Opinion
No. 2022-O-01828
02-24-2023
IN RE: Judge Guy E. BRADBERRY
Joint petition for consent discipline accepted. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
JUDICIARY COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA
PER CURIAM
This matter arises from a joint petition for consent discipline filed by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana ("Commission") and respondent, Judge Guy E. Bradberry.
UNDERLYING FACTS
Respondent has been a judicial officer since 1991. He assumed office as a district judge of the 14th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Calcasieu on January 1, 2003 and held this position at the time of the charges in this case. After the institution of formal proceedings, the Commission and respondent filed a joint petition for discipline by consent, including a joint memorandum and joint stipulation of facts, pursuant to the requirements of Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 30. In the petition, the parties stipulate to respondent's misconduct in two matters.
Respondent was elected to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit on November 8, 2022 and assumed office on January 1, 2023. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 23, the disciplinary complaint at issue in this proceeding became a matter of public record in October 2022 and was reported by the local media prior to the November election.
Notice of Hearing Case No. 363 – The Chesson Matter
On April 20, 2015, respondent signed an order citing Christian Chesson, an attorney, to appear before him on April 27, 2015 for an Article 863 Sanctions Hearing for conduct which allegedly took place in open court on January 12, 2015. Mr. Chesson was not present in court on April 27, 2015 when the matter was called, and attempts to locate him were unsuccessful. Respondent then issued a bench warrant for Mr. Chesson's arrest.
Later the same morning, Mr. Chesson was picked up pursuant to the bench warrant and walked through respondent's courtroom to holding for processing. Respondent failed to allow Mr. Chesson an opportunity to be heard by way of defense or mitigation prior to his incarceration.
The next day, April 28, 2015, a hearing was held to address the issue of sanctions for Mr. Chesson's conduct on January 12, 2015. However, respondent took up an issue of alleged direct contempt, addressing conduct respondent observed in his courtroom on February 23, 2015, rather than the matter of sanctions pursuant to Article 863 for the January 12, 2015 conduct. During the hearing, respondent denied Mr. Chesson's attorney an opportunity to speak on behalf of Mr. Chesson, despite the attorney's request to do so, until after respondent had ruled and sentenced Mr. Chesson for contempt. In finding Mr. Chesson in contempt, respondent referenced and appeared to rely upon two "statements" from witnesses to Mr. Chesson's conduct on February 23, 2015. These witness statements were not entered into evidence in the contempt proceedings, and Mr. Chesson was not apprised of the statements prior to the April 28, 2015 hearing. Moreover, the witnesses were not identified at or prior to the hearing, and they did not testify at the hearing. Finally, the sentence respondent imposed upon Mr. Chesson for contempt was impermissible.
Mr. Chesson appealed respondent's contempt ruling and sentence. On June 17, 2015, prior to a ruling on the appeal, respondent filed a per curiam with the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in which he defended his contempt finding and advocated for the sentence imposed. He included in the per curiam unsworn witness statements from two employees of the Calcasieu Parish District Attorney's Office, which were not entered into evidence in the proceedings on April 28, 2015 and which were only made part of the record after the close of the proceedings. The Third Circuit did not request that respondent submit the per curiam or any other information following the filing of the appeal by Mr. Chesson.
Following its consideration of the appeal, the Third Circuit reversed respondent's ruling of direct contempt and vacated the contempt sentence. The court of appeal found, among other things, that consideration of the two witness statements "would be a flagrant violation of Mr. Chesson's right to due process," the notice for the April 28, 2015 hearing did not "comport[ ] with due process," and the contempt sentence was "unlawful."
Respondent also mishandled recusal procedures in other cases. On April 30, 2008, despite the absence of any grounds to recuse, respondent recused himself from the matter of Chesson v. Chesson , Case No. 2003-2782, based on a representation to respondent that the parties were willing to settle their differences if he recused himself. Between March 3, 2016 and April 17, 2016, respondent recused himself from ten cases on his docket in which Mr. Chesson was counsel of record, despite the absence of any motion to recuse or other grounds for recusal. Between May 6, 2016 and May 9, 2016, respondent vacated the previous orders of recusal in all but two of these cases, without any authority or jurisdiction to do so. In one case, respondent recused himself a second time on September 26, 2016 after the matter was re-allotted back to him from another division, and despite the absence of any motion to recuse or other grounds for recusal. In some of these matters, respondent's actions caused needless delay to the parties and families involved.
On February 12, 2019, respondent entered into a Deferred Recommendation of Discipline Agreement ("DRDA") regarding the complaints filed in the Chesson matter. The DRDA required respondent to fulfill certain specified conditions, including obtaining additional education on the subject of recusal and to comply with the law and canons governing recusal. The DRDA further provided that if its term expired without a violation of these conditions by respondent, the Commission would dispense with making any recommendation of discipline to this court regarding the complaints filed in the Chesson matter. However, if respondent violated any of the conditions of the DRDA, or if "any further meritorious complaints [were] lodged against him during the term" of the DRDA, respondent would be in default of the DRDA. The DRDA specified that "[t]he consent discipline agreed to by Judge Bradberry in the event of a default under this Agreement shall consist of a public censure by the Louisiana Supreme Court." The complaint in the Stine matter, infra , was filed during the term of the DRDA, and respondent acknowledges that his conduct in the Stine matter constitutes a default under the terms and conditions of the DRDA.
Accordingly, pursuant to the DRDA, respondent waives any right to object to and accepts the imposition of a public censure for his violation in the Chesson matter of Canons 1 (a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary), 2A (a judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), 2B (a judge shall not initiate the communication of information in any court or disciplinary proceeding, but may provide such information for the record in response to a formal request by a court or disciplinary agency official), 3A(1) (a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it), and 3A(7) (a judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent also acknowledges that he engaged in willful misconduct relating to his official duty and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25 (C).
Notice of Hearing Case No. 385 – The Stine Matter
Respondent was contacted by telephone by Troy Stine, a litigant in a pending custody case assigned to respondent's court. Mr. Stine was crying and at a loss over concerns for his son, whom respondent understood was facing an emergency concerning his physical and/or mental health. At the time of the telephone call, respondent had not held any hearings in the Stine case, and he was unaware the case was pending before him (although he made no effort at the time to determine whether Mr. Stine had a case pending before him).
Respondent was familiar with the Stine family as part of the Lake Charles community.
Shortly after the call, respondent walked to Mr. Stine's office from the courthouse and met with Mr. Stine. He discussed Mr. Stine's concerns for his sons, including issues with his eldest son, and issues related to his then fourteen-year-old son. During the meeting, respondent recognized Mr. Stine as someone who is a member of a church group to which he belongs. After Mr. Stine advised respondent that he had a case pending at the 14th JDC, respondent ended the meeting.
Upon returning to his office after the meeting, respondent discovered that Mr. Stine's case was assigned to his division of court. Respondent determined that he would recuse himself from the case because he had received ex parte information from a litigant concerning a child in a family matter before him, and because it is his practice to recuse from cases involving litigants who are members of the same church groups to which he belongs. Nevertheless, respondent did not recuse at that time. Several weeks later, on March 8, 2021, respondent texted Mr. Stine contact information for the director of the Office of Juvenile Justice and encouraged him to set up a meeting regarding his seventeen-year-old son. Respondent also encouraged Mr. Stine to seek counseling for his fourteen-year-old son.
On March 9, 2021, a hearing was scheduled on a motion to compel in the Stine case. Respondent privately advised counsel for the parties that he had engaged in a discussion with Mr. Stine about concerns for one of his children and further advised that he had provided Mr. Stine with information about a juvenile program. Thereafter, respondent presided in court in the Stine case, wherein a stipulation was entered on the record by the attorneys for the parties concerning the motion to compel. Respondent instructed Evelyn Oubre, counsel for Mr. Stine, to circulate and submit a judgment to the court for signature. Respondent did not recuse himself on the date of the hearing on the motion to compel, or in the days following the entry of the stipulation.
On March 18, 2021, Ms. Oubre hand delivered a letter requesting that respondent recuse himself from the Stine case, in part because of her contention that she had learned from Mr. Stine that the circumstances of the discussion between him and respondent differed from what respondent had shared with counsel on March 9, 2021. After receiving Ms. Oubre's correspondence, respondent finally recused himself from the Stine case. He did not sign the stipulated judgment concerning the motion to compel, never presided over a contested contradictory hearing in the Stine case, and never rendered a judgment involving a contested issue after presiding over a contradictory hearing in the Stine case.
Respondent acknowledges that his conduct in the Stine matter constitutes a violation of Canons 1, 2 (a judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities), 2A, 2B (a judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interest of the judge or others), 3A(4) (a judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice), 3A(6) (except as permitted by law, a judge shall not permit private or ex parte interviews, arguments, or communications designed to influence his or her judicial action in any case), and 3C (a judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which disqualification is required by law) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent also acknowledges that he engaged in willful misconduct relating to his official duty and willful and persistent failure to perform his duty, in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25 (C).
PETITION FOR CONSENT DISCIPLINE
The parties have filed a joint petition for consent discipline in this court. For his misconduct as set forth above, the parties propose that respondent be publicly censured and ordered to pay $1,548.00 in costs incurred by the Commission.
The parties stipulate that in mitigation, respondent has good character and reputation. In addition, he has been fully cooperative throughout the duration of these proceedings. He is remorseful and has accepted responsibility for the negative light his conduct brought upon the judiciary, and he has committed to refrain from such conduct in the future. In aggravation, however, the ethical violations in both the Chesson and Stine matters were serious. Moreover, respondent is an experienced judicial officer and had already been disciplined for judicial misconduct at the time he committed the violations in the Stine matter.
Respondent is active in his church, in the community, and in numerous professional associations, including the Louisiana District Judges Association, which he formerly served as President. Respondent has received many awards and commendations throughout the years for his work and volunteer service.
In addition to the DRDA in the Chesson matter, respondent has been cautioned previously for failing to timely decide an application for post-conviction relief and for failing to comply with an order of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal directing that the application be decided by a specified date. Respondent was previously admonished for impermissibly vacating his order referring a pending motion for recusal to another judge for hearing and for making misrepresentations or misstatements in his per curiam opinion vacating the order.
Based on the foregoing, and considering the applicable jurisprudence, the parties urge the court to accept the joint petition for consent discipline.
DISCUSSION
This court is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in judicial disciplinary proceedings by La. Const. art. V, § 25 (C). Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 30 sets forth a formal procedure for the discipline of judges by consent.
Here, the parties have stipulated to respondent's misconduct in two matters. In the Chesson matter, respondent acknowledges that he mishandled a contempt proceeding, filed an unsolicited per curiam in the appellate court regarding the contempt finding and sentence, and mishandled recusal procedures in other cases. In the Stine matter, respondent acknowledges that he engaged in improper ex parte communications with a litigant and failed to expeditiously recuse himself from the matter. For the stipulated misconduct, the parties propose that respondent be publicly censured and ordered to pay $1,548.00 in costs.
There is no question that respondent's conduct constituted a serious violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore, as an experienced judicial officer serving since 1991, respondent should have known better. Nevertheless, by consenting to public discipline, respondent has acknowledged responsibility for his conduct and the negative light it cast upon the judiciary. Respondent has also committed to refrain from violating the ethical rules in the future.
Under these circumstances, we will accept the petition for consent discipline. We will publicly censure respondent for his violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct in the Chesson and Stine matters. We will also order respondent to pay $1,548.00 in costs. In accordance with Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 30(e), we further order the joint pleadings filed in this matter shall become public upon the release of this opinion.
DECREE
It is ordered that the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Judge Guy E. Bradberry be publicly censured for his violation in the Chesson matter of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), and 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and La. Const. art. V, § 25 (C), and for his violation in the Stine matter of Canons 1, 2, 2A, 2B, 3A(4), 3A(6), and 3(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and La. Const. art. V, § 25 (C). Judge Bradberry shall also pay $1,548.00 in costs incurred by the Commission.
WEIMER, C.J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Not mentioned in this court's per curiam is the fact that the Judiciary Commission and the respondent judge reached an agreement as to an appropriate sanction which the majority rejected as being too harsh, choosing instead to impose the mildest permissible sanction.
The Judiciary Commission and the respondent proposed that respondent receive a public censure in the Chesson matter, pursuant to a Deferred Recommendation of Discipline Agreement previously reached in that matter, and that respondent be suspended without pay for 30 days and ordered to pay $1,548.00 in costs for his admitted misconduct in the Stine matter.
While this court is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in judicial disciplinary proceedings, the court must await a recommendation from the Judiciary Commission before discipline can be imposed on a judge. La. Const. art. 5, § 25 ; In re: Huckaby , 95-0041, p. 4 (La. 5/22/95), 656 So.2d 292, 295. Because this court is not equipped to hear evidence, the Judiciary Commission (a constitutionally established body composed of judges, attorneys and other citizens who are neither judges nor attorneys) conducts hearings, receives evidence, and makes recommendations as to discipline. La. Const. art. 5, § 25 ; Huckaby, 95-0041 at p. 5, 656 So.2d at 296. As the court of original jurisdiction, this court is not bound by, nor required to give any weight to, the findings and recommendations the Judiciary Commission. In re: Quirk , 97-1143, pp. 3-4 (La. 12/12/97), 705 So.2d 172, 175-176. Nevertheless, in this case, the Judiciary Commission and the respondent judge reached a negotiated agreement as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed after the respondent stipulated to the facts and to the misconduct those facts represent. In such circumstances, this court need not make its own factual determinations, but simply reviews the recommendation jointly presented. The recommendation may be rejected, but the majority's action here is unprecedented, being the first time this court, in a judicial disciplinary matter, has rejected a consent sanction as being too harsh. And, the majority does so without explaining why a departure from the recommendation of the harsher sanction (previously agreed to by the respondent Judge) is warranted.
On occasion, this court has rejected lawyer consent discipline petitions as being too harsh, but this is the exception. Rather, the general rule in the analogous lawyer disciplinary arena is that the sanction in a petition for consent discipline will be accepted even if it appears too harsh, on the theory that the parties have agreed to the sanction. See, In re: Hernandez , 00-1283, p. 4 (La. 10/6/00), 770 So.2d 330, 331 n.4 ("While this court has rejected sanctions in consent discipline proceedings which are too lenient, we have sometimes accepted sanctions in such proceedings which arguably could be considered too harsh because the parties have agreed to the sanction."). I see no reason to depart from that general rule in the context of a judicial discipline case.
The evidence indicates that respondent is an exceptional person, dedicated to his faith, his family, and his community. In Re: Judge Guy E. Bradberry , 22-1828 (La. 02/24/23), 355 So.3d 1075, 1079-80, n.3. He is remorseful and has accepted responsibility for his actions. Id . at pp. 1079-80. He made mistakes and, in agreeing to the negotiated sanction, obviously believed that original sanction to be appropriate under the circumstances. I remain willing to accept that sanction out of respect for the dedicated work of the Judiciary Commission and the consent of the respondent Judge, albeit finding the sanction to be lenient.
In its per curiam, the majority recognizes that the respondent's admitted misconduct was "serious," and that he is "an experienced judicial officer" who had already been disciplined for judicial misconduct. Id . at p. 1080. The per curiam recounts in some detail the conduct for which respondent is being sanctioned; yet it provides no insight as to why it believes the departure from the original negotiated sanction to be appropriate.
To be more specific, the per curiam outlines misconduct on the part of respondent in two matters: the Chesson matter and the Stine matter. As the majority acknowledges, respondent agreed to accept a public censure for his misconduct in Chesson , misconduct similar to the misconduct in the Stine matter. Id . at p. 1078. The majority's unexplained decision here to impose a public censure for both the Chesson and the Stine matters effectively means that respondent is receiving no additional discipline for the Stine misconduct, misconduct similar to that for which he previously received the benefit of a deferred recommendation of discipline. Id .
To the extent that a short footnote in the per curiam suggests that the public was made aware of this disciplinary proceeding prior to the November election in which respondent was elected to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, that fact should have no bearing on this court's role in deciding the appropriate discipline to impose. This is true for at least two reasons. First, the complaint that was made available to the public contained no information about the Chesson matter; and second, there are many factors at issue in an election, factors which have no bearing on our decision to impose discipline for admitted misconduct.
Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 23 provides that "once the Commission files a notice of hearing ... and the respondent judge either files an answer or the time for filing an answer has expired, proceedings before the Judiciary Commission and its hearing officers in the matter shall be open to the public ... and the pleadings, orders, and evidence filed into the record of the proceedings shall be public record ...." In this case, the notice of hearing in the Stine matter was filed on July 5, 2022, but did not become public until October 11, 2022, when respondent filed his answer. Respondent attempted to obtain an extension of time to file his answer which would have resulted in the Stine charges remaining confidential until after the November 8, 2022 election, but the Judiciary Commission ultimately rejected that effort, resulting in the charges being made public on October 11, 2022. Notably, the only charges which became public on that date related to the Stine matter. The Chesson matter, which was subject to the provisions of the Deferred Recommendation of Discipline Agreement, has remained confidential at all times prior to the release of this per curiam. Nevertheless, the majority rejected the original consent discipline agreement, choosing to propose an unusually lenient consent agreement instead.
Cases can serve as guidelines in succeeding cases in determining what represents an appropriate sanction. See, e.g., In re: Ellender , 09-0736 (La. 7/1/09), 16 So.3d 351 (comparing the facts in that case to those in two previous disciplinary proceedings in reaching a conclusion as to the appropriate sanction). The record of this proceeding will become public in accordance with Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXIII § 30(e). Even if, as a consent sanction, it has limited precedential value, the result here sets a potentially dangerous precedent from which I must respectfully dissent.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
I write separately to make clear the fundamental principle that this Court has supervisory and plenary authority over all other courts and original jurisdiction in all disciplinary matters related to the bench and bar. La. Const. art. V, § 5. "This constitutional grant of supervisory authority has always been held to be plenary, unfettered by jurisdictional requirements, and exercisable at the complete discretion of the court." Albert Tate, Jr., Supervisory Powers of the La. Courts of Appeal, 38 Tul. L. Rev. 429, 430 (1964). While the Court uses past cases as guidance for the imposition of discipline, those cases are not to be understood rigidly as binding precedent. Rather, in the context of judicial discipline, this Court has the power to make original determinations of fact based upon the evidence in the record. See In re Quirk , 97-1143, p. 4 (La. 12/12/97), 705 So.2d 172, 176 ; In re Bowman , 2012-2410 (La. 3/19/13), 111 So. 3d 317, 324 ("While our precedents provide general guidance in this area, the appropriate sanction must be determined with reference to the unique facts and circumstances of the specific case at issue."). In my view, the unique facts and circumstances of this case merit the result reached by the majority in this case.
McCallum, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
I respectfully dissent. The Judiciary Commission is a constitutionally established body which gathers the facts and acts as the gatekeeper for this Court. La. Const. Art. V, § 25. Much deference should be accorded to their recommendations. Despite the Commission's recommendation of an appropriate sanction, the majority has departed from their considered agreement with the respondent himself, and have imposed a more lenient sanction.
The evidence in the record indicates that respondent is an exceptional person, dedicated to his Christian faith, his family and his community. In Re: Judge Guy E. Bradbury , 22-1828 (La. 02/24/23), 355 So.3d 1075, 1079-80, n.3. In agreeing to the negotiated sanction, the respondent obviously believed that it was appropriate under the circumstances. I would respect the recommendation of the Commission and the acquiescence of the respondent and accept the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline.