Opinion
Case No. 8:01-CV-601-T-23EAJ
July 20, 2001
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before this court are claimants Joan Hansen and Thomas Hansen's Motion to Clarify and/or Modify Ex Parte Order Approving Petitioner's Ad Interim Stipulation for Value, Directing Issuance of Notice, and Restraining Suits and Injunction (Dkt. 13), filed May 21, 2001, and Petitioner, Thunder Marine, Inc.'s Response Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Claimants' Motion to Clarify and/or Modify Ex Parte Order Approving Petitioner's Ad Interim Stipulation for Value, Directing Issuance of Notice, and Restraining Suits and Injunction (Dkt. 16), filed June 8, 2001.
The district court has referred this matter to the undersigned for consideration and a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Local Rule 6.01(a), M.D. Fla.
On March 20, 2001, Thunder Marine, Inc., as owner of the subject 1983, 23' Seacraft bearing Hull Identification No. SICF3043M83-I and Florida Vessel Registration No. FL 7011 EX, commenced this action seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 181-195, and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules of Civil Procedure. By order dated April 2, 2001, this court stayed and restrained
the further prosecution of any actions, suits or legal proceedings in any Court whatsoever, and the institution and prosecution of any suits, actions, or legal proceedings, of any nature or description whatsoever in any Court wheresoever, except in these proceedings, in respect of any claim arising out of or connected with the marine casualty set forth in the Petition filed herein.
Dkt. 9, at 2.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2001, Joan Hansen and Thomas Hansen ("claimants") filed an answer to petitioner's complaint and a claim in this proceeding. (Dkt. 11) Claimants now move this court to clarify and/or modify its April 2, 2001 order such that claimants may pursue a state court personal injury lawsuit against Jeffrey Beaulieu, the operator of the subject limitation vessel, and Bradley Fauth, the owner/operator of the other vessel involved in the subject collision.
In its response, petitioner urges this court to construe broadly the term "owner," as used in 46 U.S.C. § 185, which limits liability for vessel owners, to include the vessel captain, Jeffrey Beaulieu.
The Limitation of Liability Act, enacted in 1851, "provides for all claims against a shipowner to be decided at one time under a single set of substantive rules, thereby avoiding inconsistent results and repetitive litigation." In the Matter of: Water Taxi of Fort Lauderdale. Inc., 1993 AMC 2805 (S.D.Fla. 1991). Once a vessel owner files a limitation complaint, he or she is entitled to an injunction enjoining "the further prosecution of any action or proceeding against the plaintiff or the plaintiff's property with respect to any claim subject to limitation in the action." Rule F(3)
Section 187, however, prohibits the court from enjoining actions against the "master, officers, or seamen" of a vessel. Thus, Congress distinguished a vessel's "owner" from a vessel's "master, officers, or seamen" by specifically exempting the latter from the benefits of section 185, conferring limitation of liability privileges upon ship owners only. 46 U.S.C. § 187. Specifically, section 187 states:
[n]othing . . . shall be construed to take away or affect the remedy to which any party may be entitled, against the master, officers, or seamen, for or on account of any embezzlement, injury, loss, or destruction of merchandise, or property, put on board any vessel, or on account of any negligence, fraud, or other malversation of such master, officers, or seamen, respectively, nor to lessen or take away any responsibility to which any master or seaman of any vessel may by law be liable, notwithstanding such master or seaman may be an owner or party owner of the vessel.
46 U.S.C.A. § 187 (West, 1958).
Thus, section 187 prohibits a vessel's master, officers, or seamen from limiting their liability. This section is not ambiguous, nor does it contradict any other section of the Act. Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, et.al., 926 F.2d 484, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1991); Water Taxi, 1993 AMC at 2807. Rather, the plain language of section 187 states that the benefits of section 185 shall not extend to masters, officers, and seamen. Id. See also In the Matter of Torch, Inc., 1995 WL 688805 (E.D.La., Nov. 21, 1995); In the Matter of Brent Towing Co., 414 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Fla. 1975)
Arguing that allowing a suit to proceed against the vessel's captain undermines one of the Act's primary purposes — avoiding inconsistent results and multiple litigation — petitioner encourages this court to adopt the Ninth Circuit's holding in In the Matter of the Complaint of Paradise Holdings, Inc., 795 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1986). There, the court affirmed the district court's decision to extend the limitation action to stay proceedings against the ship's captain. Id. at 763. The Ninth Circuit determined that the Act's benefits are to permit the shipowner to retain the benefit of insurance and to aggregate all claims against a shipowner "so that they may be decided at one time under substantive and procedural rules of admiralty law." Id. at 762. See also In re Spanier Marine Corp., 1983 AMC 2441, 2442-43 (E.D.La. 1983) (granting vessel owner's petition to stay a state court action against the vessel's captain, pending resolution of the limitation action).
This court instead chooses to abide by the plain language of section 187, finding persuasive the court's opinion in Water Taxi, 1993 AMC 2805. While acknowledging that Paradise Holdings and Spanier Marine Corp. recognized the need for flexibility in interpreting section 187, the court in Water Taxi found that "those decisions . . . proceeded to ignore or disregard that statute on policy grounds." Id. at 2807. The court also acknowledged that "allowing actions to proceed against the members of a ship's crew may strip a shipowner of insurance protection and give rise to later preclusive effects," but admitted that such concerns were for Congress, and not the courts, to address. Id.
Petitioner argues that the term "owner" should be construed liberally to include the vessel's captain, or anyone who exercises dominion and control over the vessel. To support its contention, petitioner emphasizes that Congress does not define the term "owner" in the Act, and some cases have found that one who controls the vessel is the "owner" for the purposes of limitation of liability. Dkt. 16, at 3.
It is true that Congress does not define the term "owner." See 46 U.S.C. § 185 (West, 1958). Congress does, however, specify that a charterer may be deemed an owner for the purposes of the Act. 46 U.S.C.A. § 186 (West, 1958). It makes no such reference to the vessel master, officers, or seamen being deemed "owners." 46 U.S.C. § 181-195. Expressio unius exclusio alterius est — the expression or inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of others. See, e.g. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). By expressly including "charterer" within the definition of "owner," but not doing the same for "master," "officer," or "seamen," the plain language of the Act makes clear Congress' intent to treat vessel masters, officers, and seamen differently than vessel owners. The fact that section 187 specifically exempts vessel masters, officers, and seamen from the liability limitation delineated by section 185 further demonstrates Congress' intent to distinguish them from "owners." 46 U.S.C. § 187 (West, 1958).
Additionally, ordinary legal parlance defines "master" to include a ship's captain. Black's Law Dictionary 990 (7th ed. 1999) (the "master of a ship" is "[a] commander of a merchant vessel; a captain of a ship").
Petitioner does not object to the portion of claimants' motion that pertains to Bradley Fauth. Rather, petitioner objects to claimants' request to proceed with a state court action against Jeffrey Beaulieu. However, as section 187 makes clear, any remedy that any party to the limitation proceeding may have against the masters, officers, or seamen of the subject 1983, 23' Seacraft bearing Hull Identification No. SICF3043M83-I and Florida Vessel Registration No. FL 7011 EX is reserved. Brent Towing, 414 F. Supp. at 133. Accordingly, claimants do not require leave of this court to proceed against Jeffrey Beaulieu, as captain of the vessel, or any other master, officer, or seaman of the vessel.
Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:
1) the claimant's Motion to Clarify and/or Modify Ex Parte Order Approving Petitioner's Ad Interim Stipulation for Value, Directing Issuance of Notice, and Restraining Suits and Injunction (Dkt. 13) be GRANTED to the extent that nothing in this court's order dated April 2, 2001 (Dkt. 9) shall be construed to require a stay of any action brought by claimants in state court that arises out of or is connected with the marine casualty set forth in the Petition in this case and is against the captain of the subject 1983, 23' Seacraft bearing Hull Identification No. SICF3043M83-I and Florida Vessel Registration No. FL 7011 EX or any other individual who is not an owner of the above-described vessel;
2) the motion is otherwise DENIED.