Opinion
No. A-10579.
March 14, 1945.
(Syllabus.)
This is a companion case to the case of Ex parte Hazel, 80 Okla. Cr. 66, 157 P.2d 225, this day decided. Both cases were submitted on the same record. The syllabus in Ex parte Hazel is adopted as the syllabus in this case.
1. Arraignment and Pleas — Constitutional Rights of One Arraigned. Under Bill of Rights, accused has right to consult with counsel and be fully advised as to his rights and consequences of his acts before entering plea to indictment or information. O. S. 1941 Const. art. 2, § 20.
2. Same — Prerequisites to Plea of Guilty. A plea of guilty should be entirely voluntary, and made by one competent to know consequences thereof, and should not be accepted until after defendant has been fully advised by court of his rights and consequences of plea.
3. Trial — Rights of Accused That May Be Waived and Those That May not. Accused cannot waive those rights in which public generally and as a community is interested and which are jurisdictional as affecting power of court to try cause, but he may waive those rights in nature of privileges which are for benefit of accused alone.
4. Same — Rights That May Be Waived. The right to have 24 hours in which to plead after arraignment, the right to be furnished with a copy of the information, the right to two days after conviction before sentence may be passed, the right to be confronted by the witnesses, the right to trial by jury, the right to have counsel to represent him, and the right to a subpoena for his witnesses, are some of the privileges for the benefit of an accused which may be waived by him.
5. Same — Right to Assistance of Counsel Before Entering Plea in Capital Case. It is better in a capital case for trial court to assign counsel to consult with the accused before he enters his plea, even though accused attempts to waive his right to counsel.
6. Same — Whether Right Waived Dependent on Particular Facts. Whether one accused of crime has waived right to assistance of counsel for his defense depends on particular facts, including accused's background, experience and conduct.
7. Habeas Corpus — Writ Will not Lie to Correct Purely Procedural Errors. Habeas corpus will not lie to correct purely procedural errors, or to interrupt orderly administration of laws by a competent court acting within limits of its jurisdiction.
8. Same — Showing Held Insufficient for Release of Petitioner From Penitentiary on Ground His Constitutional Rights Were Denied by Trial Court.
Original habeas corpus proceedings by Clarence Carpenter to secure his release from State Penitentiary. Writ denied.
Robert O. Swimmer, of Oklahoma City, for petitioner.
Randell S. Cobb, Atty. Gen., and Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus to secure the release of the petitioner, Clarence Carpenter, from confinement in the State Penitentiary. It is a companion case to the case of Ex parte Hazel, 80 Okla. Cr. 66, 157 P.2d 225.
The facts in connection with the instant case are fully related in Ex parte Hazel, supra. The verified petition herein is based upon the same allegations as set forth in the petition of Hazel. Our conclusions in that case apply with equal force to the determination of this case. Both cases were presented on the same record and were consolidated for the purpose of argument.
There is one difference which would appeal to this court if we were sitting as a clemency board. The facts in connection with the petitioner, Clarence Carpenter, in so far as his participation in the actual robbery is concerned, are much more favorable to him than were the facts in regard to the part played by the petitioner Hazel. The facts presented in this connection, however, are not questions which pertain to the jurisdiction of the district court of Comanche county to pronounce judgment on the plea of guilty. They are matters which would have been given serious consideration by this court if an appeal had been taken and the question of modification of the sentence had arisen. Because of the former background of the petitioner Carpenter and the small part played by him in the robbery, the sentence might have been modified on appeal. If the facts were as related by Carpenter and Hazel, it is very questionable as to whether Carpenter was guilty of the crime of robbery. We are, of course, not passing on this question as it is not one of the matters properly before the court in a habeas corpus proceeding.
We feel it our duty, however, to mention them so that the petitioner Carpenter would not feel foreclosed, if he so desired, from presenting his application for clemency to the proper authorities.
The writ of habeas corpus is denied.
BAREFOOT, P. J., concurs. DOYLE, J., not participating.