In re C. B.

7 Citing cases

  1. Edwards v. State

    323 Ga. App. 864 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 4 times

    Id. at 562(1), 716 S.E.2d 608. We confronted another issue of first impression in in thE interest OF C.B., 313 gA.app. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012). in that case, as in the case at hand, the superior court was initially vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the case, see OCGA § 15–11–28(b), but the case was not presented to the grand jury within 180 days of the juvenile's detention, and the superior court granted the motion to transfer her case to juvenile court. However, a short time later, the State, invoking the provisions of OCGA § 15–11–30.2, which provides the juvenile court with discretion to transfer a case to the superior court under certain specified circumstances, filed a motion to transfer the case back to the superior court.

  2. In re Interest of M.D.H.

    300 Ga. 46 (Ga. 2016)   Cited 14 times
    Concerning remedy for court's failure to "fix a time" for an adjudicatory hearing on a delinquency petition

    See D.V.H., 335 Ga.App. at 299, 779 S.E.2d 122. The Court of Appeals first reasoned that the Juvenile Code's definition of "complaint" as "the initial document setting out the circumstances that resulted in a child being brought before the court," OCGA § 15–11–2 (14), meant that the new complaints were not "complaints" that reset the 30–day period under § 15–11–521 (b) because they set forth the same circumstances as the original complaints. See D.V.H., 335 Ga.App. at 300, 779 S.E.2d 122. The court also cited In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga.App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012), in reasoning that allowing the State to file new complaints to reset the deadline for filing a delinquency petition would eviscerate the time limitation established by § 15–11–521 (b). See D.V.H., 335 Ga.App. at 300–301, 779 S.E.2d 122. The Court of Appeals' panel did not mention the decision by another panel in M.D.H. that had issued three days earlier.

  3. In re R. J. A.

    365 Ga. App. 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    See also OCGA § 15-11-7 (b) (a juvenile court, having found probable cause to believe that a person has committed a misdemeanor or felony, may "bind [the person] over to the court of proper jurisdiction in this state"). Our decision in In the Interest of C. B. , 313 Ga. App. 778, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012), on which R. J. A. relies, is inapposite. In that case, we reversed a juvenile court order transferring back to a superior court a case the superior court had transferred under OCGA § 17-7-50.1.

  4. State v. Johnson

    292 Ga. 409 (Ga. 2013)   Cited 6 times

    See, e.g., In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga.App. 778, 779 & n. 2, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012).“The State does not have the right to appeal decisions in criminal cases unless there is a specific statutory provision granting the right.”

  5. In re Interest of D. V. H.

    335 Ga. App. 299 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    In considering other time limitations within the Juvenile Code, we have recognized that “the legislature intended to set time limitations for the [s]tate to act” and we have refused to construe the Code in a manner that would “eviscerate[ ]” those time limitations. In the Interest of C. B., 313 Ga. App. 778 , 781 (723 SE2d 21 ) (2012). The same consideration applies here.

  6. State v. Baxter

    300 Ga. 268 (Ga. 2016)   Cited 3 times

    1 (b). See also Edwards v. State, 323 Ga.App. 864, 868, 748 S.E.2d 501 (2013) (180-day time limit was not tolled when the accused was released on bail, and superior court lost jurisdiction once that time limit expired without the case being presented to grand jury, absent a motion by the State to extend the time); State v. Armendariz, 316 Ga.App. 394, 397 (1), 729 S.E.2d 538 (2012) (the clock did not stop running when some charges were deemed invalid, and superior court lost jurisdiction when the 180-day period expired without an extension); In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga.App. 778, 780, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (superior court lost jurisdiction when 180-day time limitation expired, and juvenile court could not transfer the case back to superior court, as any subsequent indictment would be void); Nunnally v. State, 311 Ga.App. 558, 561 (1), 716 S.E.2d 608 (2011) (once the 180-day time period expired without an extension, the superior court lost jurisdiction of the case, and the grand jury lost authority to indict); Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 532–535, 710 S.E.2d 667 (2011) (superior court lacked jurisdiction when the juvenile was indicted because the 180-day time limit had expired long before). If the child waives prompt presentation before the time has expired, the condition that divests the superior court of jurisdiction—the expiration of the time—never comes into being. Put another way, the jurisdiction of the superior court falls away only when the clock runs out, but so long as the clock is running, the child may agree to stop it.

  7. State v. Baxter

    333 Ga. App. 849 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times
    In State v. Baxter, 333 Ga.App. 849, 777 S.E.2d 696 (2015), the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that presentation to the grand jury within 180 days of detention is absolutely required (unless the time is extended by the superior court for good cause), that such presentation is essential to the jurisdiction of the superior court, and that parties cannot by agreement, consent, or waiver confer jurisdiction upon a court that otherwise is without it.

    See Edwards v. State, 323 Ga.App. 864, 868, 748 S.E.2d 501 (2013) (180–day limitation for State to obtain an indictment is not tolled when accused is released on bond; once 180–day time limit expired without case being presented to grand jury and absent motion to extend time by the State, superior court lost jurisdiction over case); State v. Armendariz, 316 Ga.App. 394, 396 –397(1), 729 S.E.2d 538 (2012) (180–day period was not tolled when, prior to the expiration of the period, some of the charges against the accused were deemed invalid); Nunnally, 311 Ga.App. at 561(1), 716 S.E.2d 608 (when specified time limitation authorizing jurisdiction is exceeded, trial court loses jurisdiction over case); Hill, 309 Ga.App. at 533–535, 710 S.E.2d 667 (juvenile court lacked jurisdiction at time juvenile was indicted, approximately 300 days after his detention began). See In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga.App. 778, 780–781, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (juvenile court could not negate statutory time limitations by transferring case back to superior court after superior court transferred case to juvenile court based on State's failure to indict juvenile within 180 days of detention). See Edwards, 323 Ga.App. at 868, 748 S.E.2d 501.