Opinion
No. COA12–94.
2012-08-7
In the matter of C.L.K.C.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by LaToya B. Powell, Assistant Attorney General, for State. Richard Croutharmel for respondent.
Appeal by respondent from orders entered 14 October 2011 by Judge Lawrence J. Fine in Forsyth County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 May 2012. Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by LaToya B. Powell, Assistant Attorney General, for State. Richard Croutharmel for respondent.
THIGPEN, Judge.
C.L.K.C. appeals from orders entered 14 October 2011 adjudicating C.L.K.C. delinquent, ordering a Level III disposition, and committing C.L.K.C. to a Youth Development Center for a minimum of six months and a maximum of C.L.K.C.'s 21st birthday. After careful consideration, we reverse and remand the order of the trial court.
The facts of this case are undisputed: On 18 April 2011, the mother of twelve-year-old C.L.K.C. discovered C.L.K.C. engaging in a sexual act with his younger sister (“the victim”) in the woods. On 10 August 2011, a juvenile petition of delinquency was filed alleging that C.L.K.C. unlawfully, willfully and feloniously engaged in a sexual act with the victim, who was under the age of thirteen years. The petition alleged this was in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–27.4(a)(1), which prohibits first degree statutory sex offense. The petition further alleged that C.L.K.C. was under the age of eighteen and committed the delinquent act when he was under the age of sixteen, but was at least four years older than the victim. On 6 October 2011, C.L.K.C. executed a written transcript of admission admitting to the charge of first degree statutory sex offense “in exchange for ... the disposition of probation, specifically to placement in Keys of the Carolinas.” The admission was signed by C .L.K.C., the attorney for C.L.K.C., and the prosecutor. The trial court accepted C.L.K.C.'s admission and signed the document on 6 October 2011.
After the 6 October 2011 hearing, the trial court adjudicated C.L .K.C. delinquent of first degree sex offense of a child and proceeded to the disposition, at which time the trial court placed C.L.K.C. in detention, continuing the disposition until 8 November 2011. However, the trial court then changed its order, finding it was in C.L.K.C.'s best interests to be placed in a Youth Development Center for a minimum of six months and a maximum of his 21st birthday. From the trial court's orders, C.L.K.C. appeals.
I: Standard of Review
C.L.K.C. alleges violations of statutory mandates. “Alleged statutory errors are questions of law.” State v. Mackey, ––– N .C.App. ––––, ––––, 708 S.E.2d 719, 721,disc. review denied,365 N.C. 193, 707 S.E.2d 246 (2011). A question of law is reviewed de novo. Id. Under the de novo standard, the Court “considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower” court. State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quotation omitted).
II: N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2407(c)
In C.L.K.C.'s first argument on appeal, he contends the trial court erred by accepting his admission without receiving a proper factual basis to establish all of the elements of the offense. The State concedes this argument, and we agree with respondent and the State.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2407(c), provides the following:
The court may accept an admission only after determining that there is a factual basis for the admission. This determination may be based upon any of the following information: a statement of the facts by the prosecutor; a written statement of the juvenile; sworn testimony which may include reliable hearsay; or a statement of facts by the juvenile's attorney.
Id.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–27.4(a)(1) requires that the victim be under the age of thirteen years and that the accused be at least four years older than the victim. In this case, there was no statement or sworn testimony regarding the victim's age. The trial court could not have made a proper factual determination that C.L.K.C. was at least four years older than the victim without such evidence. Therefore, C.L.K.C.'s admission of guilt must be vacated in this matter. See In re D.C., 191 N.C.App. 246, 248, 662 S.E.2d 570, 572 (2008) (vacating a juvenile's admission of guilt to felony larceny and attempted felony larceny of a vehicle valued at more than $1,000 because there was insufficient information to establish a factual basis for the juvenile's admission of guilt; specifically, there was no evidence that “the pickup truck was worth more than $1,000”).
III: Plea Arrangement
In C.L.K.C.'s second argument on appeal, he contends the trial court erred by accepting his admission pursuant to a plea arrangement that imposed a Level II disposition, and thereafter, rejecting his plea arrangement to instead impose a Level III disposition, in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2407(b). The State concedes this argument, and we agree with respondent and the State.
An admission by a juvenile “is the equivalent to a plea of guilty by an adult in a criminal prosecution.” In re Johnson, 32 N.C.App. 492, 493, 232 S.E.2d 486, 487–88 (1977). “We have held that when a trial court plans to impose a disposition level higher than that set out in the [transcript of admission], the juvenile must be given a chance to withdraw his plea and be granted a continuance.” In re D.A.F., 179 N.C.App. 832, 836, 635 S.E.2d 509, 511 (2006) (citing In re W.H., 166 N.C.App. 643, 647, 603 S.E.2d 356, 359 (2004)). “Our reasoning was based on the fact that [w]e have long considered that the acceptance of an admission by a juvenile is tantamount to the acceptance of a guilty plea by an adult in a criminal case, and thus, the record must therefore affirmatively show on its face that the admission was entered knowingly and voluntarily.” D.A.F., 179 N.C.App. at 836, 635 S .E.2d at 512.
In this case, C.L.K.C.'s admission was based on his understanding that he would receive a Level II disposition, as provided in his plea arrangement. When the trial court imposed a greater disposition than agreed to in the plea arrangement, the court was required to give C.L.K.C. a chance to withdraw his admission and grant him a continuance until the next session of court. The court did neither. For this reason, C.L.K.C.'s admission is vacated, and the order is reversed and remanded to the trial court. See D.A.F., 179 N.C.App. at 836, 635 S.E.2d at 512.
IV: Abuse of Discretion
In C.L.K.C.'s third argument on appeal, he contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a Level III disposition without making sufficient findings of fact to show that it had considered the factors listed in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2501(c). The State concedes this argument, and we agree with respondent and the State.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2501(c) provides the following:
In choosing among statutorily permissible dispositions, the court shall select the most appropriate disposition both in terms of kind and duration for the delinquent juvenile. Within the guidelines set forth in G.S. 7B–2508, the court shall select a disposition that is designed to protect the public and to meet the needs and best interests of the juvenile, based upon:
(1) The seriousness of the offense;
(2) The need to hold the juvenile accountable;
(3) The importance of protecting the public safety;
(4) The degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case; and
(5) The rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile indicated by a risk and needs assessment.
Id. “The dispositional order shall be in writing and shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court shall state with particularity, both orally and in the written order of disposition, the precise terms of the disposition[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2512. “[T]he trial court is required to make findings demonstrating that it considered the N.C.G.S. § 7B–2501(c) factors in a dispositional order entered in a juvenile delinquency matter.” In re V.M., ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 712 S.E.2d 213, 215 (2011).
In this case, there are no additional written findings beyond the checkmarks placed beside the pre-printed portions of the order. Thus, the dispositional order must be reversed and remanded. See id. at ––––, 712 S.E.2d at 215 (reversing and remanding a dispositional order when the trial court checked boxes indicating that it had received, considered, and incorporated by reference the predisposition report, risk assessment, and needs assessment, and that “[t]he juvenile has been adjudicated for a violent or serious offense and Level III is authorized by G.S. 7B–2508[,]” but the “trial court's order contained no additional findings of fact”).
V: Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we must vacate C.L.K.C.'s admission of guilt, reverse the trial court's dispositional order, and remand this matter for a new adjudication and dispositional hearing.
C.L.K.C. also filed a motion to remand to the trial court for purposes of appointing a guardian ad litem to decide whether to withdraw C.L.K.C's appeal. We denied this motion. However, upon remand, we encourage the trial court to consider—if appropriate, and as the law allows—appointing a guardian ad litem for C.L.K .C.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Judges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur.