Summary
signing judgments granting limited driving privileges upon ex parte communications with counsel without giving the State an opportunity to be heard
Summary of this case from In re BullockOpinion
No. 97
Filed 17 December 1975 — Fall Term
1. Judges 7 — misconduct in office — proceeding before Judicial Standards Commission A proceeding before the Judicial Standards Commission is neither criminal nor civil in nature but is an inquiry into the conduct of a judicial officer, the purpose of which is not primarily to punish any individual but to maintain due and proper administration of justice in our State's courts, public confidence in its judicial system, and the honor and integrity of its judges.
2. Judges 7; Judgments 1 — responsibility for judgment A judge may not escape responsibility for any judgments signed by him by delegating their preparation to counsel or anyone else.
3. Judges 7 — misconduct in office — absence of benefit to judge The conduct of a judge is not precluded from being prejudicial to the administration of justice and that which brings the judicial office into disrepute by the fact that the judge received no personal benefit, financial or otherwise, from such conduct.
4. Judges 7 — misconduct in office — motive — results of conduct Whether the conduct of a judge may be characterized as prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute depends not so much upon the judge's motives but more on the conduct itself, the results thereof, and the impact such conduct might reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers.
5. Judges 7 — misconduct in office — limited driving privileges upon ex parte request — censure by Supreme Court A district court judge, upon recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission, is censured by the Supreme Court for "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute" based upon the judge's action in signing judgments granting limited driving privileges to two defendants upon a mere ex parte application of counsel for defendants without making any effort or conducting any inquiry to ascertain whether the facts recited in the judgments were true and whether he was lawfully entitled to enter the judgments and without giving the State an opportunity to be heard, when in truth the judgments were supported neither in fact nor in law and were beyond the jurisdiction of the district court judge who signed them.
Appearances:
E. A. Hightower, C. Frank Griffin, Henry L. Kitchin, for Judge E. E. Crutchfield, Respondent.
Millard R. Rich, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for Judicial Standards Commission.
Justice LAKE dissenting.
ORDER OF CENSURE
matter is before the Court upon the Recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission (Commission) filed with us on August 13, 1975, that Judge E. E. Crutchfield, a judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Twentieth Judicial District (Respondent), be censured for "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute," as this phrase is used in Article IV, Section 17 (2) of the North Carolina Constitution and N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376 (1974 Cum. Supp.). Having considered the record in the matter consisting of the verified complaint and answer filed with, the evidence heard by, and the findings of fact, conclusions, and Recommendation made by the Commission, and the briefs for Respondent and Commission filed with us (Respondent having elected not to argue the matter orally) we note the following procedure before and Findings of the Commission and we make the following Conclusions of Law and Order of Censure:
PROCEDURE BEFORE AND FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION
1. This proceeding was instituted before the Commission on December 12, 1974, by the filing of a verified complaint which alleged in substance that Respondent had engaged in wilful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in that he had:
(a) on May 6, 1974, signed a "Judgment Allowing Limited Driving Privilege" to one William B. Byrd despite the facts that Byrd when arrested and charged with driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor on April 6, 1974, refused to take the breathalyzer test and had not, as of May 6, 1974, even been tried for the offense;
(b) on May 4, 1974, signed a "Judgment Allowing Limited Driving Privilege" to one Lybon H. Nance despite the facts that Nance when arrested and charged with driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor on April 20, 1974, refused to take the breathalyzer test and Respondent was not the judge who tried Nance for the offense; and
(c) neither of the judgments was filed with the Clerk of Court nor forwarded to the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles.
2. Respondent filed a verified answer admitting these allegations.
3. Upon due notice, Respondent was accorded a full adversary hearing before the Commission on April 3, 1975, at which time he was represented by counsel. At the hearing Respondent stipulated that the Commission could consider as evidence:
(a) the Court records pertaining to the driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor charges against Byrd and Nance;
(b) statements obtained from Byrd, Nance and Mrs. Nance by an agent of the State Bureau of Investigation;
(c) a letter Respondent had previously written to the Commission dated July 19, 1974;
(d) Respondent's earlier oral statement given to an agent of the State Bureau of Investigation;
(e) the complaint and answer; and
(f) Respondent's own sworn testimony before the Commission.
During the hearing, Respondent also consented to the Commission's considering statements taken from attorneys Charles Brown and Fred Stokes, whose clients were the beneficiaries of the judgments in question, by an agent of the State Bureau of Investigation.
4. Upon considering this evidence the Commission found certain facts as follows:
"7. That on April 6, 1974, William Brooks Byrd, Route 1, Box 56, Norwood, North Carolina, was arrested in Stanly County by North Carolina State Highway Patrolman C. B. Blackmon, and charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and the possession of tax paid liquor with the seal broken in the passenger area of an automobile.
"8. That the said William B. Byrd, at the time of his arrest, refused to take a breathalyzer test.
"9. That on or about May 6, 1974, Respondent signed a `Judgment Allowing Limited Driving Privilege' to said Byrd and in which Judgment it was recited that he had been convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and which Judgment granted to him limited driving privileges as provided by G.S. 20-179.
"10. That on the date said Judgment was signed, to wit: May 6, 1974, the said Byrd had not been tried on said charges of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and possession of tax paid whiskey and that said case was not tried until May 18, 1974.
"11. That Respondent held no hearing with reference to the request of the said Byrd that he be allowed limited driving privileges, made no inquiry with reference to whether a trial of the said Byrd had been held and if so, by whom or as to whether or not the said Byrd had been convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants.
"12. That said Judgment and copies were signed by Respondent in the law offices of the attorney representing the said Byrd, at said attorney's request; that no copy of said Judgment was filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Stanly County nor was any copy sent to the Department of Motor Vehicles in Raleigh, as required by the provisions of G.S. 20-179.
"13. That Respondent was aware at the time he signed said Judgment that only the Trial Judge was authorized by the provisions of G.S. 20-179 to allow limited driving privileges to the person convicted, and was likewise aware of the fact that the form of said Judgment set out in said statutes referred to a hearing and recited a conviction of such defendant in allowing said restricted driving privileges. That Respondent was likewise aware that the Department of Motor Vehicles was required to revoke the driving privilege of any person arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants who refused to take a breathalyzer test and was aware that such a person was not entitled under the applicable statutes, to receive restricted driving privileges.
"14. That on or about April 20, 1974, Lyvon Hampton Nance, 742 Best Street, Albemarle, North Carolina, was arrested in Stanly County by C. H. Sluder, a North Carolina State Highway Patrolman, and was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants.
"15. That said Nance refused to take a breathalyzer test.
"16. That on or about May 6, 1974, the said Nance was found guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicants by District Court Judge A. A. Webb, who was the Trial Judge presiding over the trial of said case.
"17. That on or about May 6, 1974, Respondent signed a `Judgment Allowing Limited Driving Privilege' in favor of the said Nance even though Respondent had not been the Trial Judge presiding over the trial of said Nance and even though Nance was not eligible to receive a limited driving privilege because of his refusal to take a breathalyzer test.
"18. That Respondent held no hearing with reference to the request of the said Nance that he be allowed limited driving privileges, made no inquiry with reference to whether a trial of the said Nance had been held, and if so, by whom.
"19. That Respondent signed said Judgment and copies thereof in the law offices of Nance's attorney and that copy of said Judgment was not filed in the Office of the Clerk of Superior Court of Stanly County, nor was a copy sent to the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles in Raleigh.
"20. That Respondent was aware at the time he signed said Judgment that only the Trial Judge was authorized by the provisions of G.S. 20-179 to allow limited driving privileges to the person convicted, and was likewise aware of the fact that the form of said Judgment set out in said statute referred to a hearing. That Respondent was likewise aware that the Department of Motor Vehicles was required to revoke the driving privilege of any person arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants and who refused to take a breathalyzer test and was aware that such a person was not entitled under the applicable statutes to receive restricted driving privileges.
5. In order to meet squarely Respondent's arguments urging us to reject the Commission's Recommendation we observe that the uncontradicted (except where noted) evidence before the Commission tends to show the following facts:
(a) Respondent signed each judgment in question at the request of a reputable, local attorney who had never in the past misled him (there is some evidence that Respondent signed the Byrd judgment at the request of Byrd himself but we will assume for purposes of this order, in accordance with Respondent's testimony before the Commission, the request for each judgment came from the defendant's attorney);
(b) the attorney in each case prepared each judgment for Respondent's signature but otherwise made no express representations of any fact material to the judgment upon which Respondent relied;
(c) Respondent did not personally benefit, financially or otherwise, by reason of his signing either judgment.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER OF CENSURE
1. The Commission's findings are supported by the evidence. They are indeed not contradicted by any evidence. We, consequently, affirm these findings.
2. This proceeding is neither criminal nor civil in nature. It is an inquiry into the conduct of a judicial officer, the purpose of which is not primarily to punish any individual but to maintain due and proper administration of justice in our State's courts, public confidence in its judicial system, and the honor and integrity of its judges. In Re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989; In Re Kelly, 238 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1970) cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962; Memphis and Shelby County Bar Association v. Vick, 40 Tenn. App. 206, 290 S.W.2d 871 (1955) cert. denied, 352 U.S. 975.
3. A judgment is an act of the court, not counsel. Respondent may not escape responsibility for any judgments signed by him by delegating their preparation to counsel or anyone else. "The trial judge cannot be too careful to make certain that his judgments and orders are accurate and complete, regardless of who takes the primary responsibility of preparing them." The National Conference of State Trial Judges, The State Trial Judge's Book 197 (2d ed. 1969).
4. That Respondent received no personal benefit, financial or otherwise, from signing these judgments does not preclude this conduct from being prejudicial to the administration of justice and that which brings the judicial office into disrepute. Whether a judge receives any personal benefit from his conduct has been held to be "wholly irrelevant" to the inquiry. In Re Diener, supra at 670, 304 A.2d at 594.
5. Whether the conduct of a judge may be characterized as prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute depends not so much upon the judge's motives but more on the conduct itself, the results thereof, and the impact such conduct might reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal.Rptr. 201 (1973) cert. denied 417 U.S. 932.
6. Respondent's conduct in signing these judgments in question without any semblance of an inquiry to determine either the factual or legal basis for them strikes at the very heart of the adjudicatory process. The gravamen of his offense is not so much that his judgments were contrary to law, beyond his jurisdiction to enter, or that some of the facts recited therein were indisputably false. The gravamen is that Respondent made no effort to ascertain whether his judgments were supported in law and in fact. "We have not the smallest doubt . . . that the disposition of cases for reasons other than an honest appraisal of the facts and the law, as disclosed by the evidence presented, will amount to conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice whenever and however it may be defined or whoever does the defining." In Re Diener, supra at 671, 304 A.2d at 594.
7. The result of Respondent's conduct was a gross abuse by him of those provisions of our Motor Vehicle Statutes relating to driving privileges for persons charged and not tried and charged and convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicants, particularly N.C. Gen. Stats. 20-16.2(c) and 20-179(b).
8. Respondent's judgments under these circumstances in the eyes of any knowledgeable observer were bound to prejudice the administration of justice and to bring the judicial office into disrepute.
9. The failure of Respondent to make due inquiry into the facts and law upon which these judgments were based and his execution of them upon a mere ex parte application of counsel for defendants also violates Canon 3 (A) (4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, 283 N.C. 771, 772, which provides that" [a] judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding." Codes of judicial conduct may "usefully be consulted to give meaning to the constitutional standards." Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal.3d 778, 796, 532 P.2d 1209, 1221, 119 Cal.Rptr. 841, 853 (1975); accord, Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra.
10. We conclude, finally, that Respondent's execution of each "Judgment Allowing Limited Driving Privilege" upon a mere ex parte request without making any effort or conducting any inquiry to ascertain whether the facts recited in the judgments were true and whether he was lawfully entitled to enter the judgments and without giving the State an opportunity to be heard when in truth the judgments were supported neither in fact nor in law and were beyond Respondent's jurisdiction to enter constituted a gross abuse by Respondent of important provisions of our Motor Vehicle Statutes and amounted to "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute" as this phrase is used in Article IV, Section 17(2) of the North Carolina Constitution and N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376 (1974 Cum. Supp.), and for this conduct Respondent ought to be censured in accordance with the Recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission.
Now, therefore, it is ORDERED that Judge E. E. Crutchfield, Respondent herein, be and he is hereby censured by this Court
Done by the Court in Conference, this 17 day of December, 1975.
Exum, J. For the Court