Opinion
No. COA12–1091.
2013-04-2
In the Matter of D.A.D.
Grier J. Hurley, for petitioner-appellee. Michael E. Casterline, for respondent-appellant.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 4 June 2012 by Judge Mitchell L. McLean in Ashe County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 March 2013. Grier J. Hurley, for petitioner-appellee. Michael E. Casterline, for respondent-appellant.
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts, by Appellate Counsel Deana K. Fleming, for guardian ad litem.
GEER, Judge.
Respondent mother appeals from the trial court's order adjudicating the juvenile D.A.D. (“David”) neglected. Respondent argues that the trial court's findings of fact do not support its conclusion that the juvenile was neglected. We disagree and, therefore, affirm.
The pseudonym “David” is used throughout this opinion to protect the child's privacy and for ease of reading. 1
Facts
The trial court made the following unchallenged findings of fact. On 25 January 2012, a social worker with the Ashe County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) went to respondent's home at 5:20 p.m. and found no one at home. At 5:45 p.m., David, who was nine years old at the time, got off the school bus, but could not get into the house through either the front or back doors. David waited with the social worker until respondent and his younger sister arrived home at 6:06 p.m. Respondent admitted to the social worker to being bipolar and not having her medication.
David attended an after-school program four days a week and rode the bus home most days, always arriving home just before 6:00 p.m. Since the beginning of the school year, there were seven occasions when David got home from school and the doors to his house were locked and his mother was not home. Three or four times, he stayed on the bus for the remainder of the bus route and then returned home, but his mother was still not there. Three to five times, he then went to a neighbor's house. If there had not been a neighbor with whom David could stay, he would have had to ride with the bus driver back to the school.
Respondent had no concerns about David coming home alone because she had been a “latch key child” herself. The January 2012 report that led to the social worker's visit was the tenth report that DSS had received regarding the family. Respondent also indicated that she loved her daughter more than David.
David was placed in DSS custody on 26 January 2012 pursuant to an emergency non-secure order. On the same day, DSS filed a petition alleging that David was a neglected juvenile. Subsequently, David was placed with his maternal grandparents.
The trial court entered an order on 4 June 2012 adjudicating David to be a neglected child. The court found that returning David to respondent's home would be contrary to his welfare and that it was in David's best interests to continue in the custody of DSS with placement with his maternal grandparents. The court further found that unsupervised visits by respondent mother for a minimum of two hours a week, as recommended by DSS, would be in the child's best interest. The trial court required DSS to continue reasonable efforts toward reunification. Respondent timely appealed to this Court.
Discussion
In reviewing a trial court's adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–805 (2011), this Court determines “(1) whether the findings of fact are supported by ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of fact.” In re Gleisner, 141 N.C.App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000) (internal citations omitted). Here, respondent does not challenge the findings of fact, and they are, therefore, binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).
Respondent limits her argument to whether those findings support the adjudication of neglect. Our legislature has defined a neglected juvenile as a child
who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare; or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101(15) (2011).
Here, the trial court found that in just half a school year, David had on seven occasions been locked out of his house when he arrived home from school at nearly 6:00 p.m. Sometimes, he continued to ride the bus route, and his mother still was not home. On some, but not all, of the times, he had to stay with a neighbor. DSS had received 10 reports about the family, and respondent had no concerns about David coming home alone. Based on these findings, the trial court was entitled to conclude that David was not receiving proper care and supervision.
In contrast to In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 286–87, 582 S.E.2d 255, 260 (2003) (concluding that insufficient evidence existed for DSS to initiate investigation), on which respondent relies, this case does not involve a solitary instance of a child slipping out of a house unsupervised. Instead, the trial court found a pattern of behavior. See id. at 288, 582 S.E.2d at 261 (“Had there been a complaint of a pattern of lack of supervision of the child or other credible evidence that indicated a serious failing on the part of the parents to look after the child, then such conduct could rise to the level triggering the investigative mandate of N.C.G.S. § 7B–302.”).
Further, contrary to respondent's argument, this case did not involve the question whether a nine year old may safely be left alone in his home for short periods of time. David was locked out of his house at a time of year when it would be getting dark. The fact that he was taken in by a neighbor or watched over by the bus driver does not mean David was not neglected since respondent had not made any arrangements for those third parties to care for David. In short, the pattern of David's being left without supervision or a way to get into his home, and his mother's apparent lack of concern justify the trial court's adjudication of neglect. See, e .g., In re D.C., C.C., 183 N.C.App. 344, 353, 644 S.E.2d 640, 645 (2007) (holding evidence of single incident in which 16–month–old child was left alone for no less than 30 minutes in hotel room at 4:00 a.m. was sufficient to support neglect adjudication); In re Gleisner, 141 N.C.App. at 479, 539 S.E.2d at 365 (holding trial court did not err in denying respondents' motion to dismiss neglect proceeding when, among other things, eight-year-old child was left alone for three and one-half hours as form of discipline). Because respondent presents no other argument on appeal, we affirm.
Affirmed. Judges BRYANT and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).