In the one case where the mental health order on appeal was an order of involuntary medication, not a commitment judgment, we held that expiration of the order rendered the case moot. In re C.C., 150 Vt. 112, 113, 549 A.2d 1058, 1059 (1988). Here, we conclude that the possible negative collateral consequences that will result from E.S.'s detention at VSH are not sufficient to avoid mootness.

We do not believe that any additional collateral consequences hinge on the result of this appeal. Cf. In re C.C., 150 Vt. 112, 113, 549 A.2d 1058, 1059 (1988) (where patient concedes she is mentally ill, adverse collateral consequences from order of involuntary medication are "minimal"; dispute over order is mooted by State's statement that it would no longer enforce order); O'Connell, 136 Vt. at 45, 383 A.2d at 625 (ruling that exception applies must be based on facts of case before court; fact that patient had been hospitalized on one prior occasion "does not necessarily vitiate the collateral consequences of the contested commitment"); In re M.A.C., 134 Vt. 522, 523, 365 A.2d 254, 255 (1976) (on record before court, mental health commitment case was moot). Second, the exception for situations capable of repetition yet evading review does not apply because the court's findings were specific to August 1995; any future revocations of P.S.'s order of nonhospitalization will be based on new fact patterns.