Opinion
No. 352213
11-19-2020
In re BLACKKETTER, Minors.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Eaton Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 18-020089-NA Before: JANSEN, PJ., and FORT HOOD and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In this termination of parental rights action, respondent appeals by right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her three minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services, filed a petition against respondent in December 2018 requesting that the minor children be removed from her care. The petition against respondent alleged that she had allowed the children's father to have unsupervised parenting time with the children in violation of a court order prohibiting such conduct. After a preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the petition and the removal of the children from respondent's care. The children were placed into the care of respondent's sister where they remained throughout the duration of this case. A case service plan was put into place to address respondent's emotional stability, her parenting skills, and acknowledgment of sexual abuse by the children's father of respondent's other child. Throughout this case, respondent continued to deny that the sexual abuse had taken place, and petitioner was concerned that this could lead to further abuse against the children at issue in this case. Other issues arose later in this case with respect to housing and employment.
Petitioner had previously filed a petition against the children's father because of allegations of sexual abuse against a different child who is not the subject of this appeal. His parental rights, which are also not the subject of this appeal, were terminated in a separate proceeding. This Court recently affirmed that termination. See In re Blackketter Minors, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 21, 2020 (Docket 350185).
By October 2019, petitioner sought to change the goal from reunification to termination. According to petitioner, respondent had failed to cooperate or engage in the offered services, had failed to address any of the barriers to reunification, and continued to maintain contact with the children's father and to deny that the sexual abuse had occurred. In fact, despite the fact that his parental rights to the children were terminated in July 2019, respondent allegedly continued to believe that he had parental rights to the children. A petition seeking termination was filed in November 2019 and, after a termination hearing in December 2019, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j).
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, respondent maintains that petitioner did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification and that termination of her parental rights was not in the children's best interests. We disagree.
This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's decision on whether the petitioner made reasonable efforts, the trial court's decision on whether one of the statutory grounds for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, In re Smith (Amended Opinion), 324 Mich App 28, 43, 46; 919 NW2d 427 (2018), and the trial court's decision on whether termination is in the children's best interests, In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). Clear error occurs when, "although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re Smith, 324 Mich App at 43 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although respondent raises only a reasonable efforts argument, her "contention that reasonable services were not offered ultimately relates to the issue of sufficiency." In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Except in limited circumstances not applicable here, the Department of Health and Human Services "has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights." In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b). This Court has stated that, "[a]s part of these reasonable efforts, the Department must create a service plan outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification." Id. at 85-86, citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(d).
As previously discussed, the barriers to reunification identified in this case were respondent's emotional stability, her parenting skills, her failure to acknowledge the sexual abuse by the children's father, her housing situation, and her financial instability. Our review of the record convinces us that petitioner made reasonable efforts at reunification. The foster care worker assigned to this case, Shelley Mercer, testified that she provided respondent with the opportunity to use housing services but that respondent declined these services and believed she could secure her own housing. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent had left her prior housing without paying rent and without informing the landlord, and her current housing arrangements were unknown. Also, respondent had held several jobs throughout the case, but, by the time of the termination hearing, she was by all accounts unemployed and had no source of income. Mercer testified that she had spoken to respondent about Michigan Works, but it appears that respondent did not take advantage of this opportunity.
Regarding parenting skills, which were viewed by Mercer to be a significant barrier, Mercer recommended two companies to respondent, Cristo Rey Community Center and Children and Family Services, beginning in January 2019. Yet, by the time of the termination hearing nearly a year later, respondent had not attended a single parenting class and appears to have made little effort to do so. Furthermore, Mercer testified that respondent continued to maintain contact with the children's father and to deny that the sexual abuse, which was the basis for his own termination of parental rights, had occurred. Even after his parental rights had been terminated, respondent continued to believe that the father had parental rights to the children. According to Mercer, no progress had been made on this front despite many conversations between Mercer and respondent.
Regarding emotional stability, respondent underwent a psychological evaluation in May 2019, and as a result of this evaluation, Mercer believed that counseling was necessary. Mercer acknowledged that she did not take active steps to speak to respondent about the counseling until November 2019, which was mere weeks prior to the termination trial. Respondent focuses on this lapse and maintains that it demonstrates a lack of reasonable efforts on the part of petitioner. We disagree.
Mercer explained that one of the reasons for this delay was because it was not seen as a significant barrier; Mercer had believed that respondent's lack of parenting skills was a more significant barrier that warranted the main focus. Moreover, Mercer had testified at a prior hearing that the delay stemmed from allegations by respondent of abuse within the foster home. While an investigation ultimately revealed that there was no merit to these allegations, Mercer explained that "things kind of blew up" because of these allegations and the counseling was delayed while an investigation into these allegations occurred. Mercer also testified that, throughout the duration of this case, respondent was uncooperative with the services and recommendations offered by petitioner. She also refused to maintain contact with Mercer on multiple occasions, further adding to the delay.
With all of the above in mind, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that petitioner made reasonable efforts toward reunification. Additionally, we note that although respondent raises only a reasonable efforts argument, this issue relates to the sufficiency of proofs to justify termination. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).
To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination listed within MCL 712A.19b has been met. Id. at 540-541. The grounds in this case were MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), a trial court may terminate parental rights when "[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent." As previously discussed, respondent failed to acknowledge the sexual abuse by the children's father and continued to maintain a relationship with him. Even by the time of the termination hearing, there was no indication that this would change. Given the nature of the prior abuse, Mercer was concerned that the children could be at risk of sexual abuse by the father. With that in mind, we further cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish a reasonable likelihood of harm under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
If we find that the trial court did not clearly err in its determination that at least one statutory ground for termination existed, we need not address the additional grounds for termination. See In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). --------
B. BEST INTERESTS
We also reject respondent's arguments that the trial court clearly erred in its finding that termination was in the children's best interests.
After the court determines that there are statutory grounds to terminate a respondent's parental rights, "the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 40. Whether termination is in a child's best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). When deciding whether termination is in the children's best interests, the trial court may consider "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). It is also proper to consider evidence that the children are not safe with the parent, that they are thriving in foster care, and that the foster care home can provide stability and permanency. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).
The trial court addressed each of the best interest factors, and our review of the record convinces us that it did not clearly err in its findings. The trial court found that the first factor, i.e., the parent's bond with the children, weighed in favor of reunification because the children were bonded with respondent. However, the court noted that this factor was muted by Mercer's belief that the children's bond with their foster family was greater than the bond with respondent. Mercer noted that, as late as October 2019, the children sometimes did not want to attend their parenting-time sessions. The children also were often "moody" and "triggered" after these parenting-time sessions. Regarding the second factor, i.e., the parent's parenting ability, the trial court found that this weighed in favor of termination because respondent had failed to participate in services, had failed to try to improve her situation, had failed to obtain consistent employment, and had failed to address the children's medical and dental needs. In fact, when the children were taken into petitioner's care, one of the children had major dental issues requiring multiple surgeries to remedy. Additionally, the trial court found that respondent had continued a relationship with the father and would not acknowledge his sexual abuse.
Regarding the third factor, i.e., the children's need for permanency, stability, and finality, the trial court found that this weighed in favor of termination because the children had thrived in foster care and had been living in a stable environment for over a year. Moreover, it found that their ages indicated that they required permanency, finality, and stability. This was supported by the record. Mercer testified that the children had been "thriving" in their placement and that each of their needs was being met. The children referred to their placement as "home" and, as previously discussed, were bonded with their foster family. Furthermore, the children were very young: ages three, four, and five at the time of the termination hearing. Accordingly, although the duration of this case was a relatively short period of time, the children's young ages meant that they had already spent a significant portion of their lives in foster care.
Lastly, with respect to the fourth factor, i.e., the advantage of the foster home over the parent's home, the trial court noted that placement was with a relative, which generally favored reunification. However, the court also found that the children treated their placement as their home, which weighed in favor of termination. For the reasons already discussed, these findings were supported by the record.
With all of the above in mind, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred in weighing the best interests of the children, particularly in light of the children's young ages and respondent's inability to improve her situation in order to provide for their care.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause