Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Super. Ct.No. J211845, Douglas N. Gericke, Judge.
Stephen S. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKinster Acting P.J.
In a San Bernardino County case, minor admitted committing the offense of grand theft. (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a).) In a Los Angeles County case, minor admitted one count of grand theft of an automobile (§ 487, subd. (d)(1)) and two counts of false imprisonment (§ 236). The two cases were merged for the purpose of a contested disposition hearing in San Bernardino County, where minor resides. At the disposition hearing, the court ordered minor be detained in juvenile hall while awaiting placement in a foster care facility. Minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not placing minor on formal probation, because probation is a less restrictive disposition and was recommended by minor’s probation officer. We affirm the disposition of the juvenile court.
All further references to code sections will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
FACTS
Minor was 12 years old at the time of the incidents at issue in this case.
1.
FACTS RELATED TO MINOR’S SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CASE
The parties stipulated that the police reports would form a factual basis for minor’s admission. On November 22, 2006, minor entered a business, walked behind the cash register, and found the victim’s purse on the floor. Minor opened the purse and took the victim’s wallet. Minor walked to the rest room, removed $1,800 in cash from the wallet, and threw the wallet in the rest room trashcan. Minor then placed the cash in her mother’s vehicle. Minor stated that she knew the victim had money in her wallet, and minor wanted it so she took it.
2.
FACTS RELATED TO MINOR’S LOS ANGELES COUNTY CASE
The parties stipulated there was a factual basis for minor’s admission. On February 3, 2007, minor was in a van that was parked behind a second van. Four children were in the second van, which was owned by Maura, who is the mother of three of the children. The children inside the second van were Alexander who was six years old, Marco who was eight years old, and Julian and Kenia who were both eleven years old. The children were in the van listening to music.
In one version of the events, Marco, Alexander, and Julian noticed minor with a small dog and approached minor in order to play with the dog. Marco returned to the second van and asked Kenia if minor could drive the van. Kenia told Marco no. Eventually, while Kenia and Marco were speaking, minor approached the second van and pushed Kenia out of the driver’s seat. The keys to the van were in the ignition and minor started the vehicle. Marco, Alexander, and Julian entered the van. Minor drove a short distance and then returned to where the van had been parked. Kenia and Julian exited the van when it stopped.
The children gave varying stories about how minor came into possession of the van; however, the version of events included in this statement of facts is consistent with the facts included in the declaration of probable cause.
Marco and Alexander tried to leave the van, but minor yelled, “You guys sit down and shut up,” and the two children remained in the van. Minor drove away. Minor weaved through traffic, reached speeds of approximately 100 MPH, drove through red lights, almost tipped the van on its side, and collided with another vehicle, but drove away. The two children tried to open the rear passenger door of the van, but minor yelled, “Hey I told both of you to sit down and shut up,” so the children complied because they thought they would be hurt. When the six-year-old child cried and asked to see his mother, minor responded, “Shut up and stop crying.”
Minor drove from Bell Gardens to Altadena or Pasadena where she picked up a male friend, between the ages of 40 and 60 years old. Minor then returned to Bell Gardens where she dropped the two children off at a liquor store. The two children walked back to the area where the van had been parked. The van and minor were eventually found in Altadena or Pasadena. Minor stated she took the van for fun.
3.
FACTS RELATED TO MINOR’S DISPOSITION HEARING
Minor’s psychologist recommended that minor be assigned “a level 14 placement and [receive] psychotropic medication in order to control her behavior.” In Probation Officer Bryant’s report, he recommended that minor be placed on formal probation, in the custody of her mother, and participate in the wraparound process. Officer Bryant’s report reflects that minor was screened and accepted for wraparound services. Officer Bryant testified that he initially recommended minor be assigned to a placement; however, his supervisor felt minor should be given the opportunity to try formal probation with the wraparound process, because of minor’s young age and history of being molested. Officer Bryant was unsure whether minor’s mother would be capable of controlling minor, because it appeared minor’s mother encouraged some of minor’s problematic behaviors.
The wraparound process is similar to the type of programs that would be offered in a placement, but is offered in the home and involves minor’s family.
Minor’s mother testified that she would be able to control minor if the court granted minor probation. Minor’s mother stated that minor began running away from home in November 2006 and has a history of hitchhiking. Minor’s mother also testified that minor talked of committing homicide.
Prior to the offenses in the instant case, minor had one prior sustained petition for possession of tobacco products. (§ 308, subd. (b).) Minor drinks alcohol and smokes marijuana on a daily basis; minor began abusing both substances at the age of eight. Minor set fire to a yard in 2006. Minor associates with the Crazy Home Boy Gang and fights with the 18th Street Gang.
While detained in juvenile hall minor was disciplined on almost a daily basis for her behavior. Minor touched other minors inappropriately in the showers. Minor made sexual gestures towards other minors and staff. Minor threatened other minors and stole two pens from a classroom on two separate occasions. Juvenile hall staff attempted to counsel minor, but minor became angry or hysterically laughed. Minor informed staff at the juvenile hall that if she wanted to escape “all she had to do is whistle and her homies would hop over unit 12 wall and come and break her out.”
The juvenile court provided a thoughtful analysis of minor’s cases when giving its tentative disposition. The court commented upon the seriousness of minor driving the van with two small children inside. The court noted minor’s mother’s unsuccessful attempts to place minor in therapy. The court found minor continued to avoid therapy while in juvenile hall. The court concluded that minor “doesn’t seem to realize the seriousness of the conduct that she engages in and has not shown any willingness at this stage to participate in the standard kind of treatment that we have available.” The court decided that placing minor on formal probation with wraparound services would not meet minor’s needs.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not placing minor on formal probation, because probation is a less restrictive disposition and was recommended by minor’s probation officer. We disagree.
The juvenile court may not remove a delinquent minor from the custody of his or her parent unless it has made one of three findings: “(1) That the parent or guardian is incapable of providing or has failed or neglected to provide proper maintenance, training, and education for the minor. [¶] (2) That the minor has been tried on probation while in custody and has failed to reform. [¶] [or] (3) That the welfare of the minor requires that custody be taken from the minor’s parent or guardian.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (a).) The findings pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 need not be made in the precise language of the section, as long as the substance of the findings is impliedly stated in the record. (In re John S. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 285, 290-292.)
Furthermore, while the law contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of dispositions, there is no rule that a court may not impose a particular disposition unless less restrictive placements have actually been attempted. (In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 577.) Rather, the juvenile court has the discretion to determine that a particular disposition is the most appropriate to meet the minor’s needs. As long as there is evidence that the court considered and reasonably rejected alternative dispositions, the order must be upheld. (Ibid.)
“The appellate court reviews a [disposition] decision for abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court’s decision.” (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) “It is not the responsibility of this court to determine what we believe would be the most appropriate placement for a minor. This is the duty of the [juvenile] court, whose determination we reverse only if it has acted beyond the scope of reason.” (In re Khamphouy S. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1135.)
After analyzing the evidence, the juvenile court concluded placing minor on formal probation in the custody of her mother would not be appropriate for minor because placing minor back in the community would put “minor at great risk.” We infer that the juvenile court determined that the welfare of minor required that custody be taken from minor’s mother. Minor’s offenses in the instant cases, her association with gang members, her drug and alcohol abuse, her sexually inappropriate behavior at juvenile hall, her threats to escape from juvenile hall, her history of running away from home, and past incidents of hitchhiking, support the juvenile court’s finding that minor’s welfare required that minor be removed from her mother’s custody while working on her reformation and rehabilitation, because minor would likely run away again if placed in her mother’s custody. Moreover, the first psychologist that examined minor stated minor should be assigned to a level 14 placement, and the second psychologist that examined minor found that minor would likely be unsuccessful on formal probation. Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that minor should be removed from her mother’s custody in order to best provide for minor’s welfare.
Additionally, the juvenile court conscientiously weighed the less restrictive formal probation disposition option against the more restrictive residential placement disposition option. The juvenile court considered minor’s history and ordered an updated psychological evaluation in order to determine the most appropriate disposition for minor’s cases. After weighing the disposition options, the court concluded a residential placement would benefit minor more than formal probation with wraparound services because minor needed to be away from the community while working on her reformation and rehabilitation. Due to minor’s delinquent and social histories, noted ante, we see no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s determination.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Richli J., King J.