, Ayesha submitted to a hair test which was positive for cocaine and benzoylecgonine. A urine test done at the same time was negative.

Ayesha failed to attend groups as required, as of 11/04. She indicated that she was having employment and transportation problems. DCF responded by providing her with bus tokens. She also failed to submit to a hair test at CR in 12/04.

In 1/05, DCP referred Ayesha to FCA for individual counseling. However, Ayesha failed to make an appointment for an intake assessment with them. At trial, Ayesha testified that she had failed to do so because she had forgotten. She testified that she had called FCA on the day prior to her testimony and had been placed on the waiting list there. She also testified that she had an appointment with CR for the day after her testimony to return to group therapy.

Submit to random drug testing: time and method of the testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha failed to complete this step. As a result of her failure to attend PR and CR as required, Ayesha was not able to undergo random drug testing by these agencies.

Ayesha also failed to submit to a hair test in 12/04, due to her failure to attend CR.

Submit to recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment:

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha failed to complete much of this step. As indicated above in previous specific steps and incorporated therein, she failed to comply with substance abuse treatment at PR and CR. She failed to attend as required. She continued to test positive for illegal substances and alcohol when she chose to attend. As a result of these absences, Ayesha was not able to undergo random drug testing by these agencies.

Ayesha failed to submit to inpatient substance abuse treatment at either CVH or McDonough House.

Ayesha was referred by PR for a psychiatric evaluation by Family and Children's Agency (FCA) on 12/10/03 but failed to attended it. She was re-referred and attended the evaluation on 3/3/04. Dr. Lepp indicated that Ayesha smelled of alcohol and described her insight and judgment as being impaired by her apparently still somewhat intoxicated state. He further opined that the results of the evaluation were inconclusive at best as a result of her apparently being "hung-over."

In 1/05, DCF referred Ayesha to FCA for individual counseling. However, Ayesha failed to make an appointment for an intake assessment with them. At trial, Ayesha testified that she had failed to do so because she had forgotten.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha did complete parenting and anger management programs at PR.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that in-home support services were not offered to Ayesha as DaJiahonna was placed in care on 7/31/03. Due to Ayesha's lack of progress with treatment services, DCF did not refer her for in-home support services in reference to the reunification program.

Obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents.

There was no clear and convincing evidence that DCF sought information that a restraining or protective order has been sought by respondent parent.

Sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation, and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before this court.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has complied with this specific step.

Secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has been residing in an apartment in Monterey Village in Norwalk. She receives housing assistance. At the time of trial, she indicated that she was involved in temporary employment.

No substance abuse.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has failed to comply with this specific step. As indicated above in previous specific steps and incorporated therein, she regularly abused PCP, alcohol and cocaine. This was indicated by random testing, hair tests and her own admissions.

No involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system. Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Ayesha has failed to comply with this step. As indicated above in previous specific steps and incorporated therein, she regularly abused PCP and cocaine. This was indicated by random testing, hair tests and her own admissions. The possession of these substances violated Connecticut law.

Consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical, or emotional needs, including, but not limited to, keeping the child's appointments with her medical, psychological, psychiatric, or educational providers.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Make all necessary child-care arrangements insuring that the child is adequately supervised and cared for by appropriate caretakers.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has complied with this specific step.

Maintain the child within the State of Connecticut during the duration of this order except for temporary travel out of state with the authorization of DCF or the court in advance.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Visit the child as often as DCF permits and display appropriate parent/child interaction.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has complied with this specific step.

The clear and convincing evidence produced in this case shows that Ayesha has a long history of substance abuse. She admitted using alcohol at age 16. She has also abused cocaine, PCP and marijuana. At the time DCF took DaJiahonna into care, Ayesha had been using alcohol. Her older children reported that she had been physically abusing them.

Despite being in 2 different treatment programs during the pendency of this case, Ayesha has failed to maintain sobriety for more than 2 months. She has failed to maintain treatment with either agency consistently. She has continued to test positive for substances throughout the pendency of this case.

Ayesha was referred to inpatient substance abuse treatment by PR, but she refused to attend, claiming housing problems. Unfortunately, the net effect of her decision was to place more value on her apartment than on her daughter.

This court concludes by clear and convincing evidence that Ayesha has not corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment of her child. The clear and convincing evidence reveals that from 11/5/03 and continuing through the time of trial, Ayesha has not been available to take part in her child's life, and based on her substance abuse, mental health issues and parenting deficits, she will never be consistently available for DaJiahonna. It is clearly and convincingly evident that Ayesha has been primarily occupied with substance abuse issues for most of her child's life.

Even if Ayesha was finally capable of realizing and correcting her problems, it would be exceedingly rash to expect her to be able to parent her daughter at any time in the near future. She has various referrals and programs that she would need to successfully complete. She would need to establish herself in the community and demonstrate, over a substantial period of time, that she has, in fact, conquered the demons which have plagued her. She would have to obtain adequate employment, approved daycare and an appreciation of safe, responsible and nurturing parenting skills before reunification could be contemplated. Most importantly, she would have to show an extended period of sobriety. Dr. Cohen indicated that all of this would take at least 1 year. Unfortunately, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DaJiahonna's needs for permanence and stability would not allow for this.

When one considers the level of care, patience and discipline that young children require from their caregivers, it is patently clear that Ayesha is not in a better position to parent DaJiahonna now than she was at any other time in these proceedings, and that she remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent her. Effectively, she was no better able "to resume the responsibilities of parenting at the time of filing the termination petition than [she] had been at the time of the [child's] commitment." In re Hector L., supra, CT Page 6585 53 Conn.App. 367. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001) ("[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by the department"); see also In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 125, 614 A.2d 832 (1992); In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 206, 504 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 908, 508 A.2d 770 (1986).

Although the record indicates that Ayesha commenced substance abuse treatment during the pendency of this case, she has continued to abuse substances. The benefits that she has received from such treatment have been fleeting. Her long history of substance abuse shows few verifiable signs of amelioration.

Given the age, sensibility, needs and special needs of the child involved, and given Ayesha's past failure and present failure to correct her deviancies, it would be unreasonable to conclude that she will be able to achieve rehabilitation from her various issues so as to be able to serve as a safe, responsible and nurturing parent within a reasonable time.

DaJiahonna needs a parent who is able to effectively care for her now. She cannot wait for the remote possibility that Ayesha might eschew substance abuse, domestic violence, parenting deficits and poor choices in companionship and acquire sufficient parenting ability to care for her one day. DaJiahonna cannot wait for her mother to show that she has rehabilitated herself and is ready to assume her parental role. It is fundamental that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved that Ayesha has failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).

DaJiahonna is 22 months. She has been in foster care since she was almost 3 months old. She has been in the same pre-adoptive foster home since 10/18/04.

Based on all the facts presented in this case, the court finds that ascertaining whether Ayesha is capable of rehabilitating is not foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 353. In reaching this conclusion, the court has analyzed Ayesha's past failures at personal rehabilitation and her parenting deficits as they relates to her child's need for a safe, responsible and nurturing parent who can meet her requirements and needs for emotional stability, security, and consistency.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow Ayesha further time to rehabilitate herself, if that were possible, and assume a responsible position in the lives of the child would not be in the best interests of DaJiahonna.

LACK OF ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)

The State has alleged that there is no on-going parent/child relationship between Ayesha and DaJiahonna. This means that, based on the evidence produced, that the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child, has not been established, and to allow further time for the establishment of such parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child, pursuant to CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).¹⁶ Applying the requisite legal standards,¹⁷ and complying with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the respondent mother.

16 § 117a-112(j)(3)(D) provides for the termination of parental rights "where there are no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child."

17 § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) ". . . requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 601-02, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999).
With regard to the allegations of no on-going parent/child relationship, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial for adjudicatory purposes. See Practice Book § 35a-7 (commentary).

The clear and convincing evidence presented indicates the following;

Ayesha has not provided any care for DaJiahonna since 7/31/03.

Ayesha has visited with the child 33 times from 8/28/03 through 2/4/05.

She has been unable to adjust her circumstances to allow for her child to be returned to her care.

The credible evidence indicates that, during visits with Ayesha, DaJiahonna was usually happy to see Ayesha and looked forward to visits. Although DaJiahonna left visits easily without crying, DCF social worker Losquadro testified that she was affectionate with Ayesha and that there were positive interactions both ways.

Dr. Cohen evaluated the child and the parents in 8/04. In his report, he opined:

The child, [DaJiahonna] is still [too] young to verbalize her relationship with her two parents. This must be inferred from observational status with them. During the brief one hour observation of the child with each parent, DaJiahonna has a poor attachment with each parent. This may in part be due to some type of developmental weaknesses by DaJiahonna and also the limited contact she has with each parent vs. her everyday caregivers. Certainly, Ayesha attempts to make a very positive and joyful experience for her daughter but their ability to share mutual experiences and remain interactive is very limited.

Dr. Cohen also noted that DaJiahonna had limited attachment skills.

At trial, Dr. Cohen testified that there was an extremely limited relationship between Ayesha and DaJiahonna with poor interaction between parent and child. He further described the parent-child relationship as weak.

In re Megan M., 24 Conn.App. 338, 341-42, 588 A.2d 239 (1991), the Appellate Court set forth the test for no going relationship:

The statutory criteria set forth in CGS § 17-43a must be satisfied before a termination of parental rights can be accomplished. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 163, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). CGS § 17-43a(b)(4) provided for the termination of parental rights if, upon clear and convincing evidence, it is proven that no ongoing parent-child relationship has existed in excess of one year, and requires the court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. "First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists; and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interests to allow time for such a relationship to develop." In re Juvenile Appeal (84-3), 1 Conn.App. 463, 479, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193 Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984).

The statutory term "no ongoing parent-child relationship" has been interpreted "to contemplate a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitely lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). In addition, the mere fact that there has been some minimal contact between the parent and the child does not require a determination that an ongoing parent-child relationship has existed in excess of one year. In re Juvenile Appeal, 181 Conn. 638, 646, 436 A.2d 290 (1980). In determining whether there is an ongoing parent-child relationship, the court should consider the feelings of the child toward the parent, especially if those feelings are positive rather than negative. See In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 709, 483 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487 A.2d 564 (1985).

Based upon the clear and convincing evidence produced, the court finds that there exists a parent-child relationship between Ayesha and DaJiahonna, though it is a weak and limited one. In view of the testimony of DCF social worker Losquadro, the State has failed to prove that DaJiahonna has no present and positive memories of her mother. Furthermore, there was no evidence adduced showing that DaJiahonna did not seek comfort from Ayesha or go to her to have her needs met during visitation. The court must draw this conclusion based upon the circumstances set forth in the clear and convincing evidence, because DaJiahonna is unable to express herself.

Due to the State having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no parent-child relationship exists between Ayesha and DaJiahonna, the court need not address the 2nd prong of the required analysis.

PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE BY A PARENT WITH A PREVIOUS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS § 17a-112(j)(3)(E)

The petitioner next alleges that both Ayesha's parental rights should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B), the child in question is under 7 years of age and Ayesha has had her parental rights previously terminated as to at least one other child.¹⁸ Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

18 As amended, CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court where: "(E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families."

The court incorporates by reference its comments and findings previously made in its rulings concerning Ayesha's failure to rehabilitate, above. As DaJiahonna has been adjudicated neglected and the respondent mother has been found to have failed to rehabilitate herself within the meaning of the statute, the critical issues for this court is whether Ayesha has had her parental rights previously terminated in regards to at least one other child, specifically James and whether DaJiahonna is under 7 years of age.

In support of this ground, the State submitted into evidence the TPR social study for this case and the TPR social study for James, filed in SCJM on 6/14/96. This indicates that Ayesha's parental rights were terminated in SCJM as to James on 1/15/98.

Finally, Ayesha testified that her parental rights to James had been terminated.

DaJiahonna was born on 5/2/03, making her 23 months old.

Therefore, the court finds that the State and DCF have shown by clear and convincing evidence that Ayesha has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B), the child in question is under 7 years of age and Ayesha has had her parental rights previously terminated as to at least one other child.

STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION AS TO DERRICK ABANDONMENT-CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)

The petitioner first alleges that Derrick abandoned his daughter DaJiahonna, within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).¹⁹ In the absence of evidence to the contrary, applying the requisite legal standards²⁰ and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.

19 CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) provides for the termination of parental rights where "[t]he child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child."

20 "Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct . . . CGS [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(A)] defines abandonment as the fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare . . . Section 17a-112(b)(1) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . The commonly understood obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes; "(1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care: (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.'" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 185, 193, 763 A.2d 37 (2000).

The clear and convincing evidence related to Derrick's conduct reveals that from 11/5/03 through 3/10/04, the respondent father failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193. He has seen DaJiahonna only 7 times since she was placed in foster care on 7/31/03. Prior to the filing of the TPR petition, Derrick has never consistently contacted DCF to show concern for her.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that, for much of DaJiahonna's young life, Derrick has been incarcerated, as a result of his criminal undertakings and/or his proclivity to violate the conditions of his probation.

DaJiahonna was born on 5/2/03. Derrick had been placed on probation the previous month on the charges of Possession of Narcotics and Failure to Appear in the 1st Degree. By the time DaJiahonna been taken into DCF care, Derrick had already violated the conditions of his probation by failing to go to CR for a substance abuse evaluation, by failing to report to the probation officer, by submitting a drug test positive for cocaine, by failing to comply with the Alternative Incarceration Center (AIC) and by admitting to the use of cocaine. At the time of DaJiahonna's adjudication on 11/5/03, Derrick was in the custody of DOC. On 12/11/03, he was sentenced to a total effective jail term of 1 year for Use of a Motor Vehicle Without the Owner's Permission and Violation of Probation. He was released from the custody of DOC on 9/10/04.

Derrick has been either in jail or on probation for most of his daughter's life. This deplorable fact is clearly a result of his own actions. Even after being placed on probation, Derrick repeatedly violated the conditions of his probation and became involved in new crimes, resulting in his reincarceration. The concomitant effects upon his parent-child relationship are totally due to his actions alone. Had he forsworn criminal acts or recidivism, he would have been at liberty to cultivate an appropriate parent-child relationship with DaJiahonna.

Furthermore, the clear and convincing evidence shows that, since his daughter has been in foster care, Derrick has shown a minimum of interest in her health or her welfare. The credible evidence shows that Derrick has failed to maintain contact with DCF and has not inquired as to the child's well-being. The evidence indicates that Derrick failed to maintain contact with DCF from 7/31/03 through 10/23/03, after he had been incarcerated.

Subsequent to his release on 9/10/04, Derrick again failed to maintain contact with DCF despite DCF's best attempts to contact him for services, etc. DCF was able to speak to him by telephone once, in 10/4. He agreed to meet with DCF social worker Losquadro, but subsequently failed to attend the appointment. Losquado testified at trial that she saw Derrick when he unexpectedly appeared with Ayesha for a visit on 2/4/05. Losquadro informed him of the TPR trial date and offered to assist him with transportation to CPS. Derrick failed to appear for the TPR trial.

DCF sent Derrick at least 1 letter in 10/04 in an attempt to establish contact with him and to offer him visits with DaJiahonna.

Based upon all of the above, the clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of his child.

When the adjudicatory date of 11/5/03 is applied, the evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that Derrick has failed the test of meeting "[t]he commonly understood obligations of parenthood" identified by In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193. The test in this case is twofold; 1) whether the respondent father could refrain from returning himself to jail due to criminal recidivism and, 2) while at liberty, what level of interest, if any, he took in his daughter. The clear and convincing evidence sets forth his failure at both prongs. Accordingly, based on clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has met its burden of proving that Derrick has abandoned DaJiahonna within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).

PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE-CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)

The petitioner State of Connecticut and DCF alleges that Derrick's parental rights should be terminated because he has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As DaJiahonna has been adjudicated neglected, the critical issue for this court is whether this respondent has achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render him able to care for the child. Applying the requisite legal standards, and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of CGS § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Derrick has yet to achieve a sufficient "level of rehabilitation . . . which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his child's lives]." In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. See In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 339; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665. First, the credible evidence in this case, presented through the TPR social study, exhibits and witnesses' testimony at the TPR trial clearly and convincingly establishes that Derrick has not achieved CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. The court credits the DCF reports and the testimony which showed that Derrick has been unable to achieve his rehabilitation.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick's issues are those of criminal recidivism, substance abuse, domestic violence, and parenting deficits.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that specific steps were originally ordered for Derrick ex parte, at the time of the issuance of the OTC on 8/1/03. (Mottolese, Sr. J.)

Keep all appointments set by or with the Department. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced and unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step.

Keep child's whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney, and the attorney for the child.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step.

Participate in parenting, individual and family counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step. He failed to maintain contact with DCF so as to be able to participate in referrals.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF

The clear and convincing evidence shows that in-home support services were not offered to Derrick as DaJiahonna was placed in care on 7/31/03.

Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step. He failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation at CR on 8/5/03. He failed to maintain contact with DCF so as to be able to participate in referrals.

Submit to random drug testing: time and method of the testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step. He failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation at CR on 8/5/03. He failed to maintain contact with DCF so as to be able to participate in referrals.

Submit to recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step. He failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation at CR on 8/5/03. He failed to maintain contact with DCF so as to be able to participate in referrals.

Additionally, while incarcerated, Derrick failed to take advantage of any DOC substance abuse programs.

Obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents.

There was no clear and convincing evidence that DCF sought information that a restraining or protective order has been sought by respondent parent.

Sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation, and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before this court.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with referrals to service providers; therefore, DCF does not have releases signed by him to communicate with said providers.

Secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to provide DCF with information as to his housing and income.

No substance abuse.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to attend the 8/5/03 substance abuse evaluation at CR; hence DCF was unable to ascertain compliance with this step.

No involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system. Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Derrick has failed to comply with this step.

He was arrested by the Norwalk Police Department on 9/10/03 on a charge of Larceny in the Third Degree. The incident occurred on the same date. On 12/11/03 in Superior Court, Geographical Area Twenty, Norwalk, he was sentenced to a total effective jail term of 1 year for Use of a Motor Vehicle Without the Owner's Permission and Violation of Probation.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Derrick failed to comply with probation. Subsequent to the issuance of the specific steps, Derrick failed to report to the probation officer as directed, failed to submit to the 8/5/03 DCF-referred substance abuse evaluation at CR and failed to supply verification of substance abuse treatment.

Consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical, or emotional needs, including, but not limited to, keeping the child's appointments with her medical, psychological, psychiatric, or educational providers.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Make all necessary child-care arrangements insuring that the child is adequately supervised and cared for by appropriate caretakers.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to insure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to provide DCF with information as to his housing and income.

Maintain the child within the State of Connecticut during the duration of this order except for temporary travel out of state with the authorization of DCF or the court in advance.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Visit the child as often as DCF permits and display appropriate parent/child interaction.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this specific step.

While in custody, Derrick was offered monthly visits, but only visited 5 times. After his release from DOC on 9/10/04, Derrick failed to contact DCF to schedule visits with DaJiahonna. Derrick saw his daughter during the interactional evaluation with Dr. Cohen on 9/11/04 and only visited her once afterwards, on 2/4/05 with Ayesha.

This court concludes by clear and convincing evidence that Derrick has not corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment of his child. The clear and convincing evidence reveals that from 11/5/03 and continuing through the time of trial, Derrick has not been available to take part in his child's life, and based on his criminal recidivism, substance abuse, domestic violence, and parenting deficits, he will never be consistently available for DaJiahonna. It is clearly and convincingly evident that Derrick has been primarily occupied with substance abuse issues and criminal justice involvement for most of his child's life.

Even if Derrick was finally capable of realizing and correcting his deficiencies, it would be exceedingly rash to expect him to be able to parent his daughter at any time in the near future. He would have various referrals and programs that he would need to successfully complete. He would need to establish himself in the community and show, over a substantial period of time that he has, in fact, overcome a lifetime of serious problems which have led to substantial dysfunction. He would have to obtain adequate employment, approved daycare and an appreciation of safe, responsible and nurturing parenting skills before reunification could be contemplated. Most importantly, he would have to show an extended period of sobriety and appropriate citizenship. Unfortunately, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DaJiahonna's needs for permanence and stability would not allow for this time.

When one considers the level of care, patience and discipline that young children require from their caregivers, it is patently clear that Derrick is not in a better position to parent DaJiahonna now than he was at any other time in these proceedings and remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent her. Effectively, he was no better able "to resume the responsibilities of parenting at the time of filing the termination petition than [he] had been at the time of the [child's] commitment." In re Hector L., supra, 53 Conn.App. 367. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001) ("[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by the department"); see also In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 125; In re Maligdalia M., supra, 6 Conn.App. 206.

The record indicates that Derrick has failed to comply with any substance abuse treatment or any referrals during the pendency of this case. While incarcerated, he has failed to comply with DOC regulations.

Given the age, sensibility, needs and special needs of the child involved, and given Derrick's past failure and present failure to correct his deviancies, it would be unreasonable to conclude that he will be able to achieve rehabilitation from his various issues so as to be able to serve as a safe, responsible and nurturing parent within a reasonable time.

DaJiahonna needs a parent who is able to effectively care for her now. She cannot wait for the remote possibility that Derrick might eschew criminal recidivism, substance abuse, domestic violence, and parenting deficits and acquire sufficient parenting ability to care for her one day. DaJiahonna cannot wait for her father to show that he has rehabilitated himself and is ready to assume his parental role. It is fundamental that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent improved [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved that Derrick has failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to C.G.S § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).

DaJiahonna is 23 months old. She has been in foster care since she was almost 3 months old. She has been in the same pre-adoptive foster home since 10/18/04

Based on all the facts presented in this case, the court finds that ascertaining whether Derrick is capable of rehabilitating is not foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 353. In reaching this conclusion, the court has analyzed Derrick's past failures at compliance with substance abuse treatment and other personal rehabilitation measures and his parenting deficits as they relate to his child's need for a safe, responsible and nurturing parent who can meet her requirements and needs for emotional stability, security, and consistency.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow Derrick further time to rehabilitate himself, if that were possible, and assume a responsible position in the life of the child, would not be in the best interests of DaJiahonna.

LACK OF ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP-CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)

The State has alleged that there is no on-going parent/child relationship between Derrick and DaJiahonna. This means that, based on the evidence produced, the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child has not been established and to allow further time for the establishment of such parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child, pursuant to CGS § 17a-112(c)(3)(D). Applying the requisite legal standards, and complying with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the respondent father.

The clear and convincing evidence presented indicates the following;

The court incorporates, by reference, the abandonment findings set forth in previous parts of this decision.

Derrick has not provided care for his child since 7/31/03, nor has he ever provided regular, consistent care for her since then.

Since 7/31/03, Derrick played little if any role in his child's life, whether incarcerated or at liberty.

He has been unable and/or unwilling to adjust his circumstances to allow for his child to be returned to his care in that he failed to cooperate with DCF and he refused to eschew a life of wrongdoing and criminal recidivism so as to be available for DaJiahonna.

The credible evidence indicates that, during 2 of the 6 visits with Derrick, DaJiahonna initially cried before interactions became appropriate. During the 8/31/04 visit, DaJiahonna initially would not go near or look at Derrick. DaJiahonna left visits with Derrick easily without crying.

Dr. Cohen evaluated the child and the parents in 8/04. In his report, he opined:

The child, [DaJiahonna] is still [too] young to verbalize her relationship with her two parents. This must be inferred from observational status with them. During the brief one hour observation of the child with each parent, DaJiahonna has a poor attachment with each parent. This may in part be due to some type of developmental weaknesses by DaJiahonna and also the limited contact she has with each parent vs. her everyday caregivers. Certainly, Ayesha attempts to make a very positive and joyful experience for her daughter but their ability to share mutual experiences and remain interactive is very limited.

Dr. Cohen also noted that DaJiahonna had limited attachment skills.

At trial, Dr. Cohen testified that there was an extremely limited relationship between Derrick and DaJiahonna with poor interaction between parent and child. He further described the parent-child relationship as weak.

In re Megan M., 24 Conn.App. 338, 341-42, 588 A.2d 239 (1991), the Appellate Court set forth the test for no going relationship:

The statutory criteria set forth in CGS § 17-43a must be satisfied before a termination of parental rights can be accomplished. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 163, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). CGS § 17-43a(b)(4) provided for the termination of parental rights if upon clear and convincing evidence, it is proven that no ongoing parent-child relationship has existed in excess of one year, and requires the court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. "First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists; and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interests to allow time for such a relationship to develop." In re Juvenile Appeal (84-3), supra, 1 Conn.App. 479.

The statutory term "no ongoing parent-child relationship" has been interpreted "to contemplate a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitely lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). In addition, the mere fact that there has been some minimal contact between the parent and the child does not require a determination that an ongoing parent-child relationship has existed in excess of one year. In re Juvenile Appeal, supra, 181 Conn. 646. In determining whether there is an ongoing parent-child relationship, the court should consider the feelings of the child toward the parent, especially if those feelings are positive rather than negative. See In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), supra, 2 Conn.App. 709.

Based upon the clear and convincing evidence produced, the court finds that there exists a parent-child relationship between Derrick and DaJiahonna, though it is a weak and limited one. In view of the testimony of DCF social worker Losquadro, the State has failed to prove that DaJiahonna has no present and positive memories of her father. Furthermore, there was no evidence adduced showing that DaJiahonna did not seek comfort from Derrick or go to him to have her needs met during visitation. The court must draw this conclusion based upon the circumstances set forth in the clear and convincing evidence, because DaJiahonna is unable to express herself.

Due to the State having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no parent-child relationship exists between Derrick and DaJiahonna, the court need not address the 2nd prong of the required analysis.

DISPOSITION

As the court has concluded that statutory grounds for termination exist, it next "must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn.App. 103; see also In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511 and n15, 613 A.2d 478 (1992). In this dispositional phase the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events through the close of evidence. Practice Book § 35a-9.

SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS

The court has made each of the seven written factual findings required by CGS § 17a-112(k) based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented at trial, and has considered the evidence relevant to each of these findings in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. See In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 528.

TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — CGS § 17a-112(k)(1)

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has provided reasonable efforts in the past to reunify the child with the respondent mother Ayesha and the respondent father Derrick. Those services were ordered in a timely manner and were appropriate for the circumstances at hand.

The State proved by clear and convincing evidence that DCF offered to provide or provided the following services to the respondent mother Ayesha or that the following services were provided to her by other agencies:

DCF: Case management services Transportation

Visitation

Psychological evaluations with Dr. Cohen

Psychiatric evaluations with Dr. Lepp

Referrals for substance abuse evaluation and treatment at PR and CR parenting classes

Anger management classes

Referrals for inpatient substance abuse evaluation and treatment at McDonough House and CVH were made by PR

Anger management, parenting and psychiatric services have been made available though PR

Anger management treatment and individual counseling were made available through FCA

The State proved by clear and convincing evidence that DCF offered to provide or provided the following services to the respondent father Derrick or that the following services were provided to him by other agencies:

DCF: Case management services

Transportation

Visitation

Psychological evaluation with Dr. Cohen

Referrals for substance abuse evaluation and treatment at CR

Counseling services at FCA

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the respondent mother with her child, In re Antonio M., supra. 56 Conn.App. 547; see also In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn.App. 480-82.

At the time of the issuance of the OTC on 8/1/03 in SCJM (Mottolese, Sr. J.), the court found that DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from her home.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence in this matter that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with each of the respondent parents.

Based on the clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances present in this case, the court finds that each of the respondent parents is unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. § 17a-112(j)(1). In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348.

REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW-CGS § 17a-112(k)(2)

This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that both Ayesha and Derrick are presently unable and/or willing to benefit from such reunification services as are contemplated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence in this matter that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with each of the respondent parents.

Based on the clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances present in this case, the court finds that each of the respondent parents is unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. § 17a-112(j)(1). In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348.

COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS-CGS § 17a-112(k)(3)

The clear and convincing evidence shows that specific steps were originally ordered for Ayesha ex parte at the time of the issuance of the OTC on 8/1/03. (Mottolese, Sr. J.) On 8/6/03 in SCJM (Mottolese, Sr. J.), preliminary steps were issued for the respondent mother and she signed them.

Keep all appointments set by or with the Department. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced and unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has essentially complied with this step.

Keep child's whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney, and the attorney for the child.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has complied with this step.

Participate in parenting, individual and family counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha did complete parenting and anger management programs at PR. However, Ayesha failed to complete substance abuse treatment at PR and CR. She also failed to schedule an intake evaluation at FCA for individual counseling.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that in-home support services were not offered to Ayesha as DaJiahonna was placed in care on 7/31/03. Due to Ayesha's lack of progress with treatment services, DCF did not refer her for in-home support services in reference to the reunification program.

Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, including inpatient treatment, if necessary, aftercare, and relapse prevention.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha failed to complete this step. DCF referred Ayesha to Project Reward (PR) for substance abuse treatment, anger management counseling and parenting classes shortly after DaJiahonna was taken into custody. She participated in a substance abuse assessment there on 8/18/03. At that time, Ayesha denied being an alcoholic or a drug addict. She admitted past cocaine use but indicated that she could "stop whenever I want to." PR diagnosed her as being alcohol and cocaine dependent and recommended on-going treatment. Ayesha began intensive outpatient treatment at PR on 8/22/03.

Ayesha was not compliant with substance abuse treatment at PR. She failed to attend the program as required on 9/4/03, 9/9/03, 9/31/03, 10/16/03, 11/3/03, 12/2/03, 12/4/03 and 12/5/03. She failed to attend PR as required 3 times in 1/04.

In 2/04 and 3/04, her attendance improved with only 1 unexcused absence. However, she was suspended from the program from 3/15/04 through 3/26/04 due to a positive screen for alcohol on 3/5/04.

Ayesha failed to attend the program as required on 4/26/04, 5/25/04, 6/1/04, 6/11/04, 7/29/04 and 7/30/04.

While in PR, Ayesha continued to abuse substances. She tested positive for PCP as follows:

8/18/03, 8/21/03, 8/25/03, 8/28/03, 9/3/03, 9/5/03, 9/8/03, 9/11/03, 9/15/03, 9/18/03, 9/22/03, 10/14/03, 10/16/03, 10/20/03, 10/27/03, 10/28/03, 11/6/03, 11/7/03, 11/10/03, 11/14/03, 11/17/03, 11/20/03, 11/21/03, 11/24/03, 12/1/03, 12/18/03, 12/19/03, 12/22/03, 1/8/04, 1/9/04, 1/12/04, 1/26/04, 1/27/04, 1/29/04, 1/30/04, 2/2/04, 2/3/04, 2/5/04, 2/9/04, 2/13/04, 2/17/04,

Ayesha submitted a hair sample on 3/12/04 that tested positive for PCP.

On 12/5/03, Ayesha denied PCP use, but admitted alcohol use. Subsequently, she admitted using both on New Year's Eve.

Ayesha tested positive for cocaine on 9/15/03 and 9/18/03. She tested positive for alcohol on 10/3/03, 11/7/03, 11/17/03, 11/24/03, 3/5/04, 5/21/04 and 7/27/04.

In 1/04, PR recommended that Ayesha go to inpatient substance abuse treatment. At the time, she agreed, and completed intakes at both Connecticut Valley Hospital (CVH) and McDonough House. She failed to follow up and had to repeat the intake process at both places on 1/26/04. By 2/13/04, she had indicated that she would not attend inpatient treatment, claiming that she would lose her apartment as a result. However, she also refused to allow DCF, McDonough House or PR to assist her in maintaining her housing while in inpatient treatment. At trial, Ayesha's testimony confirmed both.

Ayesha was referred by PR for a psychiatric evaluation by Family and Children's Agency (FCA) on 12/10/03 but failed to attend it. She was re-referred and attended the evaluation on 3/3/04. Dr. Lepp indicated that Ayesha smelled of alcohol and described her insight and judgment as being impaired by her apparently still somewhat intoxicated state. He further opined that the results of the evaluation were inconclusive at best as a result of her apparently being "hung-over."

On 3/8/04, PR confronted Ayesha with the information concerning alcohol use by Dr. Lepp, which she denied. On 3/12/04, she admitted drinking alcohol 3 times during the past week. As a result, PR suspended her from the program for 2 weeks.

On 9/2/04, PR discharged Ayesha from their care, indicating that she had received all the benefits that she could from PR. She was referred to outpatient treatment at CR.

On 9/7/04, Ayesha underwent an intake assessment at CR, where she was diagnosed with alcohol abuse and PCP abuse and placed into outpatient treatment. At the time of her intake, Ayesha submitted to a hair test which was positive for cocaine and benzoylecgonine. A urine test done at the same time was negative.

Ayesha failed to attend groups as required, as of 11/04. She indicated that she was having employment and transportation problems. DCF responded by providing her with bus tokens. She also failed to submit to a hair test at CR in 12/04.

In 1/05, DCF referred Ayesha to FCA for individual counseling. However, Ayesha failed to make an appointment for an intake assessment with them. At trial, Ayesha testified that she had failed to do so because she had forgotten. She testified that she had called FCA on the day prior to her testimony and had been placed on the waiting list there. She also testified that she had an appointment with CR for the day after her testimony to return to group therapy.

Submit to random drug testing: time and method of the testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha failed to complete this step. As a result of her failure to attend PR and CR as required, Ayesha was not able to undergo random drug testing by these agencies.

Ayesha also failed to submit to a hair test in 12/04, due to her failure to attend CR.

Submit to recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha failed to complete much of this step. As indicated above in previous specific steps and incorporated therein, she failed to comply with substance abuse treatment at PR and CR. She failed to attend as required. She continued to test positive for illegal substances and alcohol when she chose to attend. As a result of these absences, Ayesha was not able to undergo random drug testing by these agencies.

Ayesha failed to submit to inpatient substance abuse treatment at either CVH or McDonough House.

Ayesha was referred by PR for a psychiatric evaluation by Family and Children's Agency (FCA) on 12/10/03 but failed to attend it. She was re-referred and attended the evaluation on 3/3/04. Dr. Lepp indicated that Ayesha smelled of alcohol and described her insight and judgment as being impaired by her apparently still somewhat intoxicated state. He further opined that the results of the evaluation were inconclusive at best as a result of her apparently being "hung-over."

In 1/05, DCF referred Ayesha to FCA for individual counseling. However, Ayesha failed to make an appointment for an intake assessment with them. At trial, Ayesha testified that she had failed to do so because she had forgotten.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha did complete parenting and anger management programs at PR.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that in-home support services were not offered to Ayesha as DaJiahonna was placed in care on 7/31/03. Due to Ayesha's lack of progress with treatment services, DCF did not refer her for in-home support services in reference to the reunification program.

Obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents.

There was no clear and convincing evidence that DCF sought information that a restraining or protective order has been sought by respondent parent.

Sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation, and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before this court.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has complied with this specific step.

Secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has been residing in an apartment in Monterey Village in Norwalk. She receives housing assistance. At the time of trial, she indicated that she was involved in temporary employment.

No substance abuse.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has failed to comply with this specific step. As indicated above in previous specific steps and incorporated therein, she regularly abused PCP, alcohol and cocaine. This was indicated by random testing, hair tests and her own admissions.

No involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system. Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Ayesha has failed to comply with this step. As indicated above in previous specific steps and incorporated therein, she regularly abused PCP and cocaine. This was indicated by random testing, hair tests and her own admissions. The possession of these substances violated Connecticut law.

Consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical, or emotional needs, including, but not limited to, keeping the child's appointments with her medical, psychological, psychiatric, or educational providers.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Make all necessary child-care arrangements insuring that the child is adequately supervised and cared for by appropriate caretakers.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has complied with this specific step.

Maintain the child within the State of Connecticut during the duration of this order except for temporary travel out of state with the authorization of DCF or the court in advance.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Visit the child as often as DCF permits and display appropriate parent/child interaction.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Ayesha has complied with this specific step.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that specific steps were originally ordered for Derrick ex parte, at the time of the issuance of the OTC on 8/1/03. (Mottolese, Sr. J.)

Keep all appointments set by or with the Department. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced and unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step.

Keep child's whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney, and the attorney for the child.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step.

Participate in parenting, individual and family counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step. He failed to maintain contact with DCF so as to be able to participate in referrals.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that in-home support services were not offered to Derrick as DaJiahonna was placed in care on 7/31/03.

Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step. He failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation at CR on 8/5/03. He failed to maintain contact with DCF so as to be able to participate in referrals.

Submit to random drug testing: time and method of the testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step. He failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation at CR on 8/5/03. He failed to maintain contact with DCF so as to be able to participate in referrals.

Submit to recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment:

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this step. He failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation at CR on 8/5/03. He failed to maintain contact with DCF so as to be able to participate in referrals.

Additionally, while incarcerated, Derrick failed to take advantage of any DOC substance abuse programs.

Obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents.

There was no clear and convincing evidence that DCF sought information that a restraining or protective order has been sought by respondent parent.

Sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation, and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before this court.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with referrals to service providers; therefore, DCF does not have releases signed by him to communicate with said providers.

Secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to provide DCF with information as to his housing and income.

No substance abuse.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to attend the 8/5/03 substance abuse evaluation at CR; hence DCF was unable to ascertain compliance with this step.

No involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system. Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Derrick has failed to comply with this step.

He was arrested by the Norwalk Police Department on 9/10/03 on a charge of Larceny in the Third Degree. The incident occurred on the same date. On 12/11/03 in Superior Court, Geographical Area Twenty, Norwalk, he was sentenced to a total effective jail term of 1 year for Use of a Motor Vehicle Without the Owner's Permission and Violation of Probation.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Derrick failed to comply with probation.

Subsequent to the issuance of the specific steps, Derrick failed to report to the probation officer as directed, failed to submit to the 8/5/03 DCF-referred substance abuse evaluation at CR and failed to supply verification of substance abuse treatment.

Consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical, or emotional needs, including, but not limited to, keeping the child's appointments with her medical, psychological, psychiatric, or educational providers.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Make all necessary child-care arrangements insuring that the child is adequately supervised and cared for by appropriate caretakers.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to provide DCF with information as to his housing and income.

Maintain the child within the State of Connecticut during the duration of this order except for temporary travel out of state with the authorization of DCF or the court in advance.

This step is not applicable as DaJiahonna has remained in DCF care since 7/31/03.

Visit the child as often as DCF permits and display appropriate parent/child interaction.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that Derrick has failed to comply with this specific step.

While in custody, Derrick was offered monthly visits, but only visited 5 times. After his release from DOC on 9/10/04, Derrick failed to contact DCF to schedule visits with DaJiahonna. Derrick saw his daughter during the interactional evaluation with Dr. Cohen on 9/11/04 and only visited her once afterwards, on 2/4/05 with Ayesha.

THE CHILD'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — CGS § 17a-112(k)(4)

The clear and convincing evidence produced at trial indicates that there exists a parent-child relationship between each of the respondent parents and with DaJiahonna, though it is a weak and limited one.

The credible evidence indicates that, during visits with Ayesha, DaJiahonna was usually happy to see Ayesha and looked forward to visits. Although DaJiahonna left visits easily without crying, DCF social worker Losquadro testified that she was affectionate with Ayesha and that there were positive interactions both ways.

The credible evidence indicates that, during 2 of the 6 visits with Derrick, DaJiahonna initially cried before interactions became appropriate. During the 8/31/04 visit, DaJiahonna initially would not go near or look at Derrick. DaJiahonna left visits with Derrick easily without crying.

Dr. Cohen evaluated the child and the parents in 8/04. In his report, he opined:

The child, [DaJiahonna] is still [too] young to verbalize her relationship with her two parents. This must be inferred from observational status with them. During the brief one-hour observation of the child with each parent, DaJiahonna has a poor attachment with each parent. This may in part be due to some type of developmental weaknesses by DaJiahonna and also the limited contact she has with each parent vs. her everyday caregivers. Certainly, Ayesha attempts to make a very positive and joyful experience for her daughter but their ability to share mutual experiences and remain interactive is very limited.

DaJiahonna calls both Ayesha and FM "mommy."

The clear and convincing evidence shows that DaJiahonna has bonded with FM. Under her care, DaJiahonna has made developmental progress.

The credible evidence shows that DaJiahonna looks to FM for guidance, support and to have her basic needs met.

AGE OF THE CHILD-CGS § 17a-112(k)(5)

DaJiahonna is 23 months old, having been born on 5/2/03.

PARENTS' EFFORTS TO ADJUST THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES — CGS § 17a-112(k)(6)

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither Ayesha nor Derrick have made realistic and sustained efforts to conform their conduct to acceptable parental standards. Despite having had DaJiahonna in foster care for virtually all of her young life, the respondent parents have still failed to adequately address their various issues. Although Ayesha has undertaken some referrals for treatment, the clear and convincing evidence, including her own testimony, shows that she has not completed any of them. She has continued substance abuse despite being in 2 different outpatient substance abuse programs. She refused to enter any inpatient substance abuse treatment. Substantially more treatment and counseling would be necessary before any possibility of considering her a safe, responsible and nurturing parent. Furthermore, Ayesha would have to cooperate and make progress, specifically not relapse, as she has frequently done and she would need to spend much time in the community remaining substance-free.

Derrick has done absolutely nothing towards addressing his issues. Neither DCF nor APO nor the fear of incarceration have had any effect in terms of causing Derrick to change his dissolute ways. The clear and convincing evidence shows that he has done nothing to change his circumstances so as to allow reunification with DaJiahonna.

Unfortunately, it is obvious that to allow further time for either Ayesha or Derrick to rehabilitate herself or himself would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.

EXTENT TO WHICH THE PARENTS WERE PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSETP WITH THE CHILD-CGS § 17a-112(k)(7) CT Page 6616

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, DOC, APO foster parents or third parties prevented either Ayesha or Derrick from maintaining a relationship with DaJiahonna, nor did the economic circumstances of each respondent parent prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system remained in effect.

BEST INTERESTS 0F THE CHILD-CGS § 17a-112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of the parental rights of either Ayesha or Derrick would be in DaJiahonna's best interests.²¹ Applying the appropriate legal standards²² to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.

21 The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, "by clear and convincing evidence . . . (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child."

22 "Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents . . . Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action. In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990)." (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000). "[T]he question . . . to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child. See Practice Book § 33-5." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.24 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 (2000).

In determining whether termination of either Ayesha or Derrick's parental rights would be in DaJiahonna's best interests, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including, the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment, her length of stay in foster care; the nature of her relationship with her foster parents and biological parents; and the degree of contact maintained with her biological parent or parents.²³ In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., supra, 55 Conn.App. 816. In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance DaJiahonna's intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with her biological parent or parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

23 "[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in DaJiahonna's best interests to continue to maintain any legal relationship with either Ayesha or Derrick.

Ayesha has an extensive history of substance abuse which includes alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, and PCP. Despite being referred to outpatient substance abuse treatment, she has failed to remain substance-free during the time DaJiahonna has been in DCF care. She has demonstrated a failure to comply with substance abuse treatment as evidenced by poor attendance and multiple testings that have been positive for illegal substances.

Ayesha's substance abuse treatment providers have recommended inpatient treatment; however Ayesha refused to undertake it despite the recommendations, her failure in outpatient treatment and the effect that refusing inpatient treatment would have on her child.

Ayesha has demonstrated a pattern of involving herself in relationships that involve domestic violence. The relationship between Ayesha and Derrick involved domestic violence and there was at least 1 episode which required the intervention of local law enforcement. Ayesha's daughter, Janiah, has also reported witnessing domestic violence between her mother and Derrick.

Ayesha has demonstrated a pattern of being physically abusive toward her children. She was incarcerated as a result of life-threatening injuries suffered by her son, James, when he was an infant and in her care. Ayesha's daughter, Janiah, also reported that she and her brother, James, were physically abused by Ayesha subsequent to her incarceration. Janiah's legal guardian has reported that Janiah has returned home with a bruise on her back after visiting with Ayesha.

In his report, Dr. Cohen opined that Ayesha "appears to lack insight regarding the depth of her history of problems or their contribution to her current difficulties with DCF," and that she "tends to minimize the significance of her substance abuse and its impact upon the lives of her children." Dr. Cohen goes on to report that there is "substantial impairment in her capacity for self control, a marked proclivity toward impulsiveness in what she thinks, says and does." At that time, Dr. Cohen recommends that DaJiahonna remain in care until Ayesha completed the Project Reward program and met all the criteria for recovery.

At trial, Dr. Cohen testified that Ayesha minimized the depth of her addiction to him. He also indicated that she lacked insight into the depth of her problems, including those with DCF. He felt that her minimization and lack of insight negatively affected the ability to treat Ayesha's substance abuse and increased the risk of relapses.

After having been qualified as an expert witness, Dr. Cohen opined that, based on Ayesha's failure to submit to substance abuse treatment at CR after the last evaluation, reunification between Ayesha and DaJiahonna was not possible.

In his 9/04 evaluation, Dr. Cohen gave the following diagnostic impressions concerning Ayesha:

Axis I. Alcohol Abuse, 305.00, in early remission PCP Abuse in remission Dysthymic disorder with anxiety, 300.4

Axis II. Self Defeating personality disorder with dependent features

Axis III. Overweight

Axis IV. Stressors are severe (Needs support of institutional programs, relapse)

Axis V. GAF= 60/65

He further opined that, if Ayesha failed to cooperate with treatment for depression and anxiety, then her prognosis was extremely poor and that she could not care for a small child as a result.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that, despite positive interactions between Ayesha and DaJiahonna, her chronic abuse, her failure to comply with treatment and her parenting deficits make it impossible for Ayesha to be able to be a safe, responsible and nurturing parent to DaJiahonna. Additionally, the clear and convincing evidence shows that, despite having received a jail sentence as a result of James' physical abuse, she was physically disciplining James and Janiah in an inappropriate manner.

Derrick has an extensive substance abuse and criminal history. The clear and convincing evidence shows that he has failed to cooperate with DCF in any way shape or manner. He has failed to undertake any referrals or rehabilitative treatment. He has failed to come to grips with any of his issues despite several opportunities to do so. He has abjectly refused to cooperate with DCF. He has failed to visit his daughter or take much interest in her and her wellbeing. He failed to appear at the TPR trial despite adequate notice. This speaks volumes as to his interest in his daughter, as well as his real level of care and concern for her.

Dr. Cohen also opined that there was not a good possibility that either Ayesha or Derrick could rehabilitate from their issues within a reasonable period of time so as to be able to parent DaJiahonna and that the prognosis for reunification was poor.

Ayesha and Derrick's individual performances clearly and convincingly show that both parents individually lack the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill a valid parental role. Their inability to remain sober and free from involvement with substances, their failure to successfully address their parental deficits and Derrick's failure to avoid criminal recidivism clearly and convincingly show that it is unlikely that either one will ever be able to conform their behavior to appropriate norms or be able to serve as a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for DaJiahonna.

Based upon Ayesha and Derrick's behavior and performance so far, this court cannot foresee either respondent parent ever having the ability or the patience to follow the regimen necessary for DaJiahonna to maximize her abilities and achievements.

The child's attorney indicated that the TPR would be in her client's best interests.

Our courts have recognized that "long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709. Furthermore, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children. In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1991); cert. granted, 220 Conn. 927, 598 A.2d 366 (1991), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992). See also In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The court is obliged to agree with the child's attorney and DCF and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that DaJiahonna is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of her biological parents as caretakers.

The State and DCF have recommended the TPR and adoption of DaJiahonna. There has been absolutely no evidence to establish the unreasonableness of this request.

Having balanced DaJiahonna's intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with Ayesha or Derrick, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child's best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to the respondent parents. Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14.

Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Ayesha and Derrick as to DaJiahonna is in the best interests of the child in question.

ORDER OF TERMINATION

WHEREFORE, after due consideration of DaJiahonna's sense of time, her need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship she has with her foster parent, and the totality of circumstances; and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights; and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the child's best interests, the court issues the following ORDERS:

That the parental rights of Ayesha D. are hereby terminated as to the child DaJiahonna W. That the parental rights of Derrick W. are hereby terminated as to the child DaJiahonna W.

That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for DaJiahonna for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or other permanent placement for her.

That a permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law. That primary consideration for adoption of DaJiahonna shall be offered to her current foster parent.

BY THE COURT,

C. Taylor, J.