Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. PJ40972 Fred J. Fujioka, Judge.
Tara K. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and David Zarmi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ARMSTRONG, J.
The trial court sustained a petition alleging that 16-year-old appellant Aubrey P. committed vandalism in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor. The court found that appellant was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, adjudged him to be a ward of the court, and placed him in the care of a probation officer and in juvenile hall pending suitable placement, with a maximum physical confinement period not to exceed one year.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Appellant appeals from the orders sustaining the petition and adjudging him to be a ward of the court, contending that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that he committed vandalism, erred in removing him from the custody of his parents and ordering him suitably placed, and also erred in calculating his maximum period of confinement and his custody credit. Appellant further contends that one of his probation conditions is unconstitutionally vague. We affirm the juvenile court's orders.
Facts
On June 4, 2007, appellant's three-year-old and eight-year-old siblings found a marijuana pipe in their living room. Their mother, Yvette P., believed that the pipebelonged to appellant. She searched appellant's room and found more marijuana paraphernalia and also some items belonging to her which she believed that appellant had stolen from her. She barred appellant from staying in the apartment that night. Appellant lived in the apartment, but did not have a key.
The next morning, Yvette P. locked all the doors and windows to the apartment and went to the police station seeking guidance. When she returned home, she saw appellant with his arm through an apartment window. The window was broken. Four or five other boys were with appellant. All the boys, including appellant, fled when they saw Yvette P. Yvette P. called the police to report the incident.
On June 14, 2007, Yvette P. brought appellant to the police station. Appellant admitted to Los Angeles Police Detective Jones that he broke the window.
Discussion
1. Sufficiency of the evidence
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the court's finding that he committed vandalism because there is no evidence that he acted intentionally and maliciously. We see sufficient evidence.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, "courts apply the 'substantial evidence' test. Under this standard, the court 'must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence - that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value - such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 260-261.)
"The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] 'Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "'If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.'"'" (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792-793.)
Every person who maliciously damages or destroys any real or personal property belonging to another has committed vandalism. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a).) Malice is "a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act." (Pen. Code, § 7.)
Appellant contends that the evidence showed only that he was trying to get into his own home and that police never asked him if the damage was accidental. He also contends that this evidence shows that he had no desire to vex, annoy or injure another person. We do not agree.
The apartment was rented by appellant's mother, who chose not to give appellant a key. It is reasonable to infer that she did not wish appellant to have unrestricted access to the apartment. We see nothing improper about such a decision. The window breaking occurred at about 11:00 a.m. As the court noted, appellant did not have to break the window to get into the apartment. He could simply have waited for his mother to return home.
Appellant points out that his mother had a duty to provide him with food, clothing, shelter, medical care and regular care. (§ 300.) We see nothing in this duty that required her to give appellant a key to the apartment so that he could come and go as he pleased.
We see nothing in the circumstances of the incident to suggest that it was an accident. Appellant admitted he broke the window. Appellant's mother testified that the window was locked. The only reasonable inference is that appellant intentionally applied the force necessary to defeat the lock, either by breaking the glass to by-pass the lock or breaking the locking mechanism itself. Further, appellant fled when he saw his mother, an act which shows consciousness of guilt and supports an inference that he had intentionally damaged the window.
We do not agree with appellant that malice requires an intent to vex, annoy or injure another. Malice also exists when a person intends to do a wrongful act. As we have just discussed, there is sufficient evidence that appellant intended to do a wrongful act. Even if such an intent were required, we would find ample circumstantial evidence to support an inference of such intent. Appellant and his mother had had a disagreement the preceding evening, and she had kicked him out. The next day, she locked all the doors and windows before leaving the apartment. It is reasonable to infer that appellant intended to vex or annoy his mother by breaking a window to enter the apartment against her wishes.
2. Declaration of wardship
Appellant contends that the juvenile court failed to make the required findings under sections 725.5 and 726, subdivision (a), before declaring appellant a ward of the court. We do not agree.
Section 725.5 provides: "In determining the judgment and order to be made in any case in which the minor is found to be a person described in Section 602, the court shall consider, in addition to other relevant and material evidence, (1) the age of the minor, (2) the circumstances and gravity of the offense committed by the minor, and (3) the minor's previous delinquent history." (§ 725.5.)
Section 725.5 does not require the court to "specifically discuss each of the enumerated factors at the time of disposition. The Legislature used the term 'consider' in the language of that section. The court fulfills this obligation when it carefully examines and takes into account the factors stated. When the Legislature has wanted the courts to make specific findings in juvenile matters it has been explicit in so directing. However, it must be apparent from all of the surrounding circumstances that the court at least considered the appropriate factors." (In re John F. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 182, 185, fns. omitted.)
We find that the surrounding circumstances show that the court considered the appropriate factors under section 725.5. At the disposition hearing, the court stated that it found the current charge "not particularly egregious." The court also noted that the mother had had problems with the minor. The mother's testimony showed that these problems included truancy and marijuana use. The court also stated that it was following the probation officer's recommendations. That report also noted that appellant had not been attending school and had been smoking marijuana regularly. As the probation report and several other court documents show, appellant was 16 at the time of the dispositional hearing.
Section 726 provides in pertinent part: "[N]o ward or dependent child shall be taken from the physical custody of a parent or guardian, unless upon the hearing the court finds one of the following facts: [¶] (1) That the parent or guardian is incapable of providing or has failed or neglected to provide proper maintenance, training, and education for the minor. [¶] (2) That the minor has been tried on probation while in custody and has failed to reform. [¶] (3) That the welfare of the minor requires that custody be taken from the minor's parent or guardian."
Section 726 is satisfied when the court refers to the language of that section, even indirectly. Thus, an oral reference to a probation report which recommends that custody be taken for one of the reasons enumerated in section 726, together with a properly completed dispositional minute order, is sufficient. (In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616, 620-621.)
Here, the court first referred to the probation report, then stated that "the home situation just is not working for the minor, and the mother . . . just appears overwhelmed with all her problems that she has including the problems that she has with the minor. I believe suitable placement is appropriate at this point in time." The probation report itself states that appellant is "severely in need of supervision and guidance" and "beyond the control of his mother." The report concludes that "the situation has gotten so out of control between [appellant and his mother], and that removal is the only way to achieve a successful outcome." The report also states that "It is necessary to remove [appellant] from the home. Continuance in the home is contrary to the minor's welfare." On the minute order for the dispositional hearing, following findings were checked: "Welfare of minor requires that custody be taken from parents or guardians" and "There is a substantial danger to the physical/emotional health of the minor; no reasonable means exist to protect the minor without removal from the parents'/guardians' physical custody." The court's statements are sufficient under Kenneth H. to satisfy the requirements of section 726.
3. Maximum confinement time and credits
In his opening brief, appellant contends that the court failed to calculate his maximum confinement time and credits. Respondent acknowledges that the court failed to orally pronounce the maximum confinement time or credits, but did set them forth in the dispositional minute order. In his reply brief, appellant acknowledges that this is sufficient. We agree.
4. Probation condition
Appellant contends that the court's probation condition ordering him to "stay away from places users congregate" is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We do not agree.
A probation condition is unconstitutionally vague if it "'"either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."'" (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) It "'must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether if the condition has been violated.'" (Ibid.)
A claim that a probation condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad is not forfeited by the failure to raise it in the juvenile court. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)
The trial court's oral pronouncement of the probation condition ordered appellant to "stay away from places where [narcotics] users congregate." The dispositional minute order clarified that appellant must "stay away from places where known [narcotics] users congregate."
A probation condition that otherwise would be deemed vague may be constitutional if the juvenile court offers additional oral or written comments clarifying the condition. (See In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 891-892; In re Byron B. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1018 [upholding probation condition as constitutional when oral pronouncement omitted knowledge requirement but minute order included knowledge requirement].)
Appellant contends that the minute order is not sufficient either, and that "known users" might mean known to the probation officer or to police. We do not agree. The most reasonable understanding of the condition is "known to appellant."
Disposition
The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J. KRIEGLER, J.