" Id. "The homestead exemption should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose, but at the same time, the Court must take care to prevent it from becoming an instrument of fraud." In re Bratty, 202 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing Croker v. Croker, 51 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1931)). "Once property is imbued with homestead status, it remains homestead until it is abandoned.

The identities, and correspondingly, locations of the Defendant's professional services providers are relevant to whether he in fact treated Palm Beach as his permanent residence, as a matter of subjective intent and actual occupancy, as opposed to a vacation home. See, e.g., In re Bratty, 202 B.R. 1008, 1010 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996); see also Barry Nelson & Cassandra Nelson, Homestead: Creditor Issues, ASSET PROTECTION IN FLORIDA (The Florida Bar, 8th ed. 2024) (listing among suggested “acts indicating [an] intent” to establish a Florida domicile that the individual should: “Obtain a doctor in Florida to act as your primary care physician, and have your medical records transferred to his or her office”). Even if the Defendant seeks only to claim a Florida homestead established in 2024, the identities and locations of his professional services providers prior to 2024 are relevant for the purposes of comparison, and the request is not unreasonably burdensome given that it is confined to the less than 5-year period during which the Defendant maintained sole ownership of the Palm Beach Condo and the New York Co-op

In re Geiger, 569 B.R. 846, 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016) (quoting In re Bratty, 202 B.R. 1008, 1010 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996)). "The homestead exemption should not . . . 'be so applied as to make it an instrument of fraud or imposition upon creditors.'"

'" In re Geiger, 569 B.R. 846, 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016)(quoting In re Bratty, 202 B.R. 1008, 1010 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996)). As the Florida Supreme Court has written, "[t]he federal courts which have addressed the applicability of section 726.105 to homestead claims have concluded that it has no effect on the constitutionally created homestead exemption.

"At the same time, the Court must take care to prevent it from becoming an instrument of fraud." In re Bratty, 202 B.R. 1008, 1009 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996). "Homestead status is established by the actual intention to live permanently in a place coupled with actual use and occupancy."

This analysis requires consideration of all aspects of the Property's purported homestead status as of the Petition Date. In re Bratty , 202 B.R. 1008, 1010 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) ("Debtor's expression of his intention is probative, but if an owner acts inconsistently with a self-professed intention to establish homestead, a claim for exemption may fail.") (internal citation omitted); Lloyd , 394 B.R. at 610-12 (quoting same); In re Mohammed , 376 B.R. 38, 41-42 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) ("The petition date is the only relevant time period for determining Debtors' entitlement to [the] homestead exemption.").

M.D. Fla. 2002).In re Bratty, 202 B.R. 1008, 1010 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing Smith v. Hamilton, 428 So.2d 382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) ). But even assuming the Court does credit the Debtor's testimony that he intends to make the 36415 Eunice Drive property his homestead, the evidence at trial was undisputed that he was not actually living there as of the petition date.

"It is well-established that homestead status is established by the actual intention to live permanently in a place coupled with actual use and occupancy." In re Bratty, 202 B.R. 1008, 1009 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (citing Hillsborough Investment Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So.2d 448 (1943); In re Brown, 165 B.R. 512 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1994)). The intent to establish a homestead is evidenced by a person's "specific acts toward creating a permanent abode which are not contradicted by subsequent behavior[.]"

"It is well-established that homestead status is established by the actual intention to live permanently in a place coupled with actual use and occupancy." In re Bratty, 202 B.R. 1008, 1009 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing Hillsborough Investment Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So.2d 448 (1943); In re Brown, 165 B.R. 512 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994)).

        4003(c) , the Objection to Exemption is overruled. The instant decision is not inconsistent with the Court's previous decision in In re Bratty, 202 B.R. 1008, 1010 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (holding debtor abandoned homestead where he acquired condominium as a vacation home and used it primarily for that purpose over twelve-year period, leasing it out to tenants much of that time). For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby