Jurisdiction of a state court in foreclosure, suspended by the institution of a proceeding under § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, again attached upon dismissal of the bankruptcy case and empowered the state court to confirm a foreclosure sale previously made and to order a sheriff's deed. P. 8. 3. Reinstatement under the Act of 1935, supra, of a proceeding under § 75(s) previously dismissed, did not invalidate a sheriff's sale and deed which were confirmed and authorized by a state court acting within its jurisdiction during the interval between the dismissal of the bankruptcy case and the motion to reinstate it. P. 8. 4. There is no occasion to refer a cause under § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act to a conciliation commissioner for the administration of property which, by reason of foreclosure proceedings already consummated in a state court, no longer belongs to the debtor. P. 10. 106 F.2d 576, reversed. CERTIORARI, 309 U.S. 643, to review a judgment reversing the district court in bankruptcy which, in a proceeding under § 75(s), denied rehearing of an order of disclaimer and refused to refer the cause to a conciliation commissioner.

It was present in Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit v. Byerly, 60 S.Ct. 773, 84 L.Ed. ___, decided April 22, 1940, in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was reversed. 106 F.2d 576. But neither court undertook to interpret the phrase. Whatever may be the preliminary step required by it, the step had not been taken in that case for no commissioner had as yet been appointed at the time the court "erroneously" permitted a sale.

The sale and the confirmation were therefore void and the deed was a nullity. Hoyd v. Citizens Bank of Albany Co., 6 Cir., 89 F.2d 105, 107; Byerly v. Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit, 6 Cir., 106 F.2d 576, decided September 18, 1939. Appellant at the time he filed his petition had an estate in the land, and he has not been divested of this estate; hence the District Court has jurisdiction. It is urged that sub-section (o) does not apply to appellee because he is not the mortgagee nor a creditor of the farmer-debtor, but simply a third party, purchaser at the sheriff's sale.

See Frazier-Lemke Act, 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 203. Once the petition is filed, the farmer-debtor and all of his property wherever located immediately become subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 203 (n). Kalb v. Feuerstein, Wis. 1940, 60 S.Ct. 343, 308 U.S. 433, 84 L.Ed. 370, 41 A.B.R., N.S. 501; Mangus v. Miller, 317 U.S. 178, 51 A.B.R., N.S. 136, 63 S.Ct. 182, 87 L.Ed. 169; Byerly v. Union Stock Land Bank of Detroit, C.C.A. Ohio 1939, 106 F.2d 576, 41 A.B.R., N.S. 6, rev. on other grounds 60 S.Ct. 773, 310 U.S. 1, 84 L.Ed. 1041, 42 A.B.R., N.S. 402, reh. den. 60 S.Ct. 1071, 310 U.S. 657, 84 L.Ed. 1420; Wilcons v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., C.C.A. Kan., 91 F.2d 417; Nettles v. Doss, Tex. Civ. App. 1942, 161 S.W. 2nd 138; In re O'Brien, C.C.A., N Y 1935, 78 F.2d 715, 29 A.B.R., N.S. 556, aff. 9 F. Supp. 892, 27 A.B.R., N.S. 376; Eaves v. Glenn, 9 F. Supp. 647 (D.C.N.D. Tex.)