Opinion
D048588
12-8-2006
In re C.B. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SONIA P., Defendant and Appellant.
Sonia P. appeals judgments of the juvenile court terminating parental rights to her children C.B. and Frank L., Jr. (Frank). She contends the courts finding the children were likely to be adopted is not supported by substantial evidence and the court erred when it did not continue the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing for 180 days to allow the home study of the prospective adoptive parent to be completed. We affirm the judgments.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
C.B. and Frank (together, children) were adjudicated dependents of the juvenile court in February 1998 under section 300, subdivision (g). Sonia was incarcerated on felony drug charges and left the children, then nine and seven years old, with a family friend who was unable to support them. The whereabouts of the childrens fathers were unknown. At disposition, the court placed the children in the home of the family friend, which was initially certified for foster care.
Sonia remained incarcerated throughout the reunification period. At the 12-month review hearing in March 1999, the court found that the children were not adoptable and there was no person willing to assume legal guardianship. The court ordered a permanent plan of long-term foster care for the children.
In March 1999 the children were moved to a second foster care home. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) located Franks father in New York City. In January 2000 the court placed Frank with a paternal aunt in North Carolina. (See In re Frank L. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 700.) C.B. was "deeply saddened" by Franks move. In August 2000, due to serious behavioral problems, C.B was moved to the foster home of her current caretaker (foster mother). Frank missed his sister and he became depressed. In April 2001, he returned to San Diego and was placed in foster care with C.B.
C.B.s father was located in an out-of-state prison. He did not participate in dependency proceedings.
C.B.s behavioral problems continued and required consistent therapeutic attention. However, during the summer of 2003, her behaviors began to stabilize. Frank was well adjusted and happy to be with his sister and foster family. Frank continued to have some contact with his father, who visited him once or twice a year from New York. The children had supervised visits with Sonia when she was not in custody. In approximately August 2002 Sonia was arrested on federal criminal charges and remained incarcerated from that time. In March 2006 the Agency reported that Sonia had not contacted C.B and Frank in more than one year.
Foster mother provided a stable, nurturing home and the children bonded with her and their foster siblings. In September 2005 foster mother expressed a desire to adopt C.B and Frank. The Agency recommended the childrens permanency plans be changed from long-term foster care to adoption, and asked the court to set a section 366.26 hearing.
In March 2006 at the section 366.26 hearing, the Agency presented evidence that C.B., now age 16, and Frank, now 14 years old, wanted to be adopted by foster mother. The children looked to foster mother as a parent and she was committed to adopting them. Foster mother initiated an adoptive home study. Although the home study was not yet completed by the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the Agency did not anticipate any problems with the adoption because foster mother was a capable parent who had previously adopted two other children.
After much introspection, Franks father concluded that adoption by foster mother was in his sons best interests and consented to termination of parental rights. Foster mother planned to allow continued contact and visits between Frank and his father.
C.B stated she did not want to have any contact with Sonia and she would "really like" to be adopted by foster mother. The parties stipulated that Frank did not want contact with Sonia and wanted to be adopted by foster mother.
The court found that the children were likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated. The court stated that it had no reason to believe the foster mothers home study would not be approved. The court found that the benefits of adoption outweighed the childrens relationships with their parents, terminated parental rights, and freed the children for adoption.
DISCUSSION
Sonia contends the courts finding the children were likely to be adopted within a reasonable time is not supported by substantial evidence. She asserts that C.B had significant and longstanding behavior problems, the children could not be separated, and they wanted only to be adopted by foster mother. Sonia argues the court abused its discretion when it denied a request to continue the section 366.26 hearing to allow the Agency to complete the home study and ensure the children were not left legal orphans.
Adoption is the preferred permanent plan. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573-574.) Unless termination of parental rights would cause serious detriment to a child under one or more specific statutory exceptions, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) requires the juvenile court to terminate parental rights upon clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time (adoptability or adoptability finding). (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
In reviewing the juvenile courts order, we determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that the child was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1561-1562.) We give the courts finding of adoptability the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolve any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the trial courts ruling. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
The question of adoptability usually focuses on whether the childs age, physical condition, and emotional health make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt that child. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) If the child is considered generally adoptable, we do not examine the suitability of the prospective adoptive home. (In re Scott M. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 839, 844.) However, where the child is deemed adoptable based solely on the fact that a particular family is willing to adopt him or her, the trial court must determine whether there is a legal impediment to adoption. (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061.) The juvenile court should also explore a childs feelings toward his or her parents, foster parents, and prospective adoptive family. (In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 820; In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1334.)
On appeal, the parties argue whether the children were generally adoptable. We do not believe a comprehensive discussion of this issue is necessary. At the 12-month review hearing and the many post-permanency planning review hearings, the juvenile court consistently found that the children were not proper subjects for adoption. In addition, even if there were other families now willing to adopt them, C.B and Frank would not consent to adoption by anyone other than their foster mother. (See In re Christopher L., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333, fn. 3.)
However, when foster mother decided she was willing to adopt C.B and Frank, their adoptive status changed. The evidence at the section 366.26 hearing showed that foster mother initiated an adoptive home study and was committed to adopting the children. She demonstrated a long-term commitment to C.B and Frank, and cared for C.B through her most difficult behaviors. The children were bonded with foster mother and found in her a stable, attentive, responsible, competent and loving parent. We believe the juvenile court was exactly right when it observed that this adoption was a matter of "simply formalizing" the existing parent-child relationships between foster mother and the children.
In addition, the record shows the court made a proper inquiry into whether any legal impediment to adoption by foster mother existed. (See In re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061.) The evidence shows that the Agency did not anticipate any problems that would preclude the childrens adoption by their foster mother. The Agency recognized the high quality of care she provided the children for more than five years. She had previously adopted two other children. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the courts finding the children were likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
Sonia also contends the court should have continued the section 366.26 hearing until the foster mothers home study was approved. We review a courts exercise of its discretion to grant or deny a motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion. (In re Karla C.B (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 188.) As discussed above, the court inquired into whether any impediment to adoption existed, and found none. In view of foster mothers stability, her parenting skills, and previously approved adoptions, the court did not believe there was "anything that would stand in the way" of her adoption of C.B and Frank. The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for a continuance.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
McDONALD, J.