Opinion
No. V88-33856.
Decided July 23, 1993.
Dexter W. Clark, for the applicant.
Lee Fisher, Attorney General, for the state.
This matter came on to be considered upon the Attorney General's notice of appeal from the February 19, 1993 order issued by the panel of commissioners. The panel's determination reversed the order of the single commissioner, which had denied the applicant, Michael S. Butera, an award of reparations based upon a felony conviction subsequent to the criminally injurious conduct.
The sole issue on appeal in this case, and a number of similar pending cases, is the statutory interpretation of R.C. 2743.60(E), which provides as follows:
"Neither a single commissioner nor a panel of commissioners shall make an award to a claimant who is a victim, or who claims an award of reparations through a victim, who, within ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to the claim, was convicted of a felony or who is proved by a preponderance of the evidence presented to the commissioner or the panel to have engaged, within ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to the claim, in conduct that, if proven by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, would constitute a felony under the laws of this state, another state, or the United States."
The panel of commissioners found that the plain language of the statute provides for felony convictions or felonious conduct that occurred within ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that is the basis of the claim and not the date that the reparations application or supplemental reparations application was filed.
The assistant attorney general, while agreeing that the plain reading of R.C. 2743.60(E) would not disqualify an applicant, argued that there is a legitimate state purpose in restricting awards to felons regardless of when the felony occurred. The assistant attorney general further stated that the "innocent victim" and "clean hands" doctrines are considered to be integral parts of the Victims of Crime Act to avoid the unconscionable result of recompensing a felon.
For a court to ascertain legislative intent, it shall apply the principle of statutory construction and the canons of interpretation. A discussion of these concepts is found in 85 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1988) 177-178, Statutes, Section 182, which provides in part:
"It is a cardinal rule that a court must first look to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a statute must be determined primarily from the language of the statute itself and the purpose to be accomplished, without deleting employed terms, or inserting that which has not been written. The language of a statute is its most natural expositor. These principles are to be adhered to notwithstanding the fact that the court may be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the legislature intended to enact something very different from that which it did enact. If an inquiry into the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent reveals that the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the interpretative effort is at an end, and the statute must be applied accordingly."
The standard for reviewing claims appealed to the court is established by R.C. 2743.61, which provides, in pertinent part, the following:
"If upon hearing and consideration of the record and evidence, the court decides that the decision of the commissioners appealed from is reasonable and lawful, it shall affirm the same, but if the court decides that the decision of the commissioners is unreasonable or unlawful, the court shall reverse and vacate the decision or modify it and enter judgment thereon."
The plain language of R.C. 2743.60(E) is clear, unequivocal and definite; therefore, it is not subject to interpretation. An applicant is not excluded from eligibility solely by felonious conduct or a felony conviction that occurs after the criminally injurious conduct that is the subject matter of the claim.
Based on the evidence and R.C. 2743.61, it is the court's opinion that the decision of the panel of commissioners was reasonable and lawful. Therefore, this court affirms the decision of the three-commissioner panel and hereby denies the Attorney General's claim.
Decision affirmed.
RUSSELL LEACH, J., retired, of the Franklin County Municipal Court, sitting by assignment.