Opinion
2019–02054 Docket No. E–12501–18
07-29-2020
In the MATTER OF COREY H. (Anonymous), Appellant.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Dawne A. Mitchell and Raymond E. Rogers of counsel), for appellant. James E. Johnson, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Melanie T. West and Cynthia Kao of counsel), for respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Dawne A. Mitchell and Raymond E. Rogers of counsel), for appellant.
James E. Johnson, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Melanie T. West and Cynthia Kao of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Corey H. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Alan Beckoff, J.), dated February 1, 2019. The order of disposition, upon an order of fact-finding of the same court dated November 8, 2018, made after a hearing, finding that Corey H. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the third degree, assault in the second degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent, and placed him in a limited secure facility for a period of up to 18 months.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
" ‘[T]he evidence supporting a fact-finding in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is legally sufficient if, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, any rational trier of fact could have found the appellant's commission of all the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt’ " ( Matter of Christopher H., 123 A.D.3d 713, 714, 997 N.Y.S.2d 682, quoting Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d 757, 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685 ; see Family Ct Act § 342.2[2] ). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the third degree, assault in the second degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree.
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Brandon V., 133 A.D.3d 769, 20 N.Y.S.3d 385 ), we accord great deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Darnell G., 125 A.D.3d 969, 5 N.Y.S.3d 180 ; Matter of Clarissa S., 83 A.D.3d 1083, 921 N.Y.S.2d 540 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determinations were not against the weight of the evidence. Contrary to the appellant's contention, because the inconsistencies between the complainant's testimony and her prior unsworn out-of-court statements describing the incident were minor, it cannot be said that the court erred in crediting her testimony (see Matter of Sekani D., 172 A.D.3d 1204, 1205, 102 N.Y.S.3d 52 ; Matter of Andrea V. [James A.], 128 A.D.3d 1077, 1078, 9 N.Y.S.3d 669 ; Matter of Juan P., 107 A.D.3d 1001, 966 N.Y.S.2d 898 ).
RIVERA, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HINDS–RADIX and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.