Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County No. 90641-4, Jane A. Cardoza, Judge..
Erik R. Beauchamp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kevin Briggs, County Counsel, and William G. Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Dawson, J. and Hill, J.
Appellant F.W. (Mother) appeals from the dispositional order of the juvenile court concerning the minor A.R. She contends the juvenile court erred by denying her reunification services. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Before the birth of A.R. in 2008, Mother had three children. In 1997, they were removed from Mother’s care and a juvenile dependency petition was filed on their behalf. The petition alleged that one of the children had suffered serious physical harm as a result of being hit with a belt by Mother and that the other children faced a substantial risk of being similarly abused. The petition also alleged Mother had a substance abuse problem which negatively affected her ability to control her anger. The petition further alleged the three children were left without any provision for their care and support because their fathers were currently incarcerated.
After the 1998 detentional hearing, the juvenile court ordered Mother to complete parenting and anger management classes, substance abuse evaluation and treatment, drug testing, and ordered that reunification services be provided to Mother. Services were terminated six months later at the review hearing, at which time Mother’s whereabouts were unknown. The court found that Mother had failed to comply with her case plan and that her failure to participate in court-ordered treatment programs constituted prima facie evidence that return of the children would create a substantial risk of detriment.
The minute order also reflects that, prior to the 1998 review hearing, one of Mother’s three children died, and thus the court dismissed the dependency action as to that child. The cause of the child’s death is not disclosed.
On August 11, 2008, the Fresno County Department of Children and Family Services (the department) filed a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b), (g) and (j), on behalf of A.R. Count b-1 alleged that Mother had a substance abuse problem (alcohol and cocaine), which negatively affected her ability to provide regular care, supervision, and protection for her child. On August 7, 2008, Mother left the two-month-old A.R. alone and Mother was later found to be under the influence of alcohol. In addition, on May 13, 2008, at the time of A.R.’s birth, both Mother and baby tested positive for cocaine. Count b-1 further alleged that A.R. was an infant who required a clean and sober care provider and, despite receiving services through the department, Mother continued to use drugs.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Count b-2 alleged that A.R.'s father knew or reasonably should have known that A.R.'s safety was at risk if left in Mother’s care.
Count g-1 alleged that A.R. had been left without any provision for her ongoing care and support because her father was currently incarcerated.
Count j-1 alleged that A.R.’s three half siblings had previously been found to be neglected by Mother and were removed from Mother’s care due to drug-related issues and physical abuse. Count j-1 further alleged that, despite receiving services, Mother failed to reunify successfully with her children and a permanent plan was made for each. A.R. was at substantial risk of suffering similar abuse and/or neglect if left in Mother’s care.
As relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, the jurisdictional report included a copy of the Addiction Severity Index (ASI), which was completed shortly after A.R.’s birth. The interviewer concluded with this assessment:
“[Mother] is … 41 year[s] old.… This assessment was completed as a walk in. [Mother] presented herself in a cordial man[ner], but did not see the severity of her consuming any substance. [Mother] disclosed the following regarding Cocaine. She stated that she first used cocaine at the age of 18 years old; she stated that she began smoking ‘Cavies’. [Mother] then stated that by the age of 22 years old she began smoking ‘Rock Cocaine’. [Mother] disclosed that from 2002 through 2004 she remained abstinent from all drugs. She disclosed that in 2004 she relapsed with alcohol (beer) and then 5 months later she began using Rock cocaine again. [Mother] stated that she last used on Mother’s day 2008. [Mother] disclosed the following regarding Marijuana. She stated that she first used marijuana at the age of 14 years old. She stated that she smoked marijuana with cocaine ‘Cavies’ till the age of 29 years old; she stated that she stopped smoking cavies because she preferred smoking rock cocaine. [Mother] disclosed the following regarding alcohol. She disclosed that she first consumed alcohol at the age of 16 years old. [Mother] disclosed that from the age of 22 through 30 years old she was drinking alcohol heavily and daily. [Mother] states that from 2002 through 2004 she relapsed on alcohol and 5 months later cocaine. [Mother] continues to state that she is an occasional drinker and that she does not have a problem with alcohol. [Mother] disclosed the following regarding methamphetamines. She stated that she tried methamphetamines one time in her life at the age of 40. She stated that she has never tried it again. Interviewer [i]dentifies that [Mother] is minimizing her substance abuse problem. [Mother] is a poly substance abuser using both alcohol and rock cocaine for the past 26 years. [Mother] stated that she has been in two drug programs in her life, the first being CRC in 2001, parole mandated, and the second Westcare in 2002 where she completed successfully. [Mother] continued to deny that she has a problem with substances especially alcohol, she disclosed that as soon as she relapses with alcohol all the other drugs follow. Despite of [Mother’s] statements regarding to alcohol she continues to state that she [sees] no problem with drinking a few beers.”
The dispositional report report detailed the findings of the Family Reunification Services Initial Review Panel (FRSIRP), which met on October 22, 2008, to review the appropriateness of providing reunification services to Mother. The FRSIRP recommended that no reunification services be given to Mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (13), stating, in relevant part:
“[Mother] does meet the criteria for WIC 361.5(b)(10), in that she previously failed to reunify with [A.R.’s] siblings.… On or about November 8, 1997, the minors … were removed from their mother … due to physical abuse, general neglect and caretaker absence. Despite receiving services, including substance abuse, [Mother] failed to comply with the court ordered services and failed to reunify with her children. A permanent plan of legal guardianship was made for [M.] and [D.]. The minor, [A.] passed away during the time [Mother] was ordered Family Reunification Services. Family Reunification Services were terminated to [Mother] on August 14, 1998. [¶] … [¶]
“[Mother] meets [section 361.5(b)(13)’s] definition of ‘extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol,’ in that she has been using controlled substances on a regular basis since she was a teenager. [Mother] disclosed in her ASI that she tried marijuana and cocaine when she was fourteen years old and alcohol when she was sixteen years old. [Mother] further stated that she has used cocaine for the past twenty-seven years, smoked marijuana for the past twenty-six years, has drank alcohol for the past twenty-five years and has used methamphetamines for the past year. [Mother] has never been able to maintain her sobriety for any length of time. Therefore, she has a history of extensive, abusive and chronic use of drugs.
“[Mother] meets the criteria for WIC 361.5(b)(13), in that [Mother] was court ordered to complete substance abuse treatment on February 11, 1998. On or about November 9, 1997, the minors, [D.], [M.] and [A.], were removed from their mother … due to physical abuse, general neglect and caretaker absence. Despite receiving services, including substance abuse, [Mother] failed to comply with the court ordered services and failed to unify with her children. A permanent plan of legal guardianship was made for [M.] and [D.]. The minor, [A.], passed away during the time [Mother] was ordered Family Reunification Services. Family Reunification Services were terminated to [Mother] on August 14, 1998. [¶] … [¶]
“The FRSIRP determined that it would not be in the best interest of [A.R.] to provide reunification services to her mother.… [Mother] has not been able to establish a bond with her daughter. A child [A.R.’s] age generally develops a parent-child relationship with the individuals that provide for their daily care, and the mother is not providing for [A.R.’s] daily care. [Mother] has been inconsistent in visiting and has shown up to several visits smelling like alcohol.
“The prognosis for successful reunification is poor, as the mother has an extensive history of substance abuse. [Mother] has an extensive history of substance abuse (marijuana, cocaine and alcohol) dating back to her teenage years, and she used during her pregnancy with [A.R.]. The mother has failed to reunify with [A.R.’s] three older siblings. [Mother’s] family reunification services were terminated regarding [D.], [M.] and [A.]. [Mother] continues to abuse controlled substance and alcohol.
“[A.R.] is adjusting very well to [her] current foster home. [A.R.] appears to be developing a bond with her care providers, as she appears to be very comfortable in their care.… [A.R.’s] care providers are able to meet all of her physical and emotional needs, and they are providing her with the stability she needs at her young age. Therefore, it appears that denying services to [A.R.’s] mother would not be detrimental to [A.R.], as she has adjusted well to being separated from her mother and she does not have a significant bond with her mother.”
At the contested dispositional hearing on January 20, 2009, Mother’s attorney stated that Mother did not disagree with the department’s reasons for recommending against providing Mother services but noted that Mother was scheduled to participate in an inpatient program at the end of the month and wished to reunify with A.R. In response, the deputy district attorney pointed out that Mother had been offered treatment in September 2008, but had failed to follow through. He further noted that Mother had not been visiting A.R. consistently and had not been able to establish a bond with A.R. He concluded: “So intention to enter a program is not good enough with this kind of history. We agree [with the department] it would not be in the child’s best interest to pursue reunification with her.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court followed the department’s recommendation and ordered that no reunification services be given to Mother.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her reunification services.
Family reunification services play a critical role in dependency proceedings. (In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 563.) When a minor is removed from parental custody, the court must provide services designed to reunify the family unless one of several statutory exceptions applies. (Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 845.) There is no general exception to the provision of reunification services; the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the enumerations described in section 361.5, subdivision (b) apply to a parent before it may deny reunification services to that parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(1)-(15).) These statutory provisions reflect that in some circumstances “‘it may be fruitless to provide reunification services ….’ [Citation.]” (In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 200.) In this case, the juvenile court denied reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (13).
We review an order denying reunification services for substantial evidence. (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not consider the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence, or evaluate the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the order even if there is substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. The parent has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) provides that reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian who “has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the petition that brought that child to the court’s attention.” The statute reflects “a legislative determination that an attempt to facilitate reunification between a parent and child generally is not in the minor’s best interests when the parent is shown to be a chronic abuser of drugs who has resisted prior treatment for drug abuse. [Citation.]” (In re Levi U., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 200.) Within the meaning of the statute, resistance to prior treatment for chronic drug abuse may be shown when “the parent has participated in a substance abuse treatment program but continues to abuse illicit drugs.” (Ibid., italics added; Karen S. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1008, 1009-1011 [drug treatment programs not effective in preventing relapse; continuing drug abuse despite participation in various treatment programs constitutes resistance]; Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 73 [completion of drug treatment program but “failure to maintain any kind of long-term sobriety must be considered resistance to treatment”]; Laura B. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 776, 780 [proof of resistance to treatment may “come in the form of resumption of regular drug use after a period of sobriety”].) The department “must show the parent underwent or enrolled in substance abuse rehabilitation, and during the three-year period before the petition was filed, engaged in conduct that demonstrated resistance to rehabilitation. Proof may come in the form of dropping out of programs, or in the form of resumption of regular drug use after a period of sobriety. [Citation.]” (In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1402, fn. omitted.)
Mother admits she has a long-standing and chronic drug problem, but she maintains she has successfully completed drug treatment and a two-year period of sobriety. She asserts “[s]obriety for two years is significant and indicates a willingness to take sobriety serious[ly].” She also asserts “the evidence is much closer to a relapse than a resumption of daily, long term drug use” and that the latter is required to sustain the court’s finding under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13).
Mother defines a “relapse” as “the use of drugs a few times or even for a substantial period of time before returning to not using drugs,” whereas “[a] resumption of long term drug use is essentially continuing a life controlled by drugs.” Assuming Mother’s definitions are correct, we have no difficulty concluding on this record that, after the brief period of sobriety Mother claims, she essentially resumed a life controlled by drugs. We note that the ASI on which Mother relies to support her claim that she was sober for a two-year period also included an assessment by the interviewer that Mother tended to minimize her substance abuse problem and that, even though she denied having a problem with alcohol and other substances, she also disclosed “as soon as she relapses with alcohol all the other drugs follow.”
Even if Mother completed various treatment programs and stayed sober for two years, we find the record contains ample evidence that she resumed her regular drug use after that period of sobriety. As we have explained, this qualifies as resistance to treatment under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). Mother’s conduct has demonstrated resistance to rehabilitation and has shown that reunification services would be a fruitless attempt to protect her child because her past failure to benefit from treatment indicates that future treatment also would fail to change her destructive behavior. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s denial of services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13).
Having concluded the juvenile court had a statutory basis for denying Mother reunification services, we need not address the second statutory basis. (Randi R. v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 72.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.