Opinion
No. COA15-604
07-19-2016
IN THE MATTER OF: A.S., A JUVENILE
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gerald K. Robbins, for the State. Marie H. Mobley, for juvenile-appellant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Orange County, No. 14 JB 95 Appeal by juvenile from orders entered 20 January 2015 by Judge Joseph Buckner in District Court, Orange County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2015. Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Gerald K. Robbins, for the State. Marie H. Mobley, for juvenile-appellant. STROUD, Judge.
Juvenile appeals adjudication and disposition orders placing him on 12 months of probation for assault on a person under 12. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
In November of 2014, the State filed a juvenile petition for misdemeanor assault. The petition alleged that Arlie, age 13, had assaulted a child under the age of 12 by "threatening, cho[]king, and tackling [a boy] to the concrete sidewalk causing him to hit and injure his head." On 6 January 2015, Arlie received a continuance; the order noted that it would be "the only continuance" and set adjudication and disposition for 20 January 2015.
A pseudonym will be used to protect the identity of the minor involved.
On 20 January 2015, Arlie's attorney again requested a continuance. During the course of the motion counsel also raised issues regarding Arlie's possible incapacity to proceed because Arlie "does not seem to be understanding what I am telling him." Arlie's attorney explained that he had an IEP which showed "he may be below average in some [IQ and processing] areas[,]" but she did not have "any specific information regarding his IQ and with his processing ability." The trial court denied the motion. Arlie's attorney then stated, "Your Honor, I respect your decision, but you are denying my request to have my client evaluated for capacity at this time."
While it is unclear to this Court when exactly Arlie's counsel made a motion for evaluation, the trial court answered affirmatively that it was indeed denying the request for evaluation. The trial court then gave Arlie's attorney some time to look over the files and consider if she had anything further. Arlie's attorney then "renew[ed her] motion to have [Arlie] evaluated for capacity" arguing that "his IEPs as well as academic testing . . . show cognitive deficits pretty much across the board" particularly "strong cognitive deficit in his ability to hear information and then to be able to verbally relate the information afterwards." The trial court again denied the motion.
The trial court held the adjudicatory hearing and adjudicated Arlie delinquent for assault on a person under 12. The case then proceeded to disposition, and the trial court placed Arlie on probation for 12 months. Arlie appeals.
II. Arlie's Motions
Arlie makes only one argument on appeal: "[t]he trial court . . . abused its discretion by denying counsel's motion to continue to have thirteen year old juvenile assessed for competency to proceed to trial[.]" (original in all caps). We consider whether the trial court should have continued the case under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Stitt, 147 N.C. App. 77, 80, 553 S.E.2d 703, 706 (2001) ("Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to continue will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.").
Section 15A-1002(b) of our General Statutes provides that when the capacity of the defendant to proceed is questioned, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the defendant's capacity to proceed. Although the present statute requires the court to conduct a hearing when a question is raised as to a defendant's capacity to stand trial, no particular procedure is mandated. The method of inquiry is still largely within the discretion of the trial judge. The statutory hearing requirement appears to be satisfied as long as it appears from the record that the defendant, upon making the motion, is provided an opportunity to present any and all evidence he or she is
prepared to present.
The burden rests upon the defendant to establish his mental incapacity. Ultimately, the decision to grant a motion for an evaluation of a defendant's capacity to stand trial remains within the trial judge's discretion.
The trial court may determine the question of capacity with or without a jury. When proceeding without a jury, the trial court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when there is competent evidence to support them, even if there is evidence to the contrary. The trial court has not erred if it does not make findings of fact where the evidence would compel the ruling made, but the better practice is to make findings and conclusions.
Where the procedural requirement of a hearing has been met, defendant must show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion before reversal is required.State v. Robinson, 221 N.C. App. 509, 513-14, 729 S.E.2d 88, 94 (2012) (emphasis added) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
"The provisions of G.S. 15A-1001, 15A-1002, and 15A-1003 apply to all cases in which a juvenile is alleged to be delinquent." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2401 (2013).
Here, Arlie's attorney first contends that "the trial court did not satisfy the procedural requirement of holding a hearing" by directing this Court to numerous cases where the "hearing requirement was satisfied" and explaining how this case is different from those cases. However, counsel does not direct us to any analogous cases where the hearing requirement was not satisfied; if anything counsel's argument emphasizes the wide range of situations in which this Court has determined that the requirement of a hearing has been met. Contrast State v. Woods, 293 N.C. 58, 64, 235 S.E.2d 47, 50 (1977) ("The record is not entirely satisfactory as to whether and to what extent defendant was accorded a hearing. It seems, though, that defendant was heard on this question and expressly declined an opportunity to be heard further. . . . Clearly, the trial court considered all information relative to defendant's capacity which was presented to it and found, implicitly at least, that defendant was competent to proceed to trial. That defendant makes no complaint about the lack of a hearing on this threshold question bolsters our view that the requirements of General Statute 15A-1002(b)(3) were, in fact, satisfied at trial."); State v. Gates, 65 N.C. App. 277, 284, 309 S.E.2d 498, 502 (1983) (determining that the hearing requirement was met when "the record shows that defendant's motion was made during a recorded conference in chambers. The only evidence offered in support of the motion were statements by defendant's counsel that he and defendant had not had meaningful communication and defendant's own statements concerning his drug use and marital problems prior to his arrest. No medical evidence was offered or presented"); State v. Potts, 42 N.C. App. 357, 359, 256 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1979) ("The adoption of this section makes such hearing mandatory. The question posed by this appeal is whether the action of Judge Hasty complies with the requirement that there be a hearing. We hold that it does so comply. At the time the motion was made to have the defendant declared incompetent, the jury was being selected. The defendant's attorney stated he did not have any medical testimony. The attorney stated the defendant had cooperated with him and in his opinion the defendant understood the 'nature of the circumstances surrounding the charge.'"); State v. Williams, 38 N.C. App. 183, 189, 247 S.E.2d 620, 623 (1978) ("The 'hearing' in this case was in the context of a motion for a continuance to allow for a psychiatric examination prior to trial. Defense counsel did not request a full hearing on the matter nor did he tender evidence to support his motion.").
Again, "no particular procedure is mandated" for the hearing, Robinson, 221 N.C. App. at 513, 729 S.E.2d at 94, and "the statutory hearing requirement appears to be satisfied as long as it appears from the record that the defendant, upon making the motion, is provided an opportunity to present any and all evidence he or she is prepared to present." Id. Here, Arlie had "an opportunity to present any and all evidence[.]" Id. Therefore, we conclude that the procedural hearing requirement was met.
Arlie's counsel then argues that even assuming the procedural hearing requirement has been met, the trial court's denial of the motions "was error." Arlie's attorney attempts to analogize cases where the competency of a defendant was not evaluated at a time close enough to the trial to be determinative. But in those cases, there was evidence that the defendant was potentially incompetent; here, there was no such showing. Contrast State v. McRae, 139 N.C. App. 387, 390, 533 S.E.2d 557, 559 (2000) (noting that the defendant had at one point been diagnosed "as schizophrenic and psychotic and . . . incapable of standing trial"); State v. Reid, 38 N.C. App. 547, 549, 248 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1978) (noting that defendant had been "involuntarily committed" to a hospital for "paranoid schizophrenia"), disc. review denied, 296 N.C. 588, 254 S.E.2d 31 (1979). Here, Arlie's attorney did not present evidence that he was or likely was incompetent, but rather wanted to conduct a fishing expedition to consider the issue.
Here, Arlie's attorney made vague arguments regarding the motion to continue and his capacity to proceed and provided the trial court with Arlie's IEP and a psychological evaluation from the school. However, nothing in the documents before the trial court or this Court indicate Arlie was incompetent to stand trial. Though Arlie's attorney repeated numerous times that she was uncertain her client understood, there was no evidence presented that indicated Arlie was unable to stand trial nor did Arlie's attorney express that. Instead, she expressed that she would like to consider the issue further.
While Arlie's counsel makes several intriguing arguments on appeal and draws from a wide body of case law regarding competency to stand trial, the fact remains that "[t]he burden rests upon the defendant to establish his mental incapacity." Robinson, 221 N.C. App. at 513, 729 S.E.2d at 94. There is simply nothing in the record indicating that the trial court failed to conduct a proper hearing by giving Arlie's counsel an opportunity to be heard or abused its discretion in determining Arlie was fit to stand trial without further evaluations or need for further continuance; therefore, this argument is overruled.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Judges DIETZ and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).