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In re Christopher C.

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Jan 29, 2008
No. D050920 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2008)

Opinion


In re CHRISTOPHER C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER C., Defendant and Appellant. D050920 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division January 29, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. J208988, Francis M. Devaney, Judge.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

Christopher C., a ward of the juvenile court, appeals from an order that he pay restitution in the amount of $47,179.12 following his admission that he committed battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)). Christopher contends the court abused its discretion by setting the monthly payments at $1,000 and in considering his parents' income in determining his ability to make the payments. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

FACTS

At about 1:00 a.m. on August 25, 2006, Christopher and a large group of fellow teenagers confronted Logan Knutzen and his girlfriend as the couple left an Encinitas restaurant. After a verbal exchange, the teenagers chased the couple, who ran into a nearby alley. When the teenagers surrounded the couple, Knutzen grabbed a large piece of wood and held it as a shield. While others in his group grabbed wood sticks, Christopher picked up a metal fence pole with chain link on it and swung the pole, hitting Knutzen on the right side of his face. The teenagers fled. Christopher later told law enforcement officials that he had consumed 12 beers that night.

Knutzen suffered a fracture to his orbital socket, a crushed sinus, a crushed cheekbone and a laceration to his eyebrow, which required 15 stitches. The plastic surgeon who operated on Knutzen said "he had never seen an eye socket, sinus and cheekbone so smashed."

The San Diego County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, alleging that Christopher had committed the following offenses: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); battery resulting in serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)); and false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236).

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

On December 4 Christopher admitted he committed battery that resulted in serious bodily injury, and the rest of the petition was dismissed.

On January 10, 2007, the court continued Christopher as a ward of the court, committed him to Camp Barrett for a period not to exceed 365 days (stayed pending further hearing) and placed Christopher with his father on home supervision. The court also ordered Christopher, among other things, to complete the Phoenix House program, and attend at least two Alcoholics Anonymous meetings per week. The court set the initial amount of restitution to Knutzen at $3,500 and found that Christopher and his parents are presumed jointly and severally responsible for the restitution.

On January 17, 2006, Christopher was declared a ward after he admitted an allegation that he committed petty theft. At that time, the court placed Christopher on probation and placed him with his father.

On March 9 the court vacated the order setting Knutzen's restitution at $3,500, and set Knutzen's restitution at $40,179.72 after the parties stipulated to that amount. The court ordered the restitution be paid in monthly payments of $2,000.

On May 16 the court reduced the monthly amount of restitution to $1,000 and found each of Christopher's parents are liable for $34,700 in restitution.

Christopher's parents are divorced. Christopher lives with his father in Encinitas and spends every other weekend with his mother in Hemet.

DISCUSSION

Christopher contends the court abused its discretion in setting the monthly restitution payments at $1,000 as a condition of probation because the court considered the parents' incomes as part of his ability to make the payments. We disagree.

The California Constitution provides, "It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).)

Restitution has long been considered a valid condition of probation because of its rehabilitative value. (See People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th at 1114, 1121.) " 'Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.' " (Id. at p. 1124.) "In addition, while it is still recognized that orders of restitution have rehabilitative purposes, it is now also recognized that such orders have the additional important purpose of preventing the victims of crimes from suffering economic loss." (In re I.M. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1209; see also Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).)

The juvenile court is vested with wide discretion to order restitution in a manner that will further the legislative objectives of making the victim whole, rehabilitating the minor and deterring future delinquent behavior. (In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381.)

Section 730.6, subdivision (a)(1), which imposes direct liability for restitution on minors, states: "It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be the person described in Section 602 who incurs any economic loss as a result of the minor's conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor." Section 730.6, subdivision (h) provides, in relevant part, that a restitution order "shall identify each victim . . . and the amount of each victim's loss to which it pertains, and shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct . . . ." (Italics added.)

Section 730.6, subdivision (h), also provides that the juvenile court "shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record. A minor's inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling or extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution order, nor shall inability to pay be a consideration in determining the amount of the restitution order."

Section 730.7, which provides for vicarious liability for the minor's parents, provides in pertinent part:

"(a) In a case in which a minor is ordered to make restitution to the victim or victims . . . a parent or guardian who has joint or sole legal and physical custody and control of the minor shall be rebuttably presumed to be jointly and severally liable with the minor in accordance with Section[] 1714.1 . . . of the Civil Code for the amount of restitution . . . so ordered, up to the limits provided in [Civil Code section 1714.1], subject to the court's consideration of the parent's or guardian's inability to pay. When considering the parent's or guardian's inability to pay, the court may consider future earning capacity, present income, the number of persons dependent on that income, and the necessary obligations of the family, including, but not limited to, rent or mortgage payments, food, children's school tuition, children's clothing, medical bills, and health insurance. The parent or guardian shall have the burden of showing an inability to pay." (§ 730.7, subd. (a).)

Civil Code section 1714.1 provides: "Any act of willful misconduct of a minor [which] results in injury or death to another person or in any injury to the property of another shall be imputed to the parent or guardian having custody and control of the minor for all purposes of civil damages, and the parent or guardian having custody and control shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages resulting from the willful misconduct."

"The legislative intent of section 730.7 is to impose joint and several liability on the parents for the economic damages arising out of the criminal acts of their children while they are minors, even when the delinquent child reaches majority before the restitution order can be imposed. Section 730.7 is intended to transfer the vicarious liability policy endorsed by Civil Code section 1714.1 to juvenile court proceedings, in part, so that victims of a crime committed by a minor may seek restitution from the parents without the need for a separate independent civil action." (In re Jeffrey M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1025.) Thus, "as between innocent third parties and the parents of a minor child causing damage through willful misconduct, the parents should bear the burden of responsibility of the loss in order to ensure recovery of any losses incurred."(Id. at p. 1026.)

The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion. " 'A victim's restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.' ' "When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court." ' " (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132, citations omitted.)

Here, the parties stipulated that restitution to Knutzen should be $40,179.72; that amount is not in dispute. In reducing the amount of monthly payments from $2,000 to $1,000, the court relied upon, among other things, the financial statements provided by each of Christopher's parents, and Christopher's ability to get a job. The court found the $2000 monthly payment "unrealistic and not doable" and the $1,000 monthly payment "realistic and doable" as well as "reasonable." The court said "[b]etween Christopher working and his parents finding $100 here or there per month," the monthly payment of $1,000 could be accomplished.

We find the order that Christopher, with the assistance of his parents, make monthly restitution payments in the amount of $1,000 was reasonable. A juvenile court may require a minor to go to work to earn money to make restitution. (See § 730, subd. (b).) In keeping with the purposes of restitution─making the victim whole, rehabilitating the minor and deterring future delinquent behavior─the court acted well within its discretion in concluding that Christopher should get a job and prioritize payment of restitution to Knutzen. The record indicates Christopher is in good health and does not suffer from any disability that would preclude employment. The court found Christopher will "be able to find close to a [$1,000] a month on his own, never mind contributions that mom and dad can help while this is pending." The court explained that Christopher could earn $250 a week if he found a job that paid $10 an hour and worked 25 hours a week, or if he found a job that paid $6 an hour, which is below the minimum wage and worked 40 hours, he could earn $240 a week.

The court did not abuse its discretion in considering the parents' income in ordering restitution be paid in $1,000 monthly installments. The court properly found the parents jointly and severally liable under section 730.7, subdivision (a). The court's determination, based on the parents' financial statements, that they had the ability to contribute to the $1,000 monthly installments by cutting down on some of their other expenses was sound. In assessing whether the minor's parents should be responsible for payment of restitution, the court properly takes into account the parents' ability to pay, and "may consider future earning capacity, present income, the number of persons dependent on that income, and the necessary obligations of the family, including, but not limited to, rent or mortgage payments, food, children's school tuition, children's clothing, medical bills, and health insurance." (§ 730.7, subd. (a).)

In sum, given the statutory requirement that victims receive full restitution for economic loss caused by juvenile offenders, and the juvenile court's broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation to rehabilitate delinquent minors by forcing them to confront the harm caused by their crimes, we find no abuse of discretion in the challenged restitution order.

DISPOSITION

The restitution order is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J., O'ROURKE, J.


Summaries of

In re Christopher C.

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Jan 29, 2008
No. D050920 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2008)
Case details for

In re Christopher C.

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER C., Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Jan 29, 2008

Citations

No. D050920 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2008)