Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. In re A.S.C.H., 380 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.). S.C. moved to dismiss, asserting the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the divorce action because neither the parties nor S.G.F. resided in Dallas County when the petition was filed or when the decree was signed.

"The question of whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." In re A.S.C.H., 380 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004), and In re B.A.B., 124 S.W.3d 417, 419 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2004, no pet)).

We review the trial court's jurisdictional determination de novo. See In re A.S.C.H., 380 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.).

The evidence at trial reflects that while Mother and the children had frequently visited Arizona, see id. § 152.102(7) (stating that a period of temporary absence of a parent is part of the six-consecutive-month period), Mother did not move from Texas to live permanently in Arizona until September 2012, only two months—not six months—before Father filed his original petition. See In re A.S.C.H., 380 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (stating that when jurisdictional facts are challenged, the court may consider relevant evidence to resolve the jurisdictional issues). Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding or abuse its discretion by denying Mother's motion for new trial on this basis.

See42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(b)(4) (“The Convention and [the ICARA] empower courts in the United States to determine only rights under the Convention and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.”); In re A.S.C.H., 380 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.) (“[J]urisdiction under the [ICARA] is granted only as to the merits of the abduction claim; the statute does not grant jurisdiction to decide the merits of any underlying custody dispute.”). Father argues that the sentence, read in context, does not purport to establish a possession order applicable in Panama or to alter the Panamanian orders, but he states that he has no objection to a “clarifying statement” that the order does not modify the possession orders in effect in Panama.