See In re Pierce, 142 B.R. 308, 309 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1992); In re Barac, 62 B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1985).----

This Court has previously addressed the issue and has held that the debtor's direct obligation to third party creditors on the marital debts as well as the concomitant hold harmless obligation is a debt to a spouse, former spouse or child of the debtor under § 523(a)(5). Burns v. Burns (In re Burns), 149 B.R. 578, 581-82 (Bankr. E.D.Mo. 1993); Telgmann v. Maune (In re Maune), 133 B.R. 1010, 1014 (Bankr. E.D.Mo. 1991); Barac v. Barac (In re Barac), 62 B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1985);. However, upon reconsideration of the issue, the Court now finds that the language, legislative history and policy rationale underlying § 523(a)(5) compel a construction of the scope of the statute that does not include the debtor's obligation to pay the marital debt to third party creditors when the debtor is also obligated to hold his former spouse harmless for those debts.

The payment of the life insurance or accident insurance premiums has the effect of providing support for the former spouse and children in the event of the untimely demise of the insured. See In re Pierce, 142 B.R. 308, 309 (Bankr.E.D.Ark. 1992); In re Barac, 62 B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1985). The issue of whether post-secondary education costs are debts that are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5)(A) is not ready for resolution at this time.

"That function can be inferred where either the support granted would be inadequate but for the debt assumption or where the debt itself was initially incurred to provide the necessities of everyday life." In re Barac, 62 B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1985). According to the language of paragraph 4 of the parties' Separation Agreement, Debtor's assumption of the joint debts and hold harmless agreement constitute support.

"That function can be inferred where either the support granted would be inadequate but for the debt assumption or where the debt itself was initially incurred to provide the necessities of everyday life." In re Barac, 62 B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1985). According to the language of paragraph 4 of the parties' Separation Agreement, Debtor's assumption of the joint debts and hold harmless agreement constitute support.

As provided by paragraph 11 of the Judgment of Dissolution, the Debtor's obligation to maintain, pay for, and fully discharge any and all premiums and other expenses associated with the life insurance policy insuring the life of the Debtor with named beneficiaries being the minor children of the Parties until further order of the Madison County Circuit Court, is not dischargeable in this case. In re Pierce, 142 B.R. 308, 309 (Bankr.E.D.Ark. 1992); In re Barac, 62 B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1985). As provided by paragraph 13 of the Judgment of Dissolution, the Debtor's obligation to purchase, maintain, pay for, and fully discharge any and all premiums associated with the health care insurance group policy available through the Debtor's employment until further order of the Madison County Circuit Court, and the Debtor's obligation to pay one-half of any and all uninsured medical, dental, optical, or related expenses are nondischargeable.

Ms. Carroll-Fisher testified in this Court that in the period prior to February, 1995, approximately ninety percent of the time her firm had spent on this file was spent on matters relating to alimony, not property division. She apparently has read those cases which hold that fees incurred in connection with a dischargeable property settlement are also dischargeable. See, e.g. Barac v. Barac (In re Barac) 62 B.R. 713, 718 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1985); Cantor v. Lever (In reLever), 137 B.R. 243, 246 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1992). The evidence apart from her testimony, however, does not support her contention.

, In re Peters, 133 B.R. 291, 294 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Raff, 93 B.R. 41, 44 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1988). Thus, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether the payment of the legal fee is in the nature of support or rather of a property settlement. If it is part of a property settlement or has some other purpose, then it is dischargeable. Lindh v. Brenegan (In re Brenegan), 123 B.R. 12, 14 (Bankr.D.Del. 1990), citing In re Barac, 62 B.R. 713, 716 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1985) The complaining party bears the burden of proof in establishing that the debts in question are not dischargeable, since the court must begin with the assumption that discharge is favored in bankruptcy.

1987); In re Meadows, 75 B.R. 695, 699 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1987); In re Grijalva, 72 B.R. 334, 338-39 (S.D.W.Va. 1987); In re Cockhill, 72 B.R. 339, 341-44 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1987); In re Heverly, 68 B.R. 21, 23 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1981); In re Galpin, 66 B.R. 127, 131 (N.D.Ga. 1985); Siegel v. Smith, 65 B.R. 668, 669-70 (W.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Anderson, 62 B.R. 448, 456 (Bankr.D.Minn. 1986); In re Barac, 62 B.R. 713, 717-18 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1985); In re Manners, 62 B.R. 656, 658-59 (Bankr.D.Mont. 1986); In re Tosti, 62 B.R. 131, 132-33 (Bankr.D.N.J. 1986); In re Sigworth, 60 B.R. 137, 138-39 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1986); In re Tessler, 44 B.R. 786, 787-88 (Bankr.S.D.Calif.

Thus, as Mr. Lindh correctly points out, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether the award is in the nature of support or part of a property settlement. If a particular debt is a support obligation, it is not dischargeable. If it is part of a property settlement or has some other purpose, then it is dischargeable. In re Barac, 62 B.R. 713, 716 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1985); In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (1983). In making its determination, this court should look to the substance rather than the form of the award.