Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County, Super.Ct.No. SWJ007233, Mark Ashton Cope, Judge.
Tracy Rogers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ P.J.
D.A., the minor, appeals from a juvenile court disposition declaring him to be a ward of the court and placing him on probation, following two admitted petitions and one adjudicated petition, relating to offenses that would have been crimes if committed by an adult.
BACKGROUND
In May 2007, the minor admitted an allegation of vandalism of a truck (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)), for which he was placed on probation pursuant to a deferred entry of judgment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790, et seq.) In November 2007, the minor admitted committing a residential burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459).
Prior to the disposition hearing, a new delinquency petition was filed in December 2007, alleging the minor had committed an attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664), and assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). The minor and a confederate had approached a man who was leaving a drive-through ATM, asked the man for the use of his cell phone, used a taser gun on the victim and punched him.
At the disposition hearing respecting the November 2007 petition, the court declared the minor a ward of the court, placed him on probation in the home of his grandmother, and set the maximum period of confinement at six years, eight months for the vandalism and burglary petitions. On March 24, 2008, a court trial was conducted to adjudicate the attempted robbery and assault with a deadly weapon allegations. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found the attempted robbery charge to be true, but dismissed the assault with a deadly weapon allegation.
The disposition hearing was conducted by the juvenile court in Los Angeles County, pursuant to a transfer of the matter to that court, because the minor had been declared a dependent in Los Angeles County. After the disposition hearing as the prior petitions, the minor’s dual jurisdiction status changed from dependent to ward, the dependency status was terminated, and the case was transferred back to Riverside County.
On April 16, 2008, the juvenile court made a declaration of wardship, lifted the deferred entry of judgment as to the prior petitions, removed the minor from the custody of his legal guardian (his maternal grandmother), and placed him in a suitable foster group, or relative home, or a county or private facility, with terms of probation. The minor appealed.
DISCUSSION
At his request, this court appointed counsel to represent the minor on appeal. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1386, 18 L.Ed.2d 493], setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues, and requesting that we undertake an independent review of the entire record. (See In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97, 99 [applying Wende/Anders procedures to delinquency appeals].) We offered the minor an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have conducted an independent review of the record.
First, we reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence to support the true finding as to the attempted robbery allegation. In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) An appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile court judgment is governed by the same standards of review applicable to a similar claim by a criminal defendant. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.)
Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) Here, the testimony of the victim, coupled with the minor’s admissions, constitutes substantial evidence to support the true finding on the attempted robbery allegation.
We also reviewed whether the minor’s extrajudicial admissions were introduced in violation of the corpus delicti rule. The corpus delicti of a crime consists of two elements: (a) the fact of the injury or loss or harm, and (b) the existence of a criminal agency as its cause. (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 297.) However, such proof may be circumstantial, and need only be a slight proof or a prima facie showing that a crime was committed. (People v. Riccio (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000.) The record shows that there was independent corroboration of the crime, so there was no violation.
Finally, we reviewed the entire record and observed that following the minor’s admission of the vandalism petition, for which the minor was placed on probation upon a deferred entry of judgment, the court failed to declare whether that offense was a felony or a misdemeanor. (In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1201, 1206-1209.) We note there is an ambiguity in the record as to the actual date when the juvenile court lifted the minor’s deferred entry of judgment status. The Riverside County Juvenile Court judge ordered the deferred entry of judgment lifted on two occasions—on December 5, 2007, and again on April 16, 2008. The Los Angeles County Juvenile Court had proceeded with entry of judgment on the two earlier petitions when the case was transferred there in December, 2007, after that court found he was no longer eligible for a deferred entry of judgment.
In any event, any error in failing to declare the offense to be a felony or misdemeanor was committed by the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court in December 2007, more than 60 days prior to the notice of appeal in this case. An appeal from the disposition of a prior wardship petition is untimely if not filed within 60 days of the judgment. (In re Henry S. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 248, 255; see also, Elizabeth G. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1331.)
We have concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RICHLI J., MILLER J.