Opinion
E043552
7-1-2008
In re D.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. D.A., Defendant and Appellant.
Kazoua Cha, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published
A juvenile court found true the allegation that appellant D.A. (minor) committed the offense of receiving stolen property (a car). (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).) On appeal, minor contends: 1) there was insufficient evidence that he knew the vehicle he was driving was stolen; 2) the juvenile court failed to establish jurisdiction over him because it did not expressly declare him to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602; and 3) the court failed to exercise its discretion in determining whether its true finding was for a felony or misdemeanor. We affirm.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code section, unless otherwise noted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 18, 2007, Marlene Reed and her husband parked her GMC Yukon Denali at the Countryside Suites, where they stayed overnight. The next morning, they left on a trip, leaving the car parked in the parking lot. They locked the car before leaving. When they returned on May 26, 2007, the car was missing.
On June 1, 2007, Officer Ron Duran was on patrol when he observed a Yukon Denali. He ran a check of the license plate number, and it came back for a different vehicle make and model. Officer Duran positioned his patrol car behind the car to perform a traffic stop, and the car pulled over. Defendant was the driver, and there was one passenger. Officer Duran ran a "vehicle identification number" check, and learned that the car had been reported stolen. Officer Duran asked defendant who owned the car. Minor said it belonged to someone by the name of Javier. Javier had loaned it to him, and he was going to return it. However, defendant said he did not know how to get in contact with Javier to return the car. Officer Duran noticed that the key that defendant was using to drive the car did not signify a Denali, but was an after-market key. Furthermore, he observed signs of forced entry of the car. The lock on the passenger side door had been removed, leaving a hole there. In addition, the OnStar system, which was a computer system with three buttons built into the dashboard, had been disabled by being taken out. When the car was returned to Reed, she observed a lot of damage to the car that was not there before. There were scratches on the front end and damage on the rear right side. There were also two dents on the drivers door, and the motor was full of dirt. Inside the car, there was black grease on the seats and mats, and cigarette burns on the leather seats. Reed said she did not know minor or anyone named Javier, and that she did not give anyone permission to take her car. She further stated that the fair market value of her car was $22,000.
This system allows the OnStar company to locate the car in the case of an accident.
ANALYSIS
I. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Sustain a True Finding of a Violation of Penal Code Section 496, Subdivision (a)
Minor argues that there was insufficient evidence to show he was aware that the car he was driving was stolen. Thus, he contends the courts true finding should be reversed. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In assessing a claim of insufficient evidence, we "must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the order below and presume in support of the order the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]" (In re Khamphouy (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1134.) "We may not reverse an order on the ground of insufficient evidence unless it clearly appears `that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
B. The Evidence Was Sufficient
"[T]he knowledge element [of receiving stolen property] is inferred from the defendants failure to explain how he came to possess a stolen item or his offer of an unsatisfactory explanation or from suspicious circumstances attendant upon his possession of the item. [Citations.]" (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1019-1020.)
Here, there was sufficient evidence presented for the court to conclude that defendant knew the car was stolen. The police observed signs of a forced entry on the car. The passenger door lock was completely missing from the door, leaving a conspicuous hole in its place. The OnStar computer system that was built into the dashboard was removed, presumably also leaving a conspicuous hole. The ignition key that defendant was using to drive the car was an after-market key not issued by the car manufacturer. Furthermore, defendant was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation as to where he got the car. Although he claimed that a person named Javier loaned him the car, and that he was going to return it, he did not know how to contact Javier. It is highly suspicious that defendant accepted a car from a person he apparently hardly knew and had no way of contacting to return the car.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, as we must, we conclude that the suspicious circumstances justified an inference that defendant knew the car was stolen. Because substantial evidence supported the courts true finding, no reversal is required.
II. The Court Properly Established Jurisdiction Over Minor
Minor contends that the court committed reversible error by failing to establish jurisdiction over him, since it failed to explicitly determine that he was a person described by section 602. We disagree.
A. The Relevant Proceedings
On June 5, 2007, the San Bernardino District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition pursuant to section 602. On June 26, 2007, after hearing testimony at the contested jurisdiction hearing, the court found the allegation in the petition to be true. At the disposition hearing on July 10, 2007, the court declared minor a ward of the court and placed him in his parents custody, under certain probation terms and conditions.
B. The Circumstances Demonstrate That the Court Established Jurisdiction Over Minor
Section 702 similarly provides: "After hearing the evidence, the court shall make a finding, noted in the minutes of the court, whether or not the minor is a person described by Section 300, 601, or 602 . . . . If the court finds that the minor is such a person, it shall make and enter its findings and order accordingly, and shall then proceed to hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the minor." "`[A] general finding that the allegations of the petition are true is sufficient to show the facts upon which the court exercised its jurisdiction to declare the minor a ward or dependent child of the court. [Citations.] [Citation.]" (In re Billy M. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 973, 981.) Section 702 does not require a specific statutory citation within a jurisdictional finding. (In re Billy M., supra, at p. 981.)
Here, the district attorney filed a petition alleging that minor came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 602 because: 1) he was under the age of 18 years at the time of the law violation; and 2) he committed the crime of receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).) The court heard testimony from witnesses at the jurisdiction hearing, and then found the allegation in the section 602 petition to be true. At the disposition hearing, the court specifically stated, "the minor is declared a ward of the juvenile court and placed in the custody of his parents . . . ." By finding the allegations of the section 602 petition true, the court properly established jurisdiction over minor. Furthermore, it exercised its jurisdiction and declared him a ward of the court.
Minor complains that no witness offered testimony as to his age, and that the court did not inquire as to, or acknowledge, his age. There is no statutory requirement that a witness testify as to a minors age in juvenile court. (§§ 701, 702.) Furthermore, minors age was not at issue here. The court consistently referred to him as a minor, and throughout the record, his birthdate was listed as January 4, 1990. Therefore, he was clearly a minor at the time of the jurisdiction hearing on June 26, 2007.
In sum, the court properly considered and found that minor was a person described by section 602. He further claims that the court never made an express finding "as to how or why it found the offense to be [a] misdemeanor or a felony." We find any error harmless.
Section 702 provides: "If the minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony." In other words, the statute "requires an explicit declaration by the juvenile court whether an offense would be a felony or misdemeanor in the case of an adult." (In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1204 (Manzy W.).) The significance of the finding required by section 702 is that it "`determines the maximum period of physical confinement. Under [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 726, a minor removed from the custody of a parent or guardian may not be held for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense which brings the minor within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court." (Manzy W., supra, at pp. 1208-1209.)
California Rules of Court, rule 5.780(e)(5) specifies that "[i]f any offense may be found to be either a felony or misdemeanor, the court must consider which description applies and expressly declare on the record that it has made such consideration and must state its determination as to whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony. These determinations may be deferred until the disposition hearing."
Here, the section 602 petition alleged that minor violated Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a), and specified that it was a felony. At the jurisdiction hearing, the court found the allegation in the petition true. At the disposition hearing, the court stated that minors offense was a felony and then proceeded to declare him a ward of the court and place him on probation. The juvenile court was required, under section 702, to declare whether minors offense was a misdemeanor or felony, and it did so. However, we note that nothing in the record establishes that the court was aware of its discretion to sentence the offense as a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Nonetheless, any error in the courts failure to expressly declare that it had considered whether minors offense was a misdemeanor or felony was harmless. The receiving stolen property offense which the juvenile court found to be true was necessarily a felony. Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a), provides that "if the district attorney . . . determines that this action would be in the interests of justice, the district attorney . . . may, if the value of the property does not exceed four hundred dollars ($400), specify in the accusatory pleading that the offense shall be a misdemeanor." The evidence showed that the stolen property received by minor was worth $22,000. The district attorney accordingly alleged the offense as a felony. Likewise, the court necessarily would have found the offense to be a felony under the statute. We further note that the significance of the finding required by section 702 is that it "`determines the maximum period of physical confinement." (Manzy, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1208-1209.) Minor was not placed in physical confinement, but was placed in his parents custody on probation.
We conclude that "[i]n such case, when remand would be merely redundant, failure to comply with [section 702] amount[s] to harmless error." (Manzy, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1209.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
RAMIREZ, P.J.
KING, J.