Opinion
No. COA14–780.
04-07-2015
In the Matter of C.M.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kimberly N. Callahan, for the State. Anna S. Lucas for juvenile.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kimberly N. Callahan, for the State.
Anna S. Lucas for juvenile.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Juvenile appeals from a trial court order adjudicating him delinquent. On appeal, juvenile argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements made to officers which he alleges to have been obtained as the result of a violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2101. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.
I. Background
On 16 August 2013, at 2:00 a.m., police responded to a break-in at University Meadows Elementary School in Charlotte, North Carolina. When the officers arrived on the scene, three individuals were observed inside the school. A window along the back side of the school was broken and had plywood propped up in the inside of the window, indicating that this was the point of entry. The three individuals were seen running away from the school and entering the woods adjacent to the school. Officers were able to apprehend one of the suspects, William . The two other suspects were not apprehended at that time.
Pseudonyms have been used throughout this opinion to protect the privacy of juveniles.
During the course of an attempted interview, William, a fourteen year old, requested the presence of his father. An officer was sent to William's house to notify his father. While in William's residence, the officer was approached by two females in the home who asked if William's step-brothers, Clark (“juvenile”) and Adam “were with him that night because they were not at home.” William's father and a woman identified as William's step-mother arrived at the station later that night. Derrick Bowlin, a detective with the Charlotte–Mecklenburg Police Department (“CMPD”), expressed to them that he “had some concerns that [Clark and Adam] were involved with this break-in as well, and we left that night with the understanding that we would set up a meeting in the future.”
On 21 August 2013, Detective Bowlin called juvenile and Adam's mother to set up a meeting. The meeting was scheduled for 22 August 2013, at 4:00 p.m., in their home. On 22 August 2013, Detective Bowlin and Officer Codad, a Spanish translator, arrived at juvenile's residence. Before Detective Bowlin approached the residence, he turned on his hand-held audio recorder and placed it in his shirt pocket. Detective Bowlin was dressed in civilian clothes and wore a lanyard containing police identification around his neck. Officer Codad was wearing a police uniform. Both were armed.
Juvenile and Adam's mother answered the door. Detective Bowlin and Officer Codad entered the residence and explained that they “were guests there at the home; that the meeting was voluntary, and that they could tell us to leave at any time.” Although Detective Bowlin's statements were not made directly to juvenile, his statements were loud enough so that juvenile could hear him. Both officers were standing in the living room and juvenile and Adam were seated along the back wall in the living room. Officer Codad was translating for juvenile's mother and juvenile spoke English.
Juvenile was fifteen (15) years old on 22 August 2013 and Detective Bowlin was aware of this fact. Detective Bowlin did not advise juvenile of his rights under Mirandaor N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2101. Juvenile was not put in handcuffs or restrained physically. Detective Bowlin did not retrieve his weapon at any point in the conversation. Juvenile's mother was present throughout the entire conversation. Juvenile answered Detective Bowlin's questions freely. Juvenile and Adam admitted that on 16 August 2013, they were with William. William used a pry tool to remove the plywood panel and the three individuals went inside the school together. They described moving a box of packaged children's toys from a storage closet and discarding it when they were running away from the school. At no point did juvenile or his mother ask the officers to leave their residence. The entire conversation was recorded.
Following the conversation, Detective Bowlin was given consent to search the residence for any stolen property. A small, black Coby television was found and juvenile admitted that he took the television from the school on 16 August 2013. Detective Bowlin and Officer Codad's visit, including the search, lasted approximately one hour. Detective Bowlin arrested juvenile.
On 28 January 2014, petitions were filed against juvenile, alleging that he had committed felony breaking and entering, felony larceny pursuant to felonious breaking and entering, conspiracy to commit felony breaking and entering, and had violated a local curfew ordinance.
On 21 February 2014, juvenile filed a motion to suppress his statements made to CMPD officers on 22 August 2013. Juvenile asserted that under the factors laid out in In re D.A.C.,––– N.C.App. ––––, 741 S.E.2d 378 (2013), the circumstances of the 22 August 2013 meeting amounted to a custodial interrogation. Juvenile argued that because he was not advised of his rights under Mirandaand N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B2101 prior to the interrogation, his statements should be excluded from evidence.
The motion to suppress and the petitions were heard during the 24 March 2014 session of Mecklenburg County District Court. The trial court denied juvenile's motion to suppress, finding that based on the totality of the circumstances, no custodial interrogation had occurred. Thereafter, juvenile admitted the allegations in the petition filed 28 January 2014, alleging one count of conspiracy to commit felony breaking and entering . The trial court adjudicated juvenile delinquent and sentenced him as a level 1 offender. Juvenile was placed on supervised probation for nine months. On 28 March 2014, juvenile filed notice of appeal.
Although not relevant to this appeal, we note that Clark also admitted to the allegations in a juvenile petition filed 21 November 2013, alleging one count of driving without a valid operator's license arising from a 9 April 2013 incident.
--------
II. Standard of Review
“The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Otto, 366 N.C. 134, 136, 726 S.E.2d 824, 827 (2012) (citation omitted). The trial court's conclusions of law are subject to de novoreview. State v. Williams, 366 N.C. 110, 114, 726 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2012).
“Additionally, the trial court's determination of whether an interrogation is conducted while a person is in custody involves reaching a conclusion of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001).
III. Discussion
In his sole argument on appeal, juvenile contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements made to CMPD officers on 22 August 2013. Juvenile argues that his statements resulted from a custodial interrogation and that he was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2101 prior to the interrogation.
In Miranda,the United States Supreme Court stated that a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation must be advised “that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966). Juveniles are also afforded protection by the statutory provisions set forth in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2101 which provide as follows:
(a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to questioning:
(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;
(2) That any statement the juvenile does make can be and may be used against the juvenile;
(3) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning; and
(4) That the juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney and that one will be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented and wants representation.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2101(a) (2014). However, it is well established that “Mirandawarnings and the protections of N.C.G .S. § 7B–2101 apply only to custodial interrogations.” In re W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 247, 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (2009).
The appropriate inquiry in determining whether a person is in custody “is whether, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have thought that he was free to leave because he had been formally arrested or had had his freedom of movement restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” In re A.N.C.,––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 750 S.E.2d 835, 839 (2013) (citation omitted).
This determination involves an objective test, based upon a reasonable person standard, and is to be applied on a case-by-case basis considering all the facts and circumstances. While no single factor controls the determination of whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda[,] our appellate courts have considered such factors as whether a suspect is told he or she is free to leave, whether the suspect is handcuffed, whether the suspect is in the presence of uniformed officers, and the nature of any security around the suspect. Furthermore, so long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.
State v. Yancey, 221 N.C.App. 397, 399–400, 727 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The “ultimate inquiry” is based on the totality of the circumstances. Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338, 543 S.E.2d at 827.
In the present case, the trial court used the holding in In the matter of, D.A.C.,––– N.C.App. ––––, 741 S.E.2d 378 (2013), as guidance in determining that juvenile was not subject to a custodial interrogation on 22 August 2013. On appeal, juvenile argues that the circumstances found in D.A.C.are distinguishable from the circumstances of his case. We disagree.
In D.A.C.,two officers responded to a call that gunshots had been fired into a home. The officers determined that based upon the angle at which the bullets had entered the home, the shots had originated from the house across the street. Id.at –––, 741 S.E.2d at 379. The officers went to the house across the street and asked the juvenile, D.A.C., if his mother was home. The officers informed D.A.C.'s mother that shots had been fired into the home across the street and asked if D.A.C. had been outside shooting. D.A .C.'s mother informed the officers that she had been home most of the day with the exception of a few brief periods of time. Id.The officers obtained permission from D.A.C's mother to search the area outside D.A.C.'s home and found spent shotgun shells on the front porch. Id.The officers spoke with D.A.C.'s father and informed him that they were going to speak with D.A.C. briefly outside. D.A.C.'s father told D.A.C. to be truthful. The officers asked D.A .C. if they could speak with him and D.A.C. gave an affirmative response. Id.The officers informed D.A.C.'s parents that they could accompany their son outside, but both parents remained inside the home with the door shut. Id.The officers and D.A.C. went to a point about ten feet outside the home and their conversation lasted five minutes. Id.
Everyone was standing at arm's length from each other during this discussion. [One officer] was wearing civilian clothes, while [the other officer] was in uniform. Although both officers were armed, neither of them touched or made any movement towards their weapons at any point. Juvenile was not placed under arrest, handcuffed, or searched. On the other hand, neither officer ever explicitly told Juvenile that he was free to leave or advised Juvenile of his rights under Mirandaor N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2101. Juvenile never indicated that he did not want to speak, asked to leave, or requested to speak with anyone else.
Id.at –––, 741 S.E.2d at 379–80. After being questioned about whether he fired a gun from his residence into the home across the street, D.A.C. admitted to having fired five or six shots and explained that he had been attempting to hit a bird house across the street. Id.
D.A.C. filed a motion to suppress his oral statements made to the officers and the trial court denied his motion to suppress. Id.On appeal, D.A.C. argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because he was in custody at the time he was questioned by the two officers and that he had not been advised of his rights under Mirandaand N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2101. Id.Our Court held that based on the totality of the circumstances, D.A.C. was “not subject to the degree of restraint inherent in a formal arrest at the time that he admitted having shot in the direction of the neighbor's house.” Id.at –––, 741 S.E.2d at 382. The following factors, inter alia,were relevant in the determination: the fact that the officers asked D.A.C. to step outside, rather than instructing him to do so; all participants were standing and remained at arm's length from each other; one officer was wearing civilian clothes; D.A.C. was questioned in an open area with his parents nearby; the conversation was in daylight and lasted for five minutes; neither officer made any motion toward the use of his weapon.
After thoughtful consideration, we find the circumstances of juvenile's case to be similar to the circumstances found in D.A.C.In the present case, juvenile's mother had scheduled the meeting with Detective Bowlin and invited the officers inside her home for the meeting. Juvenile was fifteen years old on 22 August 2013 and Detective Bowlin was aware of this fact. Detective Bowlin testified that when he asked juvenile a question, his answers were given “freely.” The conversation took place in juvenile's home at 4:00 p.m. so it was still light outside. Detective Bowlin wore civilian clothes while Officer Codad was in uniform. Juvenile was questioned in the presence of his mother. Although both officers were armed, neither reached for their weapons at any point in the conversation. Juvenile was not handcuffed or physically restrained in any way. At no point throughout the conversation did juvenile or his mother ask the officers to leave or request to end the conversation.
While juvenile was suspected of being involved in entering the school on 16 August 2013 based on the fact that his step-brother had been detained and arrested at the scene and two females in juvenile's home asked about juvenile's whereabouts that night, our Court stated in D.A.C.as follows:
[a]lthough any interview of a suspect will necessarily possess coercive aspects, Mirandawarnings are not required simply because the questioned person is suspected by the police of wrongdoing. In fact, [a]bsent indicia of formal arrest, [the facts] that police have identified the person interviewed as a suspect and that the interview was designed to produce incriminating responses from the person are not relevant in assessing whether that person was in custody for Mirandapurposes.
Id.at –––, 714 S.E.2d at 382 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we are unable to hold that juvenile was subject to the degree of restraint inherent in a formal arrest at the time he admitted to breaking and entering into the school. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err by finding that juvenile's statements to officers on 22 August 2013 resulted from an impermissible custodial interrogation conducted without the warnings required pursuant to Mirandaand N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2101. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of juvenile's motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
Judges CALABRIA and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Opinion
Appeal by juvenile from disposition entered 26 March 2014 by Judge Kimberly Best–Staton in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 December 2014.