See, e.g., In re Bill, 168 Vt. 439, 442, 724 A.2d 444, 446 (1998) (when laying out or discontinuing highway selectboard must "substantially comply" with statutory procedure "or the proceedings will be void"). ¶ 12. Determining the weight afforded evidence is properly the role of the trial court.

When purporting to discontinue or reclassify a highway, a town must substantially comply with the statutory method for discontinuance or the resultant change will be void. In re Bill, 168 Vt. 439, 442, 724 A.2d 444, 446 (1998). We presume actions taken by a selectboard within the scope of its duties to be in accordance with statutory requirements.

In re Mattison, 120 Vt. 459, 462, 144 A.2d 778, 780 (1958) (citing Town of Barton v. Town of Sutton, 93 Vt. 102, 103, 106 A. 583, 584 (1919)); see In re Town Highway No. 20 of Town of Georgia, 2003 VT 76, ¶¶ 6-7, 175 Vt. 626, 834 A.2d 17 (mem.); In re Bill, 168 Vt. 439, 442, 724 A.2d 444, 446 (1998). When interpreting any law, this Court begins by examining the plain language of the statute in order to give effect to the legislative intent.

Petitioner can obtain a remedy by declaratory action in the superior court. See In re Bill, 168 Vt. 439, 724 A.2d 444 (1998). That forum can resolve all the rights and interests of the interested parties, including the Town. Additionally, we note that the Board has no special expertise regarding the issue that petitioner seeks to have it resolve.

19 V.S.A. § 709. Failure to comply with these procedures will render any purported discontinuance void. In re Bill, 168 Vt. 439, 442-45, 724 A.2d 444, 446-48 (1998) (finding road was not discontinued when selectboard failed to comply with then-applicable procedure for discontinuance); Capital Candy Co. v. Savard, 135 Vt. 14, 16-17, 369 A.2d 1363, 1365-66 (1976) (holding that mere abandonment does not constitute discontinuance because statutory procedure for discontinuance has not been followed). While the Town is correct that a selectboard must follow statutory procedures to validly discontinue a road, this does not preclude adjudication of the issue of whether there are any existing public roads on a property.

See, e.g., In re Bill, 168 Vt. 439, 442, 724 A.2d 444, 446 (1998) ("The parties agree that the present-day legal status of the disputed highway segment turns on the validity and legal effect of the 1926 selectboards's purported discontinuation of the highway"); Pillsbury v. Town of Wheelock, 130 Vt. 242, 244, 290 A.2d 42, 44 (1972) ("It appears that the land crossed by the trail and now restored to public highway status may be still subject to an annual lease payment to Dartmouth College."). Other language in the plan supports this argument.