Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County Nos. J217969, J183975, J183976 & J183977 Marsha Slough, Judge.
Merrill Lee Toole, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.T.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant S.L.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Sharon S. Rollo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors A.C., A.C. and D.C.
Michael D. Randall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor A.T.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, J.
J.T. (Father), S.L. (Mother), D.C. (born 1991), A.C. (born 1993), and A.C., Jr., (born 1994) (collectively referred to as the Siblings) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights to minor, A.T., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The parties argue there was a prejudicial conflict of interest in the representation of the Siblings and A.T. by the same attorney, that the lack of sibling visitation violated the statutory protections of sibling relationships, and that the court erred in summarily denying the Siblings’ section 388 petition seeking increased contact with A.T. For the reasons described below, we affirm the court’s ruling.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
The primary briefing is provided by counsel for the Siblings. Mother joins in A.T.’s arguments. We note that Father has provided some briefing; however, he also joins in and adopts all applicable arguments by co-appellants. To the extent that Father raised any argument not raised by the Siblings, they have joined in his argument.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
The Siblings and J.B. (born 2002,) came to the attention of San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) on August 26, 2002. Dependency petitions were filed alleging that Mother had a history of substance abuse, she left the children alone in a motel room for several hours, and the whereabouts of Siblings’ father (A.C., Sr.) were unknown. The Siblings were detained and placed in the temporary custody of CFS.
Although the record does not contain the petition for J.B., he is referenced in the Children and Family Services reports.
The September 20, 2002, jurisdiction and disposition report noted Mother had two other children who were living with their father, whom Mother claimed was also the father of J.B. The Siblings expressed a desire to return to Mother, and she acknowledged her need for assistance in parenting and providing a stable home. At the hearing, the children were returned to Mother’s care under the supervision of CFS.
By January 2003, CFS recognized that Mother was unable to complete her family maintenance service plan. A section 387 supplemental petition was filed on January 9. On January 13, the Siblings were placed in the care of their father (A.C., Sr.), and J.B. was placed in the care of CFS. Shortly thereafter, the Siblings were placed in the home of their paternal grandmother. Mother’s performance on her case plan was minimal. She had little to no visitation with the children. On March 14, A.C., Sr., signed a waiver of rights form and submitted on the amended allegations in the petition. The court found the amended allegations to be true and ordered the children removed from their parents’ custody.
In September 2003, CFS recommended guardianship as the permanent plan for the Siblings, but requested a section 366.26 hearing as to J.B. Mother was reluctant to drug test, her attitude was hostile and defensive, and she was minimally motivated to participate. Nonetheless, the Siblings began unsupervised overnight visits with Mother. The Siblings had two visits with J.B.
On September 5, 2003, CFS recommended that services be continued for Mother and A.C., Sr. The parties were ordered to mediation. At the contested six-month review hearing on October 28, 2003, Mother was granted six more months of services. Supervised visitation was ordered, along with Sibling visits every other week. D.C. was detained with Mother. In December, CFS reported that the Siblings had regular visits every week. Mother participated in one drug test, which came back negative.
On March 12, 2004, the paternal grandmother requested that the children be removed from her home, and thus, CFS filed the necessary supplemental petitions pursuant to section 387. They were taken to Mother’s home for an unsupervised weekend visit. At the end of the weekend, Mother refused to turn the children over to CFS. She was arrested and the Siblings were detained. At the detention hearing on March 19, the court found a prima facie case for detention and ordered temporary placement with CFS. Siblings’ counsel informed the court of their desire to be placed with Mother; however, counsel disagreed.
Although the Siblings continued to visit J.B., Mother’s inconsistent visitation with the child made it difficult to re-establish a bond. D.C. was very bonded to all the Siblings, including J.B. Mother continuously refused to drug test. She underwent a psychological evaluation, which concluded that she attempted to mask unfavorable personality traits, refused to accept responsibility for her actions, and was argumentative and passive aggressive.
At the May 21, 2004, contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the court terminated services for Mother and A.C., Sr., as to all four children. A section 366.26 hearing was set as to J.B., and long-term foster care was selected as the permanent plan for the Siblings. By September 16, 2004, CFS reported that Mother’s visitation averaged one to two times per month. On October 21, 2004, the parental rights to J.B. were terminated. At the permanency review hearing on November 19, 2004, the court found long-term foster care to be appropriate for the children. The court made the same finding on July 14, 2005, and on February 3, 2006.
J.B. was adopted in December 2005.
Mother gave birth to J.L., who was removed by CFS on February 21, 2006, due to Mother’s substance abuse problems. Mother was not offered reunification services. The Siblings had been living with the paternal grandmother since June 2005. Mother wanted the Siblings to visit J.L.; however, the social worker was hesitant because the Siblings had not recovered from not being allowed to visit J.B. once he was adopted. As of August 3, 2006, the Siblings remained placed with the paternal grandmother.
Mother’s parental rights to J.L. were terminated on January 16, 2007, and adoption was selected as his permanent plan. As for the Siblings, the status review report dated February 5, 2007, noted that visitation with Mother had been nonexistent for the last six months; however, the Siblings were able to visit with J.L. because he was placed with a relative who lived a few blocks away. On May 24, section 387 petitions were filed after the paternal grandmother had physically and verbally abused the Siblings. At the detention hearing, the Siblings were placed in the custody of CFS, Mother’s visitation was increased to weekly, and CFS was to provide referrals for Mother.
The jurisdiction/disposition report dated June 15, 2007, recommended providing services to Mother because the Siblings were now teenagers and were bonded with her. Also, Mother was pregnant and motivated to complete a service plan. On August 2, 2007, reunification services were ordered for Mother, and the court found it was not in the Siblings’ best interests to terminate parental rights.
In October 2007, Mother gave birth to her eighth child, A.T., who tested positive for amphetamines. The child was detained, and a section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) petition was filed. Father denied any knowledge of Mother’s drug use while pregnant. A.T. was detained out of home and placed with CFS.
Mother had two children who are not part of this appeal and who live with their father.
A.T. is the only minor who is the subject of this appeal.
The contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing took place on January 10, 2008. Neither Mother nor Father was present. No one objected to the representation of Siblings and A.T. by the same law firm. The court found the allegations in the petition to be true, ordered reunification services as to Father, denied them as to Mother, and found that Father was A.T.’s presumed father.
Regarding the Siblings’ dependency cases, the February 4, 2008, status review report recommended termination of all services to Mother, and that the Siblings remain in out-of-home care under a permanency planning program. Nothing in the report indicated the Siblings were requesting visitation with A.T. However, they did request visitation with Mother and their father. Mother’s services as to the Siblings were terminated on February 4, 2008. There was no request for visitation between Siblings and A.T.
During spring 2008, Mother’s and Father’s visits with A.T. were inconsistent. The July 10 status report recommended that services for Father be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set to establish a permanent plan for A.T. Father had missed 29 visits, failed to complete a parenting class, had not completed a substance abuse program, and failed to drug test when requested. A.T. was diagnosed with asthma and caught catch colds easily. She appeared to be meeting most of her development milestones, could sit up, and was attempting to crawl. No mention was made that the Siblings had requested visitation with her.
The six-month review hearing was set contested. It went forward on August 12, 2008, and neither parent attended. Reunification services were terminated and a section 366.26 hearing was set. At the Siblings’ permanency planning review hearing on August 4, A.C. requested to visit with A.T. CFS was to submit a report on sibling visitation. According to the August 19 addendum report, the Siblings’ foster parent facilitated visits with Mother on a regular basis; however, in July Mother was not at her home for visitation. A.C. and A.C., Jr., were removed from their placement on March 24; however, D.C. wanted to stay.
At the August 19, 2008, permanency planning review hearing, the Siblings’ counsel raised the issue of visitation with A.T. CFS objected, arguing that it would be “very painful” for the Siblings and A.T. once parental rights were terminated. The court ordered visits a minimum of one time per month with A.T., acknowledging that things may change in the future. Following the court’s order, A.C. asked why CFS was not in favor of sibling visitation. The court explained the reality was that A.T. might be adopted and CFS did not want the Siblings to get their hopes up.
On September 26, 2008, A.T.’s counsel requested to be relieved as counsel on the grounds that a conflict existed in that the Siblings did not agree with the recommendation of adoption for A.T. New counsel was appointed for A.T. on September 30.
The section 366.26 report recommended termination of parental rights and adoption for A.T. A.T. had visited with the Siblings. The social worker observed the Siblings were more concerned about Mother not attending visitation than with interacting with A.T. Prior to October 2008, the Siblings had not demonstrated an interest in visiting with A.T. other than A.C.’s request at the August 4 hearing. The social worker was concerned that A.T. was not benefitting from visitation with the Siblings. Although A.T. was a happy child, she would cling to her prospective adoptive father when he transferred her for a visit. The social worker opined that requiring A.T. to be separated from her caregivers in order to visit the Siblings was detrimental. A.T.’s prospective adoptive parents explained that A.T. was the right fit for their family and it was like she had always been with them.
On December 5, 2008, the court was informed that Father was deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Mother requested a contested section 366.26 hearing, and the Siblings’ counsel indicated that she had a conflict in continuing to represent the Siblings. On December 9, new counsel was appointed to represent the Siblings. On December 18, the Siblings filed a section 388 petition, seeking a relationship with A.T. The Siblings’ new counsel claimed the lack of a bond between A.T. and the Siblings was caused by the decision of CFS to deny the Siblings’ request for visitation upon A.T.’s birth. In response, CFS reported that the parents did not consistently visit with A.T., nor did they report that the Siblings were interested in visitation with her. On June 3, 2008, Mother told the social worker that D.C. wanted to visit A.T. The social worker told Mother to find out when D.C. wanted to visit and the social worker would make the necessary arrangements. Mother did not make any further request for sibling visitation. At the first sibling visit, D.C. arrived late with Mother, and when the social worker provided the Siblings with her contact information, Mother stated that she had already provided such information to them. Prior to D.C.’s arrival, the social worker spoke with the other Siblings, who never mentioned they had previously requested visitation with A.T. A.T. showed signs of distress when taken from her caregivers to attend visits. Thus, the social worker concluded it was not in A.T.’s best interest to suspend the section 366.26 hearing to allow more time for sibling visitation. A.T. never lived with the Siblings and never shared common experiences.
The combined sections 388 and 366.26 hearing was held on December 29, 2008. The Siblings attended; however, the parents did not. Following argument, the court found there was no bond between the Siblings and A.T. The court said: “I don’t think that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that it could be in the best interest of this child to grant this 388 petition. In fact, the Court finds that it is in the best interest of this child to deny the 388 petition.” The hearing then shifted to a section 366.26 hearing. The social worker’s report, along with the adoption assessment, were entered into evidence without objection. Father’s counsel argued that Father was residing in Mexico and wanted his family in Mexico to be considered for placement. The social worker testified. Following the testimony and argument, the court terminated the parental rights and selected adoption as A.T.’s permanent plan.
II. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Dane Burcham of the law firm of Burcham and Stern represented the Siblings and A.T. when a petition was filed to adjudge A.T. a dependent of the court. Ms. Burcham continued to represent all four children from A.T.’s detention in November 2007 until September 26, 2008, when she requested to be relieved from representing A.T. On December 5, 2008, Ms. Burcham requested to be relieved from representing the Siblings. According to the Siblings, Ms. Burcham failed to request sibling visitation during the time when she represented all four children. The Siblings contend there was a conflict of interest in Ms. Burcham’s representation of all four children and that she rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Siblings claim that A.C. “made it clear she had wanted to visit [A.T.] since her birth.” They further claim to have made ongoing requests to visit their sister.
A single attorney may represent all siblings unless, at the time of appointment, an actual conflict of interest exists among them or it appears from circumstances specific to the case that it is reasonably likely an actual conflict will arise. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 58 (Celine R.) A conflict arises when minors’ counsel seeks a course of action for one child with adverse consequences to the other. (In re Barbara R. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 941, 953.)
Here, at the time that Ms. Burcham was appointed to represent A.T., there was no reasonable likelihood that an actual conflict of interest would arise. In fact, the only conflict identified by the Siblings is Ms. Burcham’s failure to advocate for sibling visitation from the beginning of A.T.’s dependency at A.C. (1)’s request. However, turning to the record before this court, we fail to find any support for the claim that any of the Siblings requested visitation with A.T. from the very beginning of her detention. A.T. was detained in October 2007. A.C. raised the issue of visitation on August 4, 2008. In response, the court ordered monthly visitation. There were reports and hearings for the Siblings between October 2007 and August 2008, yet there is no record of any Sibling requesting visitation with A.T. According to CFS, the first reference to any request for sibling visitation with A.T. was on June 3, 2008, when Mother told the social worker that she wished for D.C. to visit A.T. The social worker told Mother to let her know when D.C. wanted to visit and it would be arranged. Mother never followed through. Nonetheless, on December 9, 2008, the Siblings’ new counsel, Mr. Remes, asserted, without any actual proof, that the Siblings had been requesting visitation since A.T.’s birth.
While the Siblings suggest they could not have been expected to assert their right to sibling visitation, this court notes the social worker’s reports indicating the Siblings were capable of expressing their opinions and stating they were able to articulate their needs and desires and what was on their minds. Mother’s counsel has previously stated he was impressed with the Siblings, and that they were “pretty much in control of their situations.” A.C. engaged the court and CFS in a discussion about sibling visitation with A.T. Moreover, the Siblings knew of their abilities to request visitation because they had done so in the past.
Based on the above, the issue of sibling visitation did not create a conflict of interest until adoption was selected as A.T.’s permanent plan. At that point, a conflict arose, and Ms. Burcham requested to be relieved so that separate counsel could be appointed. There was no error in not appointing separate counsel upon A.T.’s birth.
Notwithstanding the above, even if we assume the court erred in not appointing separate counsel for A.T. at her birth, we find the error to be harmless. (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 59-60.) According to the Siblings and Father, the conflict of interest in dual representation compromised the sibling relationship with A.T., and this compromise denied them any future relationship with A.T. because they were unable to assert the sibling bond exception to termination of parental rights and adoption.
As CFS points out, section 16002 provides for frequent sibling visitation unless it would be detrimental to the child. Here, A.T. was removed from the family home immediately after her birth. She never lived with the Siblings. Once she began visitation with them, it became evident that the visits were detrimental. A.T. was normally a happy child; however, she became visibly upset, clinging to her foster parent when she was transferred for visitation with the Siblings. Also, A.T. appeared relieved once she was returned to her caregivers following the visitations. The lack of separate counsel did not compromise the sibling relationship. Rather, it was Mother’s inability to care for her children resulting in them being removed from her home.
Regarding the sibling bond exception, CFS argues that A.T.’s negative reaction to the visitation provides clear evidence that, even if the visits had begun earlier, the exception would not have applied. We agree. The sibling bond exception applies only “‘when the juvenile court determines that there is a “compelling reason” for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be “detrimental” to the child due to “substantial interference” with a sibling relationship.’ [Citations.]” (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 61; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) In Celine R., the court found that the exception did not apply because the children had only lived together when they were very young, they were placed in separate homes at a young age, and they lived separately for a long period of time. (Celine R., supra, at p. 61.)
Here, A.T. never lived in the same home with the Siblings. Following her removal from Mother’s care shortly after her birth, Mother was denied reunification services. Services for Father were terminated after six months, making termination of parental rights inevitable. Any benefits from maintaining a sibling relationship between A.T. and the Siblings were far outweighed by the benefits of A.T. being placed in a permanent adoptive home. While the Siblings may have benefited from maintaining the sibling bond, the sibling relation exception statute “refers to that relationship’s impact on the child being considered for adoption, not the impact on the sibling or anyone else. [Citation.] ‘[T]he language focuses exclusively on the benefits and burdens to the adoptive child, not the other siblings. The court is specifically directed to consider the best interests of the adoptive child, not the siblings, and must ultimately determine whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive child, not the siblings.’ [Citation.] Nothing in the statute suggests the Legislature intended to permit a court to not choose an adoption that is in the adoptive child’s best interest because of the possible effect the adoption may have on a sibling.” (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 54.) Here, it was unquestionably in the best interests of A.T. to be placed in a permanent, stable adoptive home, even if it meant severing her bond with the Siblings.
Additionally, CFS notes the history of the Siblings’ case defeats their argument. Prior to A.T., there was J.B., another younger sibling who was removed from Mother’s care at the same time the Siblings were removed. Despite the visitation between the Siblings and J.B., parental rights were terminated and he was adopted. Likewise, a similar result occurred with J.L.
For the above reasons, it is not reasonably probable that, had A.T. been represented by independent counsel, the outcome would have been any different. (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.)
III. SECTION 388 PETITION
The Siblings contend the court should have provided them with a hearing on their section 388 petition, and that it erred in denying the petition.
A. Hearing on the section 388 petition.
Section 388 allows a sibling to petition the court “to assert a relationship as a sibling related... to a child who is... a dependent of the juvenile court.” (§ 388, subd. (b).) By way of the petition, the sibling may ask for consideration when determining or implementing a case plan or permanent plan for the child. (§ 388, subd. (b).) The court “shall order that a hearing be held” on the petition “[i]f it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order....” (Former § 388, subd. (c).) The petition is to be “liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the parent’s request. [Citations.]” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
Effective January 1, 2009, section 388 was amended, and former subsection (c) has been reclassified as subsection (d). Because the proceedings in this case took place prior to the amendment, this brief will refer to former section 388, subdivision (c).
The California Rules of Court, rule 5.570(f), provides in part: “If it appears to the court that the requested modification will be contested or if the court desires to receive further evidence on the issue, the court must order that a hearing on the petition for modification be held within 30 calendar days after the petition is filed.” Rule 5.570(h)(2) requires that such hearing “be conducted as a disposition hearing under rules 5.690 and 5.695 if: [¶] (A) The “request is for removal from the home of the parent or guardian...; or [¶] (B) There is a due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. [¶] Otherwise, proof may be by declaration and other documentary evidence, or by testimony, or both, at the discretion of the court.” (Rule 5.570(h)(2)(A) & (B).) Thus, under the provisions of rule 5.570(h), an evidentiary hearing is required only under certain circumstances. Because the Siblings have not argued that such circumstances were present in this case, the court was permitted to proceed with the hearing based on declarations and other documentary evidence.
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise indicated.
The Siblings claim it was unclear whether the court would hold an evidentiary hearing. In response, CFS contends the Siblings had roughly 11 days to seek clarification from the court as to what type of hearing would be held. CFS points out that the allegedly unclear JV-180 form indicating that no evidentiary hearing would be held was signed on December 18, 2008, and the hearing was scheduled for December 29. Further, CFS claims the Siblings could have provided the court with additional documentary evidence during those 11 days. CFS argues this court’s opinion in In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075 (C.J.W.) applies. In C.J.W., this court held that where the parents failed to object to the lack of an evidentiary hearing and failed to identify what evidence they would have presented at such a hearing, a nonevidentiary hearing comported with due process requirements. (Id. at p. 1081.) We agree with CFS.
Similar to the facts in C.J.W., here the court marked on the JV-180 form that an evidentiary hearing would not be held and that the matter would be determined based on the documentary evidence submitted. At the hearing on the Siblings’ section 388 petition, their counsel was provided the opportunity to present his arguments, along with county counsel and the parents’ counsel. The court questioned counsel on the issues. By providing the Siblings’ counsel with the opportunity to submit written evidence and to argue the merits of the section 388 petition, the court’s manner of proceeding on the petition comported with due process requirements.
Contrary to the Siblings’ claim, we find In re Lesly G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 904 (Lesly G.) distinguishable. First, the Lesly G. court contradictorily checked boxes on the JV-180 form indicating both that it would hold a hearing and that it would not hold a hearing. (Id. at p. 909.) By checking the box indicating it would hold a hearing, the Lesly G. court held that the juvenile court was legally required to do so notwithstanding the contradictorily checked box. (Id. at pp. 913-914.) Here, the court checked both boxes, but noted by interlineation that it would not hold an “evidentiary hearing”; thus, the court appropriately modified the form to conform to its legal determination that the Siblings had made a prima facie showing that a hearing, but not an evidentiary hearing, should and would be held.
Second, the Lesly G. court “provided no hearing whatsoever.” (Lesly G., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 915.) Here, the court held a hearing regarding the Siblings’ section 388 petition. The Siblings had the opportunity and did argue the merits of their petition.
Finally, Lesly G. noted that the court denied the mother’s petition without receiving documentary evidence and “without affording counsel an opportunity to argue the merits of the petition.” (Lesly G., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 915.) Here, the court took documentary evidence from CFS in the form of a response to the section 388 petition. It further granted to the Siblings’ counsel the opportunity to argue the merits of the petition.
For the above reasons, we reject the Siblings’ contention that they were denied a hearing on their section 388 petition.
B. Denial of the Section 388 Petition.
Although the Siblings focus on the procedural deficiencies, they fail to address the merits of their section 388 petition and how A.T.’s best interest would have been served in denying the petition. Under section 388, “[t]he petitioning party has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a change of circumstances or new evidence, and the proposed modification is in the child’s best interest. [Citations.]” (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.)
A section 388 petition “‘is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.’” (In re Hector A. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 783, 798.), quoting In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.) When a sibling petitions for consideration at the selection and implementation hearing, under [former] section 388, subdivisions (b) and (c), the sibling must show “that there is a sufficient bond with the adoptive child that the best interests of that child require full consideration of the impact of interfering with that relationship before a decision is reached on the permanency plan.” (In re Hector A., supra, at p. 793.)
The Siblings contend that if they “had been permitted an evidentiary hearing, the court would have had more evidence about the lapses, not only from the [Siblings] themselves, but also from the social worker.” Specifically, they claim that while the social worker reported the Siblings had never requested visits with A.T., they told their most current attorney that they had. Regardless of their contentions, the fact remains there was no sibling relationship between the Siblings and A.T. Thus, any speculation that additional visitation would have forged a relationship is simply insufficient to support a finding that it was in A.T.’s best interest to grant the section 388 petition. Here, A.T. never shared the same home as the Siblings and did not begin visitation until she was 10 months old. Assuming visitation of one time per month, there would have been only 10 visits. During the sibling visitations that did occur, the Siblings interacted more with Mother and did not demonstrate an interest in visiting with A.T. Also, A.T. reacted negatively towards the visits. A.T. had not grown up or spent a great amount of time with the Siblings. There were no shared experiences or bonds. While the Siblings were unable to find other permanent and stable homes during their dependency cases, A.T. was fortunate in that an adoptive family had been identified and was eager to adopt her. She referred to her caretakers as “Dada” and “Mama,” and they opined that she fit right into their family. The evidence before the court indicated that the severance of the sibling relationship would be inconsequential to A.T. The Siblings may disparage the procedure followed by CFS and the court, but nothing in the record discredits the evidence actually received, which shows that the relationship between the Siblings and A.T. was not strong.
Like in C.J.W., the court here based its ruling on the evidence submitted by the Siblings in their petition, the response by CFS, and the argument presented at the hearing. As we concluded in C.J.W., “there was no showing whatsoever of how the best interests of [A.T.] would be served by depriving [her] of a permanent, stable home in exchange for an uncertain future. [Citations.]” (C.J.W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081.)
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Siblings’ section 388 petition.
IV. DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P.J.MILLER J.