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In re Blake I.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Feb 18, 2016
136 A.D.3d 1190 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)

Opinion

02-18-2016

In the Matter of BLAKE I., an Infant. Richard H. et al., Respondents; Neimiah I., Appellant.

Robert N. Gregor, Lake George, for appellant. Matte & Nenninger, P.C., Glens Falls (Jeffrey C. Matte of counsel), for respondents.


Robert N. Gregor, Lake George, for appellant.

Matte & Nenninger, P.C., Glens Falls (Jeffrey C. Matte of counsel), for respondents.

Before: PETERS, P.J., McCARTHY, ROSE and LYNCH, JJ.

PETERS, P.J.Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Washington County (Wait, J.), entered June 11, 2015, which granted petitioners' application, in a proceeding pursuant to Domestic Relations Law article 7, to determine that respondent's consent was not required for the adoption of his child.

Respondent (hereinafter the father) and petitioner Kelsey H. (hereinafter the mother), who were never married, are the biological parents of a son (born in 2008). In 2009, the mother was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the child and the father was given 10 minutes of biweekly parenting time. The mother married petitioner Richard H. (hereinafter the stepfather) in 2011 and the two have lived together continuously with the child since that time. The father was released from prison in August 2013 and was reincarcerated in March 2014 upon his conviction of a drug felony, for which he received a sentence of five years in prison. In January 2015, petitioners commenced this proceeding seeking the stepfather's adoption of the child. Following a hearing, Family Court determined that the father's consent to the adoption was not required pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 111(2)(a) because he evinced an intent to abandon his parental rights. The father appeals.We affirm, albeit on a different ground. "[T]here are two steps in determining whether the biological father's consent may be dispensed with in a proceeding seeking approval of the adoption of [a] child" over six months old who was born out of wedlock (Matter of Anthony S., 291 A.D.2d 702, 702, 737 N.Y.S.2d 442 [2002], lv. denied 98 N.Y.2d 609, 747 N.Y.S.2d 409, 775 N.E.2d 1288 [2002] ; see Matter of Andrew Peter H.T., 64 N.Y.2d 1090, 1091, 489 N.Y.S.2d 882, 479 N.E.2d 227 [1985] ). The threshold inquiry is whether the biological father has established a right to consent to the adoption by "maintain[ing] a substantial and continuous or repeated relationship with the child by means of financial support according to the father's means and either monthly visitation, when physically and financially able to do so, or regular communication with the child or the child's caregiver" (Matter of Dakiem M. [Demetrius O.-Dakiem N.], 94 A.D.3d 1362, 1362, 943 N.Y.S.2d 629 [2012], lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 807, 2012 WL 2401561 [2012] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see Domestic Relations Law § 111[1][d] ; Matter of Andrew Peter H. T., 64 N.Y.2d at 1091, 489 N.Y.S.2d 882, 479 N.E.2d 227 ; Matter of Ethan S. [Tarra C.-Jason S.], 85 A.D.3d 1599, 1599, 925 N.Y.S.2d 739 [2011], lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 711, 2011 WL 4835754 [2011] ). "Only after the [biological] father establishes his right of consent to the adoption, by satisfying both the support and communication provisions of the statute, does the court proceed to determine whether he has forfeited that right by evincing an intent to forego his ... parental ... rights and obligations" within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 111(2)(a) ( Matter of Andrew Peter H. T., 64 N.Y.2d at 1091, 489 N.Y.S.2d 882, 479 N.E.2d 227 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of John Q. v. Erica R., 104 A.D.3d 1097, 1098, 962 N.Y.S.2d 487 [2013] ; see Matter of Asia ZZ. [Henry A.-Jason V.], 97 A.D.3d 865, 866, 947 N.Y.S.2d 682 [2012] ; Matter of Dakiem M. [Demetrius O.-Dakiem N.], 94 A.D.3d at 1362, 943 N.Y.S.2d 629 ).

The record does not disclose when this term of incarceration began.

Here, Family Court did not follow the two-step process set forth above, instead proceeding directly to the second inquiry under Domestic Relations Law § 111(2)(a) and concluding that the father forfeited his right to consent to the adoption by abandoning his parental rights. While Family Court's finding in that regard is amply supported by the record, particularly after due deference is given to its credibility determinations resolving the conflicting testimony in favor of the mother (see Matter of John Q. v. Erica R., 104 A.D.3d at 1099, 962 N.Y.S.2d 487 ; Matter of Asia ZZ. [Henry A.-Jason V.], 97 A.D.3d at 866, 947 N.Y.S.2d 682 ), the court should have first made a threshold finding as to whether the father established his right to consent to the adoption through satisfaction of the support and communication criteria set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d). Upon our independent review of the record, we conclude that the father did not. The uncontroverted testimony adduced at the hearing established that the father has never provided any financial support for his son. Although the father was incarcerated for a significant portion of the two-year period preceding the hearing, he offered no proof that he had insufficient income or resources to provide some measure of financial support either during that time or when he was not in prison (see Matter of Bella FF. [Margaret GG.-James HH.], 130 A.D.3d 1187, 1188, 13 N.Y.S.3d 665 [2015] ; Matter of Maurice N. [Carlos O.], 128 A.D.3d 1117, 1118, 8 N.Y.S.3d 475 [2015] ; Matter of John Q. v. Erica R., 104 A.D.3d at 1099, 962 N.Y.S.2d 487 ). Further, the absence of a court order directing the father to pay child support does not excuse his failure to provide any financial support (see Matter of Bella FF. [Margaret GG.-James HH.], 130 A.D.3d at 1188, 13 N.Y.S.3d 665 ; Matter of John Q. v. Erica R., 104 A.D.3d at 1099, 962 N.Y.S.2d 487 ). As the father failed to satisfy the support aspect of Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d), his consent to the adoption was not required under that statutory provision.

Because the support and communication provisions of Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d) must both be satisfied to require consent to an adoption (see Matter of Bella FF. [Margaret GG.-James HH.], 130 A.D.3d at 1187–1188, 13 N.Y.S.3d 665 ; Matter of Asia ZZ. [Henry A.-Jason V.], 97 A.D.3d at 867 n., 947 N.Y.S.2d 682 ), we need not address the communication provision.
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ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

McCARTHY, ROSE and LYNCH, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

In re Blake I.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Feb 18, 2016
136 A.D.3d 1190 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)
Case details for

In re Blake I.

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of BLAKE I., an Infant. Richard H. et al., Respondents…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Date published: Feb 18, 2016

Citations

136 A.D.3d 1190 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)
26 N.Y.S.3d 793
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 1227

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