Opinion
Robert A. Lehman, P.C., Denver, for petitioner-appellant.
Worth F. Shrimpton, Craig, for respondent-appellee.
BERMAN, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order dealing with a division of property in a dissolution of marriage action. We affirm.
The parties were married on December 8, 1970, and separated on June 10, 1973. No children were born of the marriage, but the wife had a child by a previous marriage who resided with her. The husband was self-employed in his farming operation and also worked for a company engaged in the business of harvesting. The wife assisted in the farming operation, worked outside the home during part of the year 1971, and was employed after the separation.
The wife filed for a dissolution of marriage in June 1973, and on January 15, 1974, after a hearing, a decree of dissolution was entered and a division of property was ordered. The wife's motion for a new trial from the order for division of property was denied, and this appeal followed. She contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in the division of property, in not allowing her $200 per month as maintenance for a period of two years, and in not awarding attorney fees.
The trial court had before it the financial statements and the testimony of both parties. The court divided only the property acquired subsequent to the marriage, each party being allowed to keep the separate property acquired before the marriage. The testimony before the court shows that the wife received $277 per month from Social Security for the support of her daughter, which the wife testified took care of her daughter's expenses. In addition, the wife earned $246 per month after deductions from which to pay her other expenses, which expenses included $81 house payment on a home owned by her, plus her expenses for food and utilities. The trial court found that the wife had not made a sufficient showing requiring maintenance from the husband and such award was denied.
The granting of maintenance and the division of property in a dissolution of marriage proceeding are matters which lie within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless the trial court abuses its discretion, its judgment will be sustained. Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 403, 457 1006; Hyde v. Hyde, 169 Colo. 403, 457 P.2d 393. We see no such abuse of discretion here.
With respect to attorney fees, the record shows that the wife had four different attorneys from the inception of her action to its conclusion, and had paid some $400 in attorney fees, which included fees for her present attorney. The trial court made no award of attorney fees. The allowance of attorney fees and suit money is within the sound discretion of the trial court and unless that discretion has been abused, the allowance made or denied will not be disturbed. Berglund v. Berglund, 28 Colo.App. 382, 474 P.2d 800. The record here does not support the contention that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing attorney fees.
We find the statement in Nunemacher v. Nunemacher, 132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 662, particularly appropriate here:
'If we were preparing a decree in this case we might have made other disposition of the property involved, and . . . might have entered a different order . . .. We do not, however, regard the conclusions of the trial court, based upon the evidence, as an abuse of discretion.'
Judgment affirmed.
ENOCH and VanCISE, JJ., concur.