Opinion
81943-COA
07-21-2021
IN THE MATTER OF: C. G.-L., DOB: 10/19/2003, A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS. v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. C. G.-L., Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
GIBBONS C.J.
This is an appeal from a juvenile court order certifying appellant to stand trial as an adult. First Judicial District Court, Carson City; James E. Wilson, Judge.
C. G.-L. and friends conspired to steal drugs from a known drug dealer. The conspiracy was elaborate as it consisted of multiple actors, the purchase of drugs via social media (Snapchat), and the use of stolen firearms during the attempted robbery. Ultimately, C. G.-L. and one of the coconspirators attempted to carry out the robbery while another coconspirator acted as the lookout. During the commission of the offenses, there was a struggle for the coconspirator's gun, resulting in the coconspirator shooting the drug dealer in the stomach, while C. G.-L. pistol-whipped the dealer's companion. After the robbery failed, C. G.-L. and his coconspirator ran to the location of the lookout and the three fled the scene. C. G.-L. was subsequently apprehended and charged.
We do not recount the facts except as necessary to our disposition.
The State filed a juvenile petition alleging that C. G.-L. committed several felonies, and then moved to certify C. G.-L. to be tried as an adult for the charged offenses. The juvenile court issued an order granting the State's amended petition to certify under NRS 62B.390(1)(a), the discretionary certification section of the statute, but refused to apply and consider NRS 62B.390(3)(b), the mandatory certification section, because the court found this section to be ambiguous. This appeal followed.
The juvenile court properly applied the version of NRS 62B.390 that was in effect as of October 1, 2014, in determining whether to certify C. G.-L. as an adult in 2020. See 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 483, § 1.3, at 2902. Of note, in 2021 the Nevada Legislature substantially amended NRS 62B.390.
On appeal, C. G.-L. argues that the juvenile court (1) erred in failing to apply NRS 62B.390(3)(b) after determining it was ambiguous, and (2) abused its discretion by certifying C. G.-L. as an adult pursuant to NRS 62B.390(1){a) because C. G.-L. played a lesser role in the criminal conspiracy, precluding adult certification. Conversely, the State argues that the juvenile court's finding of NRS 62B.390(3)(b) as ambiguous is a nonjusticiable issue because the juvenile court correctly considered certification and in fact certified C. G.-L. under NRS 62B.390(1)(a), the discretionary section. Further, the State contends that no Nevada law exists to support C. G.-L.'s contention that there is a separate standard for evaluating conspiracy offenses when making transfer decisions.
Juvenile certifications are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See In re Eric A.L., 123 Nev. 26, 33, 153 P.3d 32, 36 (2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the [juvenile] court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason." Id. at 33, 153 P.3d at 36-37 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"NRS 62B.390 provides for both presumptive and discretionary certification of juveniles for adult treatment in criminal proceedings." Id. at 32, 153 P.3d at 36. NRS 62B.390(2) and (3) enumerate conduct that qualifies for presumptive certification of a juvenile as an adult. NRS 62B.390(2) provides that the court
shall certify a child for proper criminal proceedings as an adult . . . if the child . . . [i]s charged with:
(1) la] sexual assault ... or
(2) [an] offense or attempted offense involving the use or threatened use of a firearm; and
(b) [w]as 16 years of age or older at the time the child allegedly committed the offense.
However, under NRS 62B.390(3), this presumptive certification can be rebutted
if the juvenile court specifically finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) [t]he child is developmentally or mentally incompetent to understand the situation and the proceedings of the court or to aid the child's attorney in those proceedings; or
(b) . . . has a substance use disorder or emotional or behavioral problems [that] may be appropriately treated through the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
C. G.-L. first argues that the juvenile court erred in finding a portion of the presumptive certification statute (NRS 62B.390(3)(b)) ambiguous, and therefore, also erred in declining to decide that C. G.-L. properly qualified for one of the rebuttable exceptions to certification based on either a developmental delay, substance use disorder, and/or emotional or behavioral problems, which would have allowed him to remain in the juvenile court system and not be treated as an adult. On the other hand, the State argues that this is a nonjusticiable issue because the court properly exercised its discretion and certified him as an adult under NRS 62B.390(1)(a), the discretionary certification section of the statute. We agree with the State.
Based on our conclusion that certification was proper under NKb 62B.390(1)(a), we need not address whether the juvenile court erred in deeming the mandatory certification section ambiguous and also in failing to apply the exceptions to mandatory certification in order to have kept C. G.-L. in the juvenile court system. Cf. Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 588-89 & n.26, 188 P.3d 1112, 1118-19 & n.26 (2008) (explaining that this court need not address issues that are unnecessary to resolve the case). Further, despite C. G.-L.'s claims, it is unclear from the record whether there was clear and convincing evidence that C. G.-L. could have rebutted presumptive certification. However, because the juvenile court was well within its discretion to have certified C. G.-L. under the discretionary section of the statute, we decline to consider the applicability of mandatory certification in this case.
NRS 62B.390(1)(a) authorizes discretionary certification when a juvenile "is charged with an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult and was 14 years of age or older at the time the child allegedly committed the offense." When considering discretionary certification, the court must consider "(1) the nature and seriousness of the offense; (2) the seriousness and persistency of past admitted or adjudicated criminal offenses; and (3) personal considerations such as age, maturity, character, personality, and family relationships." In re William S., 122 Nev. 432, 436, 132 P.3d 1015, 1017 (2006). The juvenile court must give primary consideration to the first two factors, although the decision under these two factors may rest on either or both of these factors. Eric A.L., 123 Nev. at 33, 153 P.3d at 36. But in close cases, when examination of the first two factors does not compel certification, the juvenile court may consider the third factor. Id.
Importantly, even in those cases where both mandatory and discretionary certification may apply, and even where a minor rebuts mandatory certification, the juvenile court may still exercise its discretion to certify. In William S., the supreme court held that the certification statute does not impinge upon the juvenile court's discretion to certify a minor as an adult, even where the minor rebuts the certification presumption. 122 Nev. at 438, 132 P.3d at 1019. The court further noted that "it was not the Legislature's intent to limit the juvenile court's discretion in making certification decisions by precluding the court from applying the discretionary certification prong after a minor rebuts presumptive certification." Id. at 437, 132 P.3d at 1018. Additionally, in Anthony Lee R. v. State, the supreme court recognized that the presumption does not alter the juvenile court's discretionary power to certify minors. 113 Nev. 1406, 1423 n.9, 952 P.2d 1, 12 n.9 (1997). Specifically, the supreme court concluded that a juvenile court's finding that the presumptive certification standard had been rebutted "does not preclude certification in cases in which the background of the juvenile or the nature of the offense makes it appear clearly and convincingly that the public safety and welfare require transfer * Id., at 1419 n.8, 952 P.2d at 9 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the juvenile court, after declining to apply the mandatory certification section of the statute, analyzed whether to certify C. G.-L. as an adult under the discretionary section. The court found that C. G.-L. was over 14 years of age (age 16) at the time of the alleged incident, and that the underlying offenses with which he was charged would also be charged as felonies in the adult court. Next, the juvenile court found that although C. G.-L. had no prior adjudicated or admitted criminal or delinquent conduct, the nature and seriousness of the charged offenses warranted adult certification.
C. G.-L. also argues that the juvenile court erred in exercising its discretion because C. G.-L. was involved in a conspiracy where his role was minor because he merely hit the drug dealer's companion with a gun. We are not persuaded by this argument.
The juvenile court found, and the record supports, that "[C. G.-L.] was all in" in the perpetration of the eight alleged offenses, as he participated in the planning, agreed with his coconspirators to commit the illegal acts, acquired the firearms for the commission of the crime, armed himself prior to the crime, pointed his gun at a man's head, and struck the same man in the head with his firearm, and a coconspirator shot the drug dealer. The juvenile court thus concluded that C. G.-L.'s alleged offenses were of the nature and seriousness to warrant certification to the adult court, which was in the public's best interest and safety. See Eric A.L., 123 Nev. at 33, 153 P.3d at 36 (holding that a decision to certify may rely on either the seriousness and nature of the underlying offense or the juvenile's prior adjudicated and admitted crimes, or both). C. G.-L. makes no persuasive argument as to how the juvenile court abused its discretion in certifying C. G.-L. as an adult under the discretionary section of the statute, and provides no relevant authority as to why certification is inappropriate in a conspiracy-type case, especially where the juvenile, as in this case, had a fundamental role in the commission of the offense, which included seven charges other than conspiracy See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (explaining that this court need not consider arguments that are not cogently argued or lack the support of relevant authority). Therefore, we
Insofar that C. G.-L. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by concluding that this was "not a close case" in analyzing NRS 62B.390(1)(a) certification, the court was within its discretion in deciding that the case was not a "close" call, and the record supports the court's decision.
ORDER the order of the juvenile court AFFIRMED.
The supreme court previously entered a stay pending resolution of this appeal. As this order resolves the appeal, the stay is necessarily lifted.
Tao J., Bulla J.
Hon. James E. Wilson, District Judge.