Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5594-13T2
04-20-2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF W.A., SVP 183-01.
Jo Astrid Glading, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant W.A. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney). Erick James Lucadamo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fisher and Nugent. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, SVP No. 183-01. Jo Astrid Glading, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant W.A. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney). Erick James Lucadamo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney). PER CURIAM
W.A. appeals from a June 18, 2014 order, which continued his commitment to the Special Treatment Unit (STU) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to-27.38. He argues that the trial judge gave undue weight to the opinions of the State's witnesses and, ultimately, that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, if released, he is highly likely to commit acts of sexual violence. We find no merit in W.A.'s arguments and affirm.
An individual, once convicted of a predicate offense as defined by the SVPA, may be subject to an involuntary civil commitment if suffering from "a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(b). Annual review hearings are required to determine whether the person remains in need of commitment despite treatment. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35; see also N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a).
To warrant commitment, or continuation of the individual's prior commitment, the State must prove "the individual has serious difficulty in controlling sexually harmful behavior such that it is highly likely that he or she will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend." In re Civil Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 132 (2002); see also In re Civil Commitment of J.M.B., 197 N.J. 563, 571, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 999, 130 S. Ct. 509, 175 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2009); In re Civil Commitment of G.G.N., 372 N.J. Super. 42, 46-47 (App. Div. 2004). The court must address the individual's "present serious difficulty with control over dangerous sexual behavior," and the State must establish "by clear and convincing evidence . . . that it is highly likely that the person . . . will reoffend." W.Z., supra, 173 N.J. at 132-34; see also In re Civil Commitment of J.H.M., 367 N.J. Super. 599, 611 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 179 N.J. 312 (2004).
W.A. is forty-five-years old and has been committed to the STU since 2001. The predicate offenses giving rise to his commitment have been discussed in earlier opinions and need not be repeated here. See, e.g., In re Civil Commitment of W.A., No. A-1591-02 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2006).
At the two-day hearing in question, the judge heard from the State's three witnesses, which included two experts, and W.A.'s two witnesses, an expert and an investigator for the public defender's office. W.A. did not testify.
Judge Freedman rendered a very thorough oral decision in which he reviewed the history of W.A.'s commitment and the predicate offenses, as well as the evidence adduced at earlier hearings that led to the continuation of commitment, and the statutes and case law governing such matters. The judge then drew the following conclusions:
I'm satisfied that there's no question that [W.A.] suffers from a severe antisocial personality disorder, everybody diagnoses him with that including his own expert, . . . that it affects him in such a way as to predispose him. Everybody agrees with that as well.
The only issue really is . . . the level of his risk, his expert feels that with a lot of substantial supervision, he could . . . be conditionally discharged [and that W.A.] doesn't have to be committed[.] [T]he State's experts disagree.In making thorough findings on that particular question, including findings that W.A. continues to minimize his past conduct and that W.A. "does what he wants when he wants to do it, and that includes engaging in sex," the judge ultimately credited the State's witnesses and determined that the circumstances did not warrant a conditional discharge.
Based on the testimony he found credible, the judge concluded that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that W.A. was highly likely to reoffend. The judge's findings and his expertise in these matters are entitled to our deference. In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 174-75 (2014). We, therefore, affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Freedman in his comprehensive and thoughtful oral decision.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION