1982); Redin v. Fidelity Financial Services, 14 B.R. 727, 729 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo. 1981); Phillips v. Household Finance Corp., 13 B.R. 811, 815 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1981); Storer v. Thorp Credit, Inc., 13 B.R. 1, 4 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1981); Frederickson v. Household Finance Corp., 12 B.R. 506, 508 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1981); Dickens v. Snellings, 10 B.R. 949, 955 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Va. 1981); Kursh v. Dial Finance Co., 9 B.R. 801, 803 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1981); Security Pacific Finance Corp. v. Banta, 8 B.R. 145, 151 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va. 1981); Credithrift of America, Inc. v. Dubrock, 5 B.R. 353, 356 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Ky. 1980). Contra, Cowan v. Cowan (In reScott), 12 B.R. 613 (Bkrtcy.D.Okla.
Thus, by the plain language of the statute, a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest may be avoided only (a) if it impairs an exemption claimed by the debtorand (b) if it attaches to property of the type described in § 522(f)(1)(B)(i) through (iii), that is, household furnishings, tools of the trade, or professionally prescribed health aids. See Security Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Barto (In re Barto), 8 B.R. 145, 147 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1981), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Security Pacific Fin. Co., 704 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1983) (Congress intended to protect otherwise exempt household goods, furnishings and appliances typically having, at best, nominal resale value, but high replacement cost); In re Wetzel, 46 B.R. 254, 255 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 1984) (consensual security interest in firearms could not be avoided because firearms are not household goods or furnishings); In re Psick, 61 B.R. 308, 313 (Bankr.D.Minn. 1985) (avoidance of consensual liens available only with respect to "a protected class of specific types of property"; dirt bike, tractor-loader and automobile did not fall within that class).
In re Fox, 17 B.R. 300 ((Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1982) (§ 523(a)(2)(A)); In re Farley, 8 B.R. 145, 5 C.B.C.2d 549 (Bkrtcy.D.Or. 1981) (§ 523(a)(2)(A)); In re Vegh, 14 B.R. 345, 3 Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 68,367 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla. 1981) (§ 523(a)(2)(A));
The policy of Congress to afford a debtor a "fresh start" was thwarted because some creditors took unfair advantage of consumer debtors and abused the blanket security interest. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977) 126-27, U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News 1978 p. 5787; 124 Cong.Rec.H. 11,095 (September 28, 1978); S. 17,412 (October 6, 1978); Security Pacific Finance Co. v. Barto, 8 B.R. 145 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va. 1980). The author of opinions should not seek to do what another has done better.
1981); In re Bowles, 8 B.R. 394 (Bkrtcy.S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Farris, 8 B.R. 186 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Tenn. 1981); In re Barto, 8 B.R. 145 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va. 1981); In re Rodgers, 5 B.R. 761, 2 C.B.C.2d 1294 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Va. 1981); In re Dubrock, 5 B.R. 353, 2 C.B.C.2d 776, 6 B.C.D. 771 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Ky. 1980); In re Curry, 5 B.R. 282, 2 C.B.C.2d 710 (Bkrtcy.N.D. Ohio 1981) ( affirmed 11 B.R. 716) ; In re Hill, 4 B.R. 310, 2 C.B.C.2d 123, 6 B.C.D. 307 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1980); In re Cox, 4 B.R. 240, 2 C.B.C.2d 255, 6 B.C.D. 434 (Bkrtcy.S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Redin, 14 B.R. 727, 8 B.C.D. 332 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo. 1981); In re Kursh, 9 B.R. 801, 4 C.B.C.2d 84, 7 B.C.D. 592 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1981).
Hence, a gap or interim of almost 11 months exists between the enactment date and the effective date of the new bankruptcy laws. For cases holding the avoidance of consensual liens created in the "gap" period to be constitutional see In re Bradford, 6 B.R. 741 (D.Nev. 1980), aff'g, 5 B.R. 18 (Bkrtcy., D.Nev. 1980); In re Dawkins, 13 B.R. 741 (Bkrtcy., S.D.Fla. 1981); In re Osborne, 11 B.R. 610 (Bkrtcy., D.S.C. 1981); In re Lumpkins, 11 B.R. 76 (Bkrtcy., D.R.I. 1981); In re Carroll, 11 B.R. 45 (Bkrtcy., E.D.N.Y. 1981) (dicta approving Steinart, infra); In re Coleman, 10 B.R. 772 (Bkrtcy., D.Md. 1981); In re Bruntz, 10 B.R. 444 (Bkrtcy., N.D.Iowa 1981); Matter of Fennel, 9 B.R. 340 (Bkrtcy., D.Idaho 1981); Matter of Teske, 9 B.R. 18 (Bkrtcy., W.D.Mich. 1981); In re Farris, 8 B.R. 186 (Bkrtcy., E.D.Tenn. 1981); In re Barto, 8 B.R. 145 (Bkrtcy., E.D.Va. 1981); In re Wells, 7 B.R. 875 (Bkrtcy., D.Colo. 1980); In re Sweeney, 7 B.R. 814 (Bkrtcy., E.D.Wisc. 1980); In re Webber, 7 B.R. 580 (Bkrtcy., D.Ore. 1980); In re Brown, 7 B.R. 264 (Bkrtcy., N.D.Tex. 1980); In re Seltzer, 7 B.R. 80 (Bkrtcy., D.Colo. 1980); In re Beck, 4 B.R. 661 (Bkrtcy., C.D.Ill. 1980); In re Head, 4 B.R. 521 (Bkrtcy., E.D.Tenn. 1980); In re Steinart, 4 B.R. 354 (Bkrtcy., W.D.La. 1980). The following cases found application of § 522(f)(2) during the gap period to be an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation.
However, the weight of authority, and in my opinion, the better reasoned decisions hold that § 522(f) is applicable to liens and security interest created before the Code became effective, but after its enactment date, and that such an application does not violate the Fifth Amendment. I choose to follow the result and reasoning adopted by these courts: E. g. Brown v. Termplan and U.S. Credit Life, 7 B.R. 264 (N.D.Tex. 1980); Baker v. GFC Corp. of Missouri, 6 BCD 747 (W.D.Mo. 1980); Head v. Home Credit Co, 4 B.R. 521, 6 BCD 489 (E.D.Tenn. 1980); Security Pacific Finance Corp. v. Barto, 8 B.R. 145 (E.D.Va. 1981); Pillow v. Avco Financial Services, 8 B.R. 404 (D.Utah 1981); Stump v. Beneficial Finance Co. of South Dakota, 8 B.R. 516 (1981); Teske v. General Finance Corp., 9 B.R. 18 (W.D.Mich. 1981).
The cases present analogous factual settings. Each of the debtors initially borrowed money prior to the "cut off date" of November 6, 1978, as established by this Court in In re Barto, 8 B.R. 145, ___ BCD ___ (E.D.Va. 1981). The debtors then refinanced the notes after November 6, 1978.
Proceedings in all of the above-captioned cases came on for hearing on February 24, 1981, upon applications for the avoidance of liens pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). In each instance the original loan and the perfection of a lien had been made prior to November 6, 1978, which under the Court's decision in In re Barto, 8 B.R. 145, (1981), would render a lien based upon such loan nonavoidable. However and further, in each instance at least one subsequent loan was made wherein the prior note was cancelled and no new recordation pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, Title 8.