Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1601-14T2
03-06-2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF J.E., SVP 508-08.
Patrick Madden, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant J.E. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney). Amy Beth Cohn, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fisher and Accurso. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, SVP No. 508-08. Patrick Madden, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant J.E. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney). Amy Beth Cohn, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney). PER CURIAM
J.E. appeals from a November 10, 2014 order, which continued his commitment to the Special Treatment Unit (STU) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. J.E. argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he suffers from a mental or emotional condition that makes him highly likely to reoffend if released. We find no merit in J.E.'s arguments and affirm.
An individual, once convicted of a predicate offense as defined by the SVPA, may be subject to an involuntary civil commitment when suffering from "a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(b). Annual review hearings are required to determine whether the person remains in need of commitment despite treatment. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35; see also N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a).
To warrant commitment, or continuation of the individual's prior commitment, the State must prove "the individual has serious difficulty in controlling sexually harmful behavior such that it is highly likely that he or she will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend." In re Civil Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 132 (2002); see also In re Civil Commitment of J.M.B., 197 N.J. 563, 571, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 999, 130 S. Ct. 509, 175 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2009); In re Civil Commitment of G.G.N., 372 N.J. Super. 42, 46-47 (App. Div. 2004). The court must address the individual's "present serious difficulty with control over dangerous sexual behavior," and the State must establish "by clear and convincing evidence . . . that it is highly likely that the person . . . will reoffend." W.Z., supra, 173 N.J. at 132-34; see also In re Civil Commitment of J.H.M., 367 N.J. Super. 599, 611 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 179 N.J. 312 (2004).
As described in an earlier appeal, In re Civil Commitment of J.E., No. A-5297-08 (App. Div. May 22, 2012), J.E. has a considerable criminal history relevant to defining him as a sexually violent predator. Among other things, in 1978, when he was seventeen-years old, J.E. was adjudicated delinquent for forcibly engaging in sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl. Id. at 3. In 1980, J.E. was arrested and eventually convicted — after we reversed an earlier conviction — of sexual assault. Ibid. J.E. was later released but returned to prison in September 1986 for violating his parole and was not again released until November 1989. Id. at 3-4. Four months later, J.E. assaulted a pregnant acquaintance and was convicted of forcible sexual contact and imprisoned until April 1992. Id. at 4. In 2000, J.E. was acquitted of sexually assaulting a thirteen-year-old girl on numerous occasions. Ibid. And, in 2005, J.E. was arrested and convicted of second-degree luring and other offenses — as a result of arranging through the internet a meeting for sexual purposes with a police officer, who was posing as a twelve-year-old girl — and sentenced to a five-year prison term subject to a thirty-six-month period of parole ineligibility. Id. at 1-2. In our prior opinion affirming J.E.'s commitment to the STU, we determined that J.E. had previously been convicted of a predicate offense. Id. at 22-23. It cannot seriously be argued otherwise.
J.E. now seeks reversal of the November 10, 2014 judgment, arguing the evidence offered in support of his continued commitment was inadequate. We reject this. The trial judge relied on the testimony of the State's expert, whom the judge found "very credible," "very forthright," and "very knowledgeable." Despite the competing evidence offered by J.E., the judge found the State's evidence was clear and convincing. The judge determined that, although J.E. is "making progress," he is "still highly likely to engage in further acts of sexual violence if not confined to a secure facility for control, care and treatment." The judge took particular note that it was
[v]ery troubling that the last [offense] was in 2005 where [J.E.] was actually attempting to lure a 12 year old over a long course of time by telephone [and] internet to meet her and to have sex with her, so I find that at this particular point he is a danger to the public, he's a danger to the community.In addition, the judge found J.E. was properly diagnosed as having "other specified paraphilic disorder nonconsent," and that he suffers from substance abuse problems and "antisocial personality disorder." The judge determined that J.E. must address in treatment the fact that he "[d]oesn't believe that he's a sexual deviant." That is, the judge found J.E. "minimizes his offending and . . . cannot develop a proper relapse prevention [approach]," a circumstance that further demonstrates J.E. is highly likely to reoffend.
Our standard of review requires deference to the judge's findings and his expertise. In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 174-75 (2014).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THEAPPELLATE DIVISION