Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CK69438 Stanley Genser, Commissioner.
John Cahill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
MOSK, J.
K.D. (mother) appeals an order of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her parental rights over her daughter, C.D. (child). Mother argues that no substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that C.D., a special-needs child, was likely to be adopted. We conclude substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding. We therefore affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
BACKGROUND
A. Detention and Reunification Period
In April 2007-before child was born-mother entered into a Voluntary Family Maintenance Agreement (VFMA) with the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) with respect to three of her older children. Child was born shortly thereafter. In August 2007, DCFS determined that mother had failed to comply with the VFMA because she had left child in the care of maternal grandmother, a cocaine user, and was unable to provide child with such necessities as running water, electricity or an operable refrigerator. DCFS detained child and filed a petition pursuant to section 300 alleging, as relevant here, that mother created a detrimental and endangering home environment by giving maternal grandmother unlimited access to child and by running an electric extension cord from a neighboring home to provide electricity to the family home. The juvenile court ordered child detained. Child was placed in the home of C.J. (caregiver).
Four of child’s half-siblings also were subjects of these dependency proceedings. This appeal concerns only child, and we state the case only as it relates to her.
The record contains conflicting reports regarding when child was placed with caregiver. It appears most likely that child was placed with caregiver in early August 2007, shortly after child was detained. Child was then two months old.
Mother entered a mediation agreement as to jurisdiction and disposition. The juvenile court sustained the petition and adopted mother’s stipulated case plan.
An evaluation of child at Childrens Hospital Los Angeles (Childrens Hospital), dated October 30, 2007, concluded that it was unclear whether child had been exposed to drugs or alcohol in utero. A developmental assessment was recommended.
When child had been placed with caregiver, child had no immunizations, severe diaper rash and eating problems. She was underweight and one-to-two months retarded in growth. Child’s left side appeared to be weak. Caregiver acted quickly to resolve those problems. By November 2007, child had been diagnosed with gastroesophageal reflux disease and, with treatment, her eating problems had been resolved. Child’s immunizations had been brought current; her diaper rash was gone; and child had gained a substantial amount of weight. With the assistance of DCFS, caregiver had arranged for child to be assessed for developmental delays at the Regional Center and to be assessed and treated for hypertonicity by medical professionals. In May 2008, DCFS reported that child appeared to be adjusting and doing well in caregiver’s home.
Hypertonicity refers to abnormally rigid muscle tone, hampering proper movement. (See generally Sanger, et al., Classification and Definition of Disorders Causing Hypertonia in Childhood (Jan. 2003) 111 Pediatrics, e89, available at [as of May 28, 2010].)
In June 2008, DCFS reported that child was eligible for Regional Center services and would be receiving in-home infant development program services once per week. In addition, a developmental assessment of child had been completed at Childrens Hospital. The assessors noted that mother had reported a history of significant learning problems and that child’s father had a problem with his “‘nerves’” that caused him to “shake” on the left side of his body. The assessors concluded that child was in the average range in cognitive function; in the borderline range in language function, with a receptive function significantly below average; and significantly below average in motor function. Child used her right side more actively than her left side. She also exhibited atypical movement patterns and had significant difficulty with her muscle tone. The assessors observed that caregiver was attentive to child’s needs and that child responded well to and was “securely attached” to caregiver. Caregiver told the assessors that she would consider adopting child if child’s relatives were unable to care for her. The assessors recommended that child receive a full neurological evaluation, an MRI, and early intervention services. DCFS referred child to a fetal alcohol clinic for an assessment.
In August 2008, DCFS reported that child was 14 months old and was not walking. She was receiving occupational therapy. Child was doing well in caregiver’s home, and caregiver was committed to caring for child on a long-term basis. In September and October 2008, DCFS reported that child was receiving all appropriate services to address her needs and that caregiver was in compliance with child’s Regional Center appointments and was transporting child to her medical appointments. Child was making “great progress” due to her services and, within the space of two months, had gone from scooting to walking to attempting to run. DCFS reported that caregiver was interested in legal guardianship of child.
In December 2008, DCFS reported that child had been screened for fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Based on child’s facial features and reports that mother was seen drinking during her pregnancy, the screening concluded that child was at high risk for prenatal exposure to alcohol. A more thorough evaluation returned a tentative diagnosis of neurobehavioral disorder with sentinel physical findings and high risk of prenatal alcohol exposure, but a full diagnosis was deferred. The evaluation stated that child exhibited facial features associated with FAS; she was at high risk of prenatal alcohol exposure; there was some evidence of brain dysfunction or delayed development, indicating probable neurobehavioral disorder; and there was no evidence of growth deficiency. A final diagnosis could be rendered only after it was determined whether child’s developmental delay in language and motor development resolved with time. If they did not, child’s diagnosis likely would be full FAS.
In March 2009, DCFS reported that child was “excelling” and had made “great progress” in her Regional Center services. She could run and she responded to sound. She continued to do well in caregiver’s home and caregiver was “willing to commit to more permanent placement” if mother’s reunification services failed.
In April 2009, DCFS reported that child had been referred for treatment of an abnormal gait. Child had also begun a neurological assessment at White Memorial Medical Center, but no MRI had been done. According to child’s physician, child would have to wait six weeks to schedule an appointment for a second opinion. Child had a hearing test that indicated normal function, but it was recommended that the tests be repeated in three months. A follow-up audiology appointment had been scheduled.
On April 7, 2009, for reasons not relevant here, the juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification services and scheduled a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
B. Permanency Planning
In early August 2009, DCFS reported that child remained with caregiver and identified caregiver as child’s prospective adoptive parent. A home study had been commenced, but because caregiver had adopted a child before and was in the process of adopting another child, all that was needed to complete the home study was a spousal waiver. DCFS reported that caregiver was “committed to adopting” child and providing child with a permanent and stable home. Caregiver was meeting child’s educational, mental and emotional needs. DCFS stated that the assessment of caregiver would be completed once the home study had been received by DCFS. No additional adoption assessment was provided.
At a hearing on August 4, 2009, the attorney for child told the juvenile court that caregiver was concerned that if she adopted child, she might not be able to provide child with all of the services that would be available under a guardianship plan. The juvenile court identified adoption as the permanent plan for child, but stated it did not find by clear and convincing evidence that child was adoptable in light of her medical and developmental issues. At another hearing the following day, child’s attorney informed the juvenile court that child was “doing fine” in her placement with caregiver.
In late August 2009, DCFS reported that child, then two years old, continued to make “great progress” in her developmental services. She was able to run, respond to sound, seek attention, and help herself with drinks and snacks. Child was also “adjusting and doing well” emotionally. Caregiver was committed to providing a permanent home for child, but was “currently struggling” to decide between guardianship and adoption “because of the child[’s] special needs.”
In early November 2009, DCFS informed the juvenile court that the home study on caregiver had been completed and approved. Caregiver told DCFS that “it was always her intent to adopt [child], but the child’s attorney told her not to adopt the child but to pursue legal guardianship.” Caregiver told DCFS that she would appear at the next hearing to clarify for the juvenile court her interest in adopting child. DCFS recommended that the juvenile court find that child was likely to be adopted and terminate mother’s parental rights. At a hearing on November 4, 2009, child’s attorney told the juvenile court that, in fact, she had not told caregiver to pursue guardianship; rather, the caregiver had been interested in guardianship and adoption, and had been confused about whether child would be removed and placed in an adoptive home if she (caregiver) chose guardianship. Child’s attorney told the juvenile court that caregiver wanted to pursue adoption. Mother requested a contested hearing.
In December 2009, DCFS reported that child had special needs due to her prenatal exposure to alcohol. Child and caregiver were attached to one another, and caregiver “expressed interest and commitment to adopt” child.
At the contested hearing, the juvenile court received into evidence the last three DCFS reports. Caregiver was present at the hearing. Mother, however, declined to conduct any cross-examination or to present any affirmative evidence. Mother’s attorney objected to the termination of parental rights on the ground that mother had tried “repeatedly to contact” caregiver and had been unable to visit with child; the juvenile court rejected mother’s assertion because mother had presented no evidence with respect to visitation. Mother’s attorney then stated that mother did “not feel” that adoption was appropriate “given [child’s] unique and special needs.” Child’s attorney informed the juvenile court that she favored the termination of parental rights and that caregiver was willing to adopt child. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that child was adoptable; terminated mother’s parental rights; and ordered DCFS to make the adoptive placement by February 3, 2010 or show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for its failure to do so. Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. No Forfeiture of Substantial Evidence Review
DCFS contends that mother forfeited her right to substantial evidence review because she failed to object in the juvenile court on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. We disagree for two independent reasons.
First, the premise of DCFS’s argument is incorrect. After the close of evidence at the contested hearing, mother expressly objected to the juvenile court finding child adoptable on the grounds of child’s “unique and special needs.” Mother’s objection was sufficient to preserve the issue of whether DCFS carried its burden of proving child’s adoptability in light of child’s special needs. This is the issue raised by mother on appeal.
Second, mother requested and received a contested hearing on the issue of adoptability. “When the merits are contested, a parent is not required to object to the social service agency’s failure to carry its burden of proof on the question of adoptability. [Citations.] ‘Generally, points not urged in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal. [Citation.] The contention that a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, however, is an obvious exception to the rule.’ [Citations.] Thus, while a parent may waive the objection that an adoption assessment does not comply with the [applicable statutory] requirements..., a claim that there was insufficient evidence of the child’s adoptability at a contested hearing is not waived by failure to argue the issue in the juvenile court.” (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623; see also In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1317.)
The authority cited by DCFS is not persuasive. In In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, the parent challenged the admissibility of the adoption assessment provided by the social services agency. (Id. at p. 411.) The appellate court held that the parent forfeited any such challenge because she failed to object in the juvenile court. (Id. at pp. 411-412.) The court then stated, “If the complaint on appeal be deemed not the admissibility, as such, of inadequate assessment reports, but substantive insufficiently [sic]to establish requisite findings, this complaint, too, was waived by failure to raise it at the trial level. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
DCFS contends this last sentence is authority that a parent may forfeit the issue of sufficiency of the evidenceby failing to raise it in the juvenile court. We do not read the sentence so broadly. We read the sentence to state that the parent in In re Crystal J., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 407, forfeited her challenge to the substantive adequacy of the adoption assessment, not a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. In other words, by failing to raise in the juvenile court the issue of whether the adoption assessment satisfied the substantive requirements of the applicable statute, the parent forfeited any contention that the adoption assessment was inadequate.
The particular statutory provision governing an adoption assessment will differ depending on the stage of the dependency proceeding at which the juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing. (See §§ 366.21, subd. (i) [status review hearing]; 366.22, subd. (c) [permanency review hearing]; 366.25, subd. (b) [subsequent permanency review hearing].) These provisions are substantially similar. Each requires, inter alia, an evaluation of the child’s medical and developmental needs, a preliminary assessment of any prospective adoptive parent, and an analysis of the likelihood that the child will be adopted if parental rights are terminated. (§§ 366.21, subd. (i)(1)(C), (D), (G); 366.22, subd. (c)(1)(C), (D), (F); 366.25, subd. (b)(1)(C), (D), (F).)
So construed, the court’s statement in In re Crystal J., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pages 411-412, is consistent with the established law that a parent forfeits the right to complain on appeal that an adoption assessment was inadequate if he or she fails to object on that basis in the juvenile court, but a parent does not forfeit the right to substantial evidence review of a contested adoptability determination by failing to object on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence. (See, e.g., In re A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317 [distinguishing for purposes of forfeiture between challenge to substantive sufficiency of adoption assessment and challenge to sufficiency of the evidence of adoptability]; In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1560-1561; In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 399; In re Brian P., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 623; see also In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [father forfeited issue of adequacy of the adoption assessment, citing In re Crystal J.]; In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [“by failing to raise the adequacy of the report below, mother waived this issue, ” citing In re Crystal J.].) We thus disagree with DCFS that there is any substantive conflict between the decisions in In re Crystal J. and In re Brian P. Mother did not forfeit substantial evidence review of the juvenile court’s adoptability finding.
In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, also relied upon by DCFS, does not alter our conclusion. In that case, the appellate court merely observed without analysis that “authority exist[ed]” to support a conclusion that the parent had forfeited substantial evidence review by failing to raise “the issue of the children’s adoptability” at the section 366.26 hearing. (Id. at p. 1153 [citing, inter alia, In re Crystal J., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 407].) The court nevertheless reviewed the record and found substantial evidence to support the finding of adoptability. (Id. at p. 1154.) The court’s statement regarding forfeiture was thus dictum. Furthermore, as discussed, in this case mother contested the issue of child’s adoptability at the section 366.26 hearing.
B. Substantial Evidence of Adoptability
1. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court’s task is to select and implement a permanent plan for the dependent child. When there is no probability of reunification with a parent, adoption is the preferred permanent plan. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1); In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 164.) If the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a child is likely to be adopted, the juvenile court must terminate parental rights, unless one of several statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Marina S., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 164.) Mother does not contend that any exception applied in this case.
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides in relevant part, “If the court determines, based on the assessment provided... and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption. The fact that the child is not yet placed in a preadoptive home nor with a relative or foster family who is prepared to adopt the child, shall not constitute a basis for the court to conclude that it is not likely the child will be adopted.”
In general, “[i]n making the determination of adoptability, the juvenile court ‘must focus on the child, and whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state may make it difficult to find an adoptive family.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526.) There are two alternative methods to demonstrate adoptability. A child is considered “generally” adoptable when the child’s personal characteristics-such as “‘[a] child’s young age, good physical and emotional health, intellectual growth and ability to develop interpersonal relationships’” (ibid.)-are sufficiently appealing that an adoptive family likely will be located in a reasonable time, regardless of whether a prospective adoptive family has yet been found. In contrast, a child is considered “specifically” adoptable when a specific prospective adoptive family is interested in adopting the child, but it might be difficult to locate other prospective adoptive families because, for example, the child is part of a sibling group, or has a physical or mental disability requiring a high level of care, or is relatively old. Such a child is likely to be adopted in a reasonable time only because a specific adoptive family has committed to adoption. (Ibid.; see also In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1060-1061; In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650.)
When a child is considered specifically adoptable, the judicial inquiry “shifts from evaluating the characteristics of the child to whether there is any legal impediment to the prospective adoptive parent’s adoption and whether he or she is able to meet the needs of the child. [Citation.]” (In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80; see also In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526.) Such an inquiry is necessary because, if the adoptive parent cannot legally adopt or cannot care for a child with special needs, the juvenile court cannot find that the child is likely to be adopted in a reasonable time. (See, e.g., In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1061-1062; In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650.) Such an inquiry is limited, however, because “[i]f an inquiry into the suitability of prospective adoptive parents were permitted at the section 366.26 hearing, many hearings would degenerate into subjective attacks on those prospective adoptive parents-a result not envisioned by the statutory scheme. [Citation.] Those types of inquiries might also discourage people from seeking to adopt, a result that would contravene the strong public policy favoring adoption.” (In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1061-1062.)
The legal impediments to adoption are set forth in Family Code sections 8601, 8602, and 8603. (See In re G.M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 552, 561.)
We review the juvenile court’s finding that child was adoptable under the substantial evidence rule. “On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citation.] An appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, we must determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could by clear and convincing evidence find a factual basis for the finding as to the child’s adoptability. [Citation.]” (In re Marina S., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 165; accord, In re R.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 486, 491.)
Although section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) requires clear-and-convincing evidence of adoptability, that standard “is for the edification and guidance of the trial court and not a standard for appellate review. [Citations.] ‘“The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.”’ [Citation.] Thus, on appeal from a judgment required to be based upon clear and convincing evidence, the clear and convincing test disappears and ‘the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant’s evidence, however strong.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1525-1526.) In the juvenile court, DCFS bore the burden to establish that child was likely to be adopted; on appeal, mother bears the burden to show there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding. (In re R.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 491; In re Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 731.)
2. Substantial Evidence
The juvenile court did not state whether it found child to be generally or specifically adoptable. (See In re A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313 [juvenile court not required to make a finding whether child is generally or specifically adoptable; “[a]ll that is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that the dependent child will be adopted within a reasonable time”].) At the hearing on August 4, 2009, after it was informed that caregiver was considering guardianship as an alternative to adoption, the juvenile court stated that it did not find child adoptable in light of her medical and developmental issues. In contrast, at the contested hearing in December 2009, after it was informed that caregiver had committed to adopting child, the juvenile court found child was likely to be adopted. As there was no material change between the two hearings with respect to child’s medical and developmental issues, it appears that caregiver’s commitment to adopting child was, in the juvenile court’s view, a decisive factor. It thus appears that the juvenile court found that child was specifically adoptable-that is, that child was adoptable solely because caregiver was willing to adopt her. (See In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526; In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061.)
There was substantial evidence that caregiver was committed to adopting child, that there were no legal impediments to the adoption, and that caregiver could meet child’s special needs. DCFS and child’s attorney reported that caregiver was committed to adopting child and providing her with a permanent home. The juvenile court may properly consider a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt as evidence that a child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (In re A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313.) Furthermore, child had lived with caregiver nearly all of her life; child and caregiver were bonded; and caregiver had provided for child’s physical, emotional and medical needs throughout the dependency proceedings. There was no evidence that caregiver would not continue to do so. Caregiver’s home study had been approved, and there was evidence before the juvenile court that caregiver had adopted before and was concurrently adopting another child. The record thus supported the conclusion that there was no legal impediment to caregiver’s adoption of child. (See In re Brandon T. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1401 [“where there is no evidence of any specific legal impediments to completing the adoption process, parental rights may be terminated to a specifically adoptable child”].) Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding that child was likely to be adopted by caregiver within a reasonable time was supported by substantial evidence. (See In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527.)
Mother argues that the document entitled “adoption assessment” provided by DCFS in its August 4, 2009 report contained no substantive information regarding either caregiver or child’s special needs, and that the assessment was therefore inadequate to support the finding of adoptability. The issue submitted by mother concerns the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of adoptability. Mother tendered no issue on appeal regarding the adequacy of the adoption assessment, and her failure to object to the adequacy of the assessment in the juvenile court forfeited any such issue. (See In re Aaron B., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 846; In re Urayna L., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 886.) Accordingly, the issue on this appeal is whether substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding, not whether that evidence was presented to the juvenile court in a document entitled “Adoption Assessment” or otherwise. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1) [finding may be based on adoption assessment and “any other relevant evidence”].) Based on the evidence presented by DCFS, as discussed, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that child was likely to be adopted by caregiver within a reasonable time. Accordingly, mother’s reliance on In re Valerie W. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1, is misplaced. (See In re A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317 [distinguishing In re Valerie W.].)
Mother argues that DCFS failed to provide the juvenile court with information regarding “what ongoing services would be available” to caregiver after the adoption was completed. But mother cites no authority that an inquiry into caregiver’s plans for child after adoption was relevant or required. To the contrary, a judicial inquiry into a prospective adoptive parent’s specific post-adoption plans for meeting a child’s needs “is neither a necessary nor appropriate inquiry at a time when the court is conducting only a preliminary assessment of whether the child’s... needs will generally be met.” (In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1063; see also In re A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315.) There was substantial evidence that caregiver had met child’s needs for over two years and was committed to meeting child’s special needs going forward. That is all the evidence required. (See In re Brandon T., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1409-1410 [although no adoption home study completed, finding of specific adoptability was supported by substantial evidence when child had been placed with caregivers for one year; child had bonded with caregivers; caregivers were aware of child’s special needs; social services agency had approved placement of child in caregivers’ home; and caregivers previously had adopted other children]; see also In re Helen W., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 79-80; In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1063.)
Mother argues that caregiver was indecisive with respect to whether to pursue guardianship or adoption. There was evidence, however, that caregiver “always” intended to adopt child, and that she considered guardianship only on the advice of child’s counsel. That there might have been contrary evidence is irrelevant to our review under the substantial evidence rule. (See In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) In any event, by the time of the section 366.26 hearing, DCFS reported that caregiver had made her decision and was committed to adopting child. Mother presented no evidence to the contrary, and she declined the opportunity to examine caregiver, who was present at the hearing. Moreover, it appears that any hesitation expressed by caregiver about adoption was prompted by caregiver’s concern that child might have access to more services under a permanent plan of guardianship than she might have under a permanent plan of adoption. Evidence that caregiver deliberated carefully before making an important decision to ensure that child’s best interests were served supports rather than undermines caregiver’s commitment to meeting child’s needs.
Mother argues that DCFS provided no evidence that “there were any other approved families willing to adopt” child. The law is clear, however, that no such evidence is required. (In re A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1313-1314.)
At the time of the contested section 366.26 hearing, child was only two and a half years old. Child undoubtedly had special needs that required treatment and a stable home environment. Child was fortunate that-due in large part to caregiver’s efforts-her special needs were identified early in life, and she had received treatment and a stable home environment throughout these proceedings. Child had made substantial progress, and her special needs were not so severe that they undermine the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J., FERNS, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.