Summary
noting the importance of stability and consistency in the child's life when determining what is in the child's best interests
Summary of this case from C.W. v. B.G. (In re Interest of M.J.W.)Opinion
No. 5-723 / 05-0930
Filed November 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Mark J. Smith, Judge.
A.M.M. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
David W. Newell, Muscatine, for appellant-mother.
Thomas G. Reidel of Knoernschild, Conway Reidel, Muscatine, for petitioners-appellees.
Mark J. Neary of Neary Law Office, Muscatine, guardian ad litem.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Amanda appeals the termination of her parental rights to C.M.H. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Amanda gave birth to C.M.H. in the summer of 1999, at the age of eighteen. She struggled financially and had difficulty maintaining a safe and sanitary home for her child.
When C.M.H. was almost two years old, Amanda asked her mother, Kathy, to take care of him. Kathy and her second husband, Kevin, became the child's guardians and caretakers for the ensuing four years.
In late 2004, Kathy and Kevin petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Amanda and C.M.H.'s father. With respect to Amanda, they alleged she abandoned the child and failed to contribute to his support without good cause, following the entry of a child support order. Iowa Code §§ 600A.8(3), (4) (2005). The district court granted the petition pursuant to the abandonment provision.
The court also found Amanda failed to support C.M.H but did not expressly terminate her parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 600A.8(4).
On appeal, Amanda contends (1) she did not abandon C.M.H., as the district court found, and (2) termination is not in C.M.H.'s best interests.
II. Abandonment
The phrase "[t]o abandon a minor child" is defined as follows:
[A] parent, putative father, custodian, or guardian rejects the duties imposed by the parent-child relationship, guardianship, or custodianship, which may be evinced by the person, while being able to do so, making no provision or making only a marginal effort to provide for the support of the child or to communicate with the child.
Id. § 600A.2(18). On our de novo review of the record, we agree with the district court that this definition was satisfied.
A. Quantity and Quality of Contacts.
According to Kathy, whose testimony the district court credited, Amanda's contact with C.M.H. diminished with time. From May to December 2001, Amanda called C.M.H. weekly and spoke to him for a few minutes at a time. She also had two or three overnight visits, three or four day visits, and four or five visits at Kathy's home. In addition, she saw C.M.H. "quite often" at her maternal grandmother's house.
During 2002, Amanda's telephone calls to C.M.H. became less frequent, and remained short. She had one or two overnight visits, one day visit at a park, two visits at Kathy's home, and "four or five" visits at her grandmother's home.
In 2003, Amanda's telephone calls were still short and became more infrequent, with up to twenty-one day gaps between calls. She had no visits of any kind.
In 2004, Amanda's telephone calls were, according to Kathy, "less frequent, very sporadic." During that year, Amanda saw C.M.H. once.
Amanda disputed Kathy's testimony concerning the quantity of contacts she had with her son and testified that her mother thwarted her efforts to maintain a relationship with him. However, we give weight to the district court's finding that Amanda's testimony was "not credible." Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g). We also note Amanda had a driver's license and access to vehicles through the first eleven months of 2003. Although she subsequently lost her license, she was able to obtain transportation from friends and coworkers, she had income, and her mother lived only thirty miles away.
We conclude Amanda's minimal contacts with her son, particularly after 2003, support a finding of abandonment. See In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Iowa 1993) (stating that "total desertion is not required for a showing of abandonment").
B. Child Support and Disability Payments.
As noted, a parent is considered to have abandoned a child if the parent makes "no provision or mak[es] only a marginal effort to provide for the support of the child. . . ." Iowa Code § 600A.2(18).
Effective May 10, 2004 a district court ordered Amanda to pay $312.00 per month in current support as well as an additional payment for back support. Amanda, who admitted she knew of the order, did not make any payments. She stated she would not voluntarily send support, because her mother "abused the privilege of receiving child support" for Amanda and her sister, when they were minors. She also made no voluntary payments before that date even though she had various jobs during the four years C.M.H. was out of her care. Finally, she acknowledged spending some of the money she earned on unnecessary expenditures for herself.
Amanda relies on a letter Kathy and Kevin sent to the Child Support Recovery Unit in October 2001, in which they indicated they did "not wish to receive support from Amanda." We do not consider this letter declining CSRU's support services as eliminating Amanda's equitable obligation to provide support for C.M.H. See Iowa Code § 600A.2(18).
We conclude Amanda had the ability to support C.M.H. but refused to do so. This factor also supports the district court's finding of abandonment even if it is insufficient to support termination under the separate provision on "failure to pay child support without good cause." See id. § 600A.8(4). III. Best Interests
Under section 600A.8(4), the relevant time period is from the date of the support order. Here, the order only became effective on May 10, 2004. Any "failure" to pay support prior to that date is not to be considered under this section. Assuming the district court terminated Amanda's parental rights based on this section, we need not consider this ground, as we have found the petitioners proved abandonment by clear and convincing evidence.
Amanda next contends termination was not in her son's best interests. See In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d at 9. We disagree. C.M.H. exhibited problem behaviors after telephone calls from his mother. On one occasion, he "put the phone down and refused to talk to" Amanda. He retreated to his bedroom, where he ripped wallpaper from the wall. On another, he became upset, put the telephone down, and would not talk to Kathy or Kevin about the conversation.
According to C.M.H.'s social worker, who had been treating the child weekly for ten months, C.M.H. told her that, during the conversation, Amanda said she would "blow up" Kathy's house. After hearing this, C.M.H. refused to sit by the windows at school because he feared the school would be blown up. Amanda did not deny making this statement but said she made it to Kathy, not C.M.H.
In light of this conversation, the social worker advised Kathy and Kevin to terminate contact with Amanda. They followed through with this recommendation. C.M.H.'s behavior subsequently improved.
At the termination hearing, the social worker stated Kathy and Kevin brought "stability and consistency to [C.M.H.'s] life." This stability was essential, as C.M.H. was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and conduct disorder. Based on this record, we agree with the district court that termination of Amanda's parental rights served C.M.H.'s best interests.
IV. Disposition
We affirm the termination of Amanda's parental rights to C.M.H.