Opinion
No. 337277
08-10-2017
In re A. BLACK, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Berrien Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2016-000123-NA Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and MURPHY and K. F. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, AB, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (b)(iii), (g), and (j), arising from respondent-mother's failure to protect AB from sexual abuse perpetrated by respondent-mother's boyfriend. We affirm.
If a trial court finds that a single statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence and that it has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the court is mandated to terminate a respondent's parental rights to that child. MCL 712A.19b(3) and (5); In re Beck, 488 Mich 6, 10-11; 793 NW2d 562 (2010); In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013); In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). "This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's ruling that a statutory ground for termination has been established and its ruling that termination is in the children's best interests." In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011); see also MCR 3.977(K). "A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). In applying the clear error standard in parental termination cases, "regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it." In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The trial court must "state on the record or in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law[,] [and] [b]rief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on contested matters are sufficient." MCR 3.977(I)(1) (rule pertains to termination proceedings).
As an initial matter, respondent-mother does not challenge the statutory grounds for termination. As such, we may presume that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the unchallenged statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence. In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92, 98-99; 585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Given respondent-mother's failure to challenge the statutory grounds, she has effectively conceded that the evidence adequately established that AB had been sexually abused by her boyfriend and that she failed to protect AB from the sexual abuse. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (b)(iii). Indeed, AB's accounts of the sexual abuse were consistent, and there was medical evidence that was indicative of sexual abuse; yet respondent-mother chose not to believe her daughter and to continue the relationship with her boyfriend.
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court clearly erred in determining that termination of her parental rights was in AB's best interests. We disagree. In determining a child's best interests, a trial court may consider such factors as "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).
In this case, in making its best-interest determination, the trial court considered AB's bond with respondent-mother. The trial court observed that there was no evidence suggesting the complete absence of a bond between respondent-mother and AB. However, according to the court, there was no evidence presented to demonstrate that AB and respondent-mother had a strong or close bond. In fact, the trial court characterized respondent-mother's relationship with AB as reflecting a "lack of interest." The trial court also emphasized that respondent-mother did not believe her own daughter when she made allegations of sexual abuse over the course of two years. The trial court stated that respondent-mother showed a lack of follow-through based on her unwillingness to attend and complete counseling and therapy sessions. The trial court also discussed respondent-mother's limited contact with AB after she was placed full-time with AB's father. Additionally, the trial court discussed the suitability of alternative homes. The trial court noted that AB was in her father's care full-time and was "doing well."
Respondent-mother argues that termination was not in AB's best interests because she was bonded with AB and because she had the ability to be a cooperative parent. However, the evidence demonstrated otherwise. Although respondent-mother finally brought AB to an emergency room for a sexual assault examination, she only did so after a police officer directed her to do so. And even then she waited two more days to bring AB to the emergency room. The evidence also revealed that respondent-mother could not, or would not, protect AB from further sexual assault, where the suspected abuser was still living with respondent-mother as her boyfriend and having contact with AB. In fact, respondent-mother and her boyfriend were acting in violation of a court's no-contact probation order stemming from prior domestic violence committed by the boyfriend. The evidence established that respondent-mother placed her relationship with her boyfriend over the well-being and safety of her own daughter, making it quite clear to the trial court and this panel that termination would undoubtedly serve the child's best interests.
Respondent-mother additionally argues that termination was premature because she did not have the opportunity to participate in reunification services. We disagree. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is not required to provide reunification services when termination of parental rights is the agency's goal. In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 463. Here, the DHHS sought termination of respondent-mother's parental rights at the initial hearing. Moreover, the DHHS did in fact give respondent-mother the opportunity to engage in services. She attended three counseling sessions in November 2016. Respondent-mother had three additional counseling sessions scheduled for December 2016, but she either cancelled them or did not show up to those appointments. Additionally, a safety plan was developed with respondent-mother in which she specifically agreed not to allow her boyfriend to have contact with AB. Respondent-mother was warned that allowing her boyfriend to have contact with AB would be viewed as her failing to protect AB and would result in the DHHS filing a petition for removal and termination of respondent-mother's parental rights. Despite this warning, respondent-mother continued to allow her boyfriend to have contact with AB. In sum, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent-mother's parental rights was in AB's best interests.
We note that reunification services had been ordered, despite the concomitant authorization of a termination petition, and that boxes on standard-court-form orders had not been checked with respect to a finding of aggravated circumstances, although such circumstances did in fact exist. See MCL 712A.19a(2)(a) (reunification services need not be made when parent subjects child to aggravated circumstances listed in MCL 722.638); MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii) (adult resident in child's home commits criminal sexual conduct involving penetration against the child). --------
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly