Opinion
B xxxx-15
05-10-2016
In the Matter of the Application of Forestdale Inc., for the Guardianship and Custody of A. L., A Dependent Child under 18 Years of Age, Pursuant to Section 384-b of the Social Services Law of the State of New York.
Todd Shaw, Esq. for Petitioner, Forestdale, Inc. Ian Spiridigliozzi, Esq., Legal Aid Society Juvenile Rights Division, Attorney for the Child Amber Khan, Esq., Center for Family Representation, for the respondent mother Alan Cabelly, Esq., for the respondent father
Todd Shaw, Esq. for Petitioner, Forestdale, Inc. Ian Spiridigliozzi, Esq., Legal Aid Society Juvenile Rights Division, Attorney for the Child Amber Khan, Esq., Center for Family Representation, for the respondent mother Alan Cabelly, Esq., for the respondent father Marybeth S. Richroath, J.
On October 22, 2007, Annie L. suffered injuries which subsequently took her life. Her mother and father were arrested, charged with homicide and incarcerated for a significant period of time pre-trial. On October 30, 2008, A. L., the subject child of this proceeding, was born. While her parents were incarcerated, family friends took care of A. L.
On February 1, 2012, the Administration for Children's Services ("ACS") filed a petition charging respondent mother and respondent father with abuse of A. L., based upon the actions which caused the death of her sibling, Annie. A. L. was remanded to the care of the Commissioner of ACS, but remained in kinship care with the resource who had been caring for her since birth. On January 2, 2013, the criminal case against respondent mother was dismissed in the interests of justice based upon her four-year pre-trial detention and issues of proof, and not because the District Attorney believed she was innocent. Petitioner's 8 in Evidence at Disposition. On February 2, 2013, respondent father was convicted, after jury trial, of Manslaughter in the Second Degree and Endangering the Welfare of a Child, in connection with the death of his daughter Annie. Respondent father is serving a state prison sentence based upon that conviction.
On July 10, 2013, ACS filed an amended petition, alleging that A. L. was a severely abused child within the Social Services Law Section 384-b(8)(a). On October 23, 2013, the Court granted the agency's motion for summary judgement with respect to respondent father, finding that based upon the father's conviction of Manslaughter in the Second Degree in violation of P.L. Section 120.15 and the victim of that crime being the sibling of the subject child, by definition, A. L., the subject child, was severely abused. SSL Section 384-b(8)(a)(iii)(A). The Court denied the agency's summary judgement motion with respect to respondent mother.
Respondent mother went to trial on the severe abuse allegations in Family Court, presented evidence and testified at length. On March 3, 2015, after considering all of the evidence, the Court issued a 26-page written decision finding that respondent mother had severely abused Annie and derivatively severely abused A. L., the subject child, and entered those findings against respondent mother by clear and convincing evidence. SSL Section 384-b(8)(a)(i). (47 Misc 3d 1212[A]; 2015 NYSlipOp 50558[U]) On March 10, 2015, the Court held a permanency hearing and ordered that A. L.'s goal be changed to adoption and that the agency file a termination proceeding within 60 days. On May 27, 2015, the Court issued dispositional orders placing the child with the Commissioner on the severe abuse case and dispensing with reasonable efforts pursuant to FCA Section 1039-b.
The Court also ordered visitation between respondent mother and the child to cease. That order has been stayed by the Appellate Division pending respondent mother's appeal.
On April 27, 2015, the agency filed the termination of parental rights proceeding against respondent mother and respondent father. By written decision dated September 24, 2015, the Court granted the agency's motion for summary judgement at fact-finding with respect to both respondent mother and respondent father. That decision ordered a dispositional hearing to be held as to A. L.'s best interests. SSL Section 384-b(8)(f).
The statutory interplay between Family Court Act Article 10 and the severe abuse provisions of Social Services Law Section 384-b contemplate addressing the permanency of severely abused children and their siblings on an expedited time-frame consistent with ASFA but also allowing due process to the biological parents. Of course, at disposition, it is the best interests of the child that must be determined.
The dispositional hearing was conducted on March 1, March 16, 2016 and March 22, 2016. The agency entered ten documents into evidence and elicited testimony from the case worker, to support its position that it was in A. L.'s best interests to achieve permanency through adoption by her current foster parent. The respondent mother (Ms. L.) testified on her own behalf and called the foster parent to testify for her. They supported a return of the child to Ms. L. The respondent father (Mr. L.) declined to be produced for the hearing, but authorized his attorney to proceed on his behalf in his absence. He did not present affirmative evidence, but supported a return of the child to Ms. L. The attorney for the child presented a stipulation as to the child's testimony and additional documents. The child's attorney presented the child's position that she would like to live with her mother. Finally, a psychologist from the Mental Health Services Unit of the Family Court testified as a Court witness. Her report was received into evidence as Court Exhibit 1 and she was cross examined by all parties. The psychologist did not offer an opinion with respect to whether termination of parental rights or a suspended judgement were in the child's best interests. The doctor evaluated whether beginning some unsupervised visitation posed safety issues for the child. Oral summations were presented by all counsel.
SSL Section 384-b(8)(f) provides, "[u]pon a finding pursuant to paragraph (a) ... of this subdivision that the child has been severely ... abused by ...her parent, the court shall enter an order of disposition... upon a further finding, based on clear and convincing, competent, material and relevant evidence introduced in a dispositional hearing, that the best interests of the child require such commitment or suspension of judgment." The Court was careful to admit only competent evidence at this dispositional hearing and is mindful that the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence.
A. L., the subject child of this proceeding, is 7 ½ years old. She has never lived with either of her parents. A. L. has not visited with her father since he was convicted of Manslaughter and transferred to state prison in 2013. Her visitation with her mother is regular, but supervised.
The fully credible testimony of the caseworker established that A. L. is fully bonded to her foster parent and is happy in that home. She is enrolled in school, attends regularly and is progressing well. Petitioner's 1 in Evidence. The foster mother has facilitated A. L.'s participation in therapy, which now takes place in the home they share. A. L. is also bonded to the children residing with the foster mother who are similar in age to her and with whom she shares a close friendship.
The caseworker's testimony was corroborated by the foster mother, Ms. F's, testimony on the mother's case, where she affirmed her love for A. L. and her commitment to caring for her long-term as her adoptive mother. The stipulation as to A. L.'s testimony states that "A. L. loves her foster mother and is bonded to her foster mother" and goes on to elaborate "...A. L. has been treated very well by her foster mother and enjoys living with her." Attorney for the Child 1 in Evidence at paragraphs 2 and 5.
Nine years have passed since Annie died in respondents' care. The injuries inflicted upon that two month old infant were multiple and devastating. The medical examiner who testified at the severe abuse fact-finding, and who was qualified as an expert without objection, catalogued them: Annie had multiple skull fractures, fractures of the thigh bones, femurs and lower tibia. Annie had numerous, bi-lateral retinal hemoraghes, bleeding all the way through the retina at every level. Annie had injuries to the nerve roots coming out of the spine where the neck attaches to the head. All of these injuries had occurred within 24-48 hours of the time Annie was taken to the hospital. She also had healing rib fractures, estimated as about 14 days old.
The medical examiner ruled out the possibility that Annie suffered from any congenital defect which would have caused these injuries to appear spontaneously or would have explained normal handling of a child to have caused these injuries, including osteogenesis imperfecta, or brittle bone disease. The doctor testified that these injuries could not have happened spontaneously. The doctor also testified that the injuries had not occurred as a result of resusitation efforts, nor were they consistent with an accidental bump of the head on, perhaps, a piece of furniture. The doctor explained that the amount of force necessary to result in the injuries suffered by Annie were consistent with a motor vehicle accident or a fall of several stories from a building. Moreover, the doctor testified that the injuries showed that there had been multiple points of impact on Annie's head, which is inconsistent with a one-time accidental bumping of a child's head.
The doctor testified that the injuries were most consistent with whip lash in conjunction with blunt force trauma and impact. The cause of death certified in the autopsy report was "shaking with blunt impact of head with skull fracture and subdural hemorrhage" and the manner of death was "homicide."
The doctor testified that the majority of the injuries were traumatic, having happened immediately before the child's entry into the hospital, or perhaps within 24-48 hours of that entry. This included the skull fracture, injuries to the nerve roots of the upper neck, retinal hemorrhages and leg fractures.
The rib fractures showed signs of healing, and were consistent with injury about 14 days before the child entered the hospital, or when the baby was about 6 weeks old. The doctor testified that the rib fractures were consistent with squeezing the baby's body violently during a shaking incident.
The doctor testified that based upon the injuries suffered by Annie, she would not have been behaving normally after the incident and before she came to the hospital. She would have been irritable and fussy, would not have been eating normally and would have appeared generally unwell.
In the face of this clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, respondent mother insisted at the severe abuse trial that neither she nor her husband had done anything to the child, that Annie had been fine all day until she "softened," that Annie had something wrong inside her that caused her to die, but that Ms. L. had no idea what that was, she "could not see inside her" and she "was not a doctor." Ms. L. called no expert to support her assertions. Her testimony was rejected by the Court as utterly incredible and self-serving.
Apparently the father called one or more experts at his criminal trial which were soundly rejected by the jury and referenced by the Supreme Court at father's sentencing hearing, the minutes of which were received at the mother's severe abuse trial.
At disposition on the instant termination of parental rights petition, nine years after the homicide of Annie, Ms. L's testimony avoided the topic of how Annie died. However, the records received at this proceeding show that despite her completion of parenting skills, despite her alleged engagement in therapy, Ms. Li continues to profess the same story.
On March 30, 2015 after the Court suspended the mother's visitation with A. L. based upon the severe abuse fact-findings on the termination proceeding, Ms. L. complained to the child protective worker and, "stated that her and her husband did not have anything to do with the death of her firstborn. Ms. L. stated that her daughter was born with a defect' which caused her death...Ms. L. stated that she had a sibling who also passed away in China due to this defect'...Ms. L. stated that she was upset because she was not found guilty in criminal court however family court was finding her guilty." Attorney for the Child 2 in Evidence at pp. 84-85, printed 8/4/15.
Similarly, on November 17, 2015, the case worker spoke with Ms. L. who, "continues to be engaged in individual therapy and believes that her child should be back in her care. Ms. L. does not believe it is fair that she was not convicted in criminal court but is being convicted in family court by not being able to care for her child. She states that her first born died due to medical problems that run in her family and does not believe that any danger was done to her." Id. at p. 1, printed 1/19/2016.
Finally, on January 6, 2016, the latest date for which records were provided in evidence, "the CP (child protective specialist) spoke to Ms. L. about the permanency goal for A. L. and she stated that she will continue to fight for her custody. Ms. L. explained that she loved her daughter very much and was ready to raise her. CP spoke to Ms. L. about the death of her older child. Ms. L. explained that she believed it was something inside the baby's body that caused her death. Ms. L. explained that she did not see Mr. L. hurt the child and due to her not seeing this she was not able to blame the death on him." Id. at p. 7, printed on 1/19/2016.
Ms. L. was evaluated by Dr. Dimitri of the Family Court Mental Health Services Unit on two separate dates in November 2015. "Ms. L. was generally cooperative with the evaluation, although she often failed to respond to questions...Ms. L. was unable to offer an explanation concerning Annie's death and maintained that neither she nor the respondent father were responsible for Annie's injuries...her description of Annie's death suggests that she views herself as a victim of unfortunate circumstances." Court Exhibit 1 in Evidence at 3. The doctor observed "Ms. L's notable guardedness." Id.When the doctor attempted to ascertain Ms. L's explanation for what brought her before the Family Court, Ms. L. "claimed that she was extremely ill for approximately three to four months after giving birth to [Annie] ... on 8/13/07." Id at 7. The father took time off from work and cared for Annie "full time." "Ms. L. claimed that she sought medical advice approximately six weeks after giving birth and said that she was told that there was nothing medically wrong with her. At that time, Ms. L. claimed that all she was able to do with Annie was feed, hold and play with her while resting in bed." Id. When the doctor attempted to focus Ms. L. on what happened which caused the ambulance to be called,
These statements repeated Ms. L's testimony at the severe abuse trial (which was rejected as incredible and self-serving by the Court) and ignored Ms. L's admissions on cross examination during that proceeding that despite her "illness" she cooked and served dinner for herself, her husband and a guest the evening Annie was taken to the hospital.
"Ms. L. claimed that [Annie] ... fainted' while she and the respondent father were feeding her...Ms. L. stated that Annie went stale' and didn't move'...She ...denied that anything had been medically wrong with [Annie]...prior to the incident. When asked concerning medical reports that Annie had suffered a fractured skull and multiple fractures to her extremities, Ms. L. replied that she had no idea how [Annie]...had sustained her injuries but denied that she or the respondent father had deliberately or inadvertently inflicted the injuries...When queried again concerning how she believes Annie sustained her injuries, Ms. L. stated that she is not a medical doctor and cannot see inside her.'" Id. at 7-8.
Ms. F's testimony on the mother's case, taken on March 16, 2016, was telling in outlining the story Ms. L. has presented outside of Court. Ms. F. testified that, of course, neither Mr. L. nor Ms. L. had done anything to Annie. The child had something wrong inside of her, something genetic, consistent with a number of L. relatives in China, whose children had died mysteriously at less than two years of age. Ms. F. testified that while she loved A. L. and would adopt her if she could not be returned to her mother, nothing could replace a mother's love. Ms. F. went on to explain that it was "common sense" to know that neither Ms. L. nor her husband could possibly have done anything to harm their older child. When she was cross examined concerning the conviction and incarceration of Mr. L., Ms. F. noted that he was appealing that conviction.
Nine years after the horrific homicide of her older child, Ms. L. continues to profess that neither she nor the child's father, in whose exclusive care the infant resided, did anything that would explain her death. More than three years after Mr. L. was convicted of Manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury who heard his testimony and the evidence presented by his defense team on his behalf, Ms. L. continues to protest his innocence. A year after Family Court made findings of severe abuse against Ms. L., she continues to assert that Annie died from some medical issue, a claim that was disproved beyond a reasonable doubt in Supreme Court and by clear and convincing evidence in Family Court. Clearly, the therapy in which Ms. L. has been engaged has failed miserably to address the issues that brought her before the Court. Much as she may wish that Annie died of medical causes, Annie died of inflicted injury, and to the extent that Ms. L. has engaged in therapy, she has not even admitted the cause of Annie's death, much less addressed the deficits in parenting judgement that allowed that death to occur.
Caselaw is clear that the point of engagement in services is to address the issues that brought the case before the Court. Mere attendance at programs, without addressing the core issues that place a child's safety in jeopardy, does not satisfy requirements that a parent plan for the return of her child. Matter of Nathaniel T., 67 NY2d 838 (1986); Matter of Tynell S., 43 AD3d 1171 (2nd Dept. 2007); Matter of Chanel C., 118 AD3d 826 (2nd Dept. 2014). Moreover, visitation, without benefitting from engaging in services meant to address the issues that brought a child into care, and make it safe for that child to return home, will not defeat the presentment agency's position that adoption is the permanency plan that is in the child's best interests. Nathaniel T., supra; Matter of Jennifer R., 29 AD3d 1005 (2nd Dept. 2006).
The standard in Criminal Court to take an individual's freedom in punishment for crimes is very different from the standard in Family Court, to address a surviving child's best interests and safety. As the Court noted in its fact-finding decision on the severe abuse case, Annie suffered broken ribs, consistent with squeezing her torso during a violent shaking incident, two weeks before the incident that took her life. Contrary to Ms. L.'s assertion, thereafter, Annie would have been irritable and fussy, probably crying whenever she was handled for feeding or changing. Further, after the incident, which took place within 24-48 hours of Annie's transport to the hospital, Annie would have been generally unwell, not eating, drinking and behaving normally, as Ms. L. insists presently. Why is this so important, nine years after the death of Annie, when Ms. L. so ardently wishes to be reunited with her surviving daughter?
It is most likely that the injuries that caused Annie's death were inflicted as the result of a violent shaking incident with blunt force trauma because the child was crying from normal handling due to pain from her older, healing rib fractures. It has been argued that A. L. is older - Annie was only two months old - A. L. is 7 ½ and verbal, and perhaps less likely to be the victim of a similar assault.
In this regard, consider the teacher comments from A. L.'s first grade report card which include the following, "A. L. has shown some progress in her ability to maintain composure and control her outbursts, which have been less frequent lately. A. L.'s frustration level is very low and when she reaches her limit, she tends to cry uncontrollably." Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Ms. F. testified that when A. L. was placed in her care, she had significant behavioral issues, including that she would cry uncontrollably and "not stop crying." As recently as May 21, 2015, Ms. F. told the caseworker that "A. L. wasn't crying as much when things wouldn't go her way and was listening more." Attorney for the Child Exhibit 2 in Evidence, at p. 92, printed 8/4/2015. Crying uncontrollably, having tantrums, are clearly issues with A. L., the surviving child. While she is older than her infant sister, she is a child, merely 7 ½ years of age. She is not capable of protecting herself from the kind of unbridled rage that resulted in the injuries that killed her sister. It is clear that Ms. L. has never even admitted the issue of crying with respect to Annie, much less dealt with its aftermath. Ms. F's support of Ms. L. by acknowledging the power of a mother's love to calm A. L. occasionally over the phone during these spells does little to address the Court's concern that normal parenting requires limit setting which can engender conflict between parent and child. Ms. L's coping mechanism, denial of the facts of Annie's homicide, places A. L. directly at risk of harm should she be unsupervised with Ms. L. It is clear that Ms. L's failure to address the issues that caused A. L. to be removed from her and come into care, despite the passage of time since the death of her sibling, directly implicate A. L.'s best interests and A. L.'s safety. Failure, over years, to address the deficiencies in parenting that brought a child into care supports a finding that it is in that child's best interests to achieve permanency through adoption. Matter of Guardianship of Star Leslie W., 62 NY2d 136 (1984); Matter of Peter C., 88 AD3d 702 (2nd Dept. 2011); Matter of Zechariah J., 84 AD3d 1087 (2nd Dept. 2011).
There was some argument that it is in A. L.'s best interests to be returned to Ms. L. because her biological mother has been the only constant in A. L.'s life. In the fall 2014, the long term resource who had cared for A. L. since birth moved to Pennsylvania, leaving A. L. with Ms. F., her day care provider. Ms. F. was thereafter qualified as A. L.'s foster care resource. Upon placement in Ms. F's care, there were behavioral issues with A. L.. It is unclear whether these issues were new or a continuation of behavior tolerated in the former resource's home. Counsel for respondent has sought to tie these issues to the Court's suspension of visitation on March 10, 2015. Review of the evidence shows that on February 22, 2015, A. L. had stealing issues at home and school, prior to suspension of the visits. She even stole from her biological mother. See Attorney for the Child 2 in Evidence at 75-76, printed 8/4/2015). In her testimony, Ms. F. referenced A. L.'s crying and tantrums, from the point at which she was placed in her care, which was in the fall 2014. The argument was that once the visitation was put back in place, A. L.'s behavioral issues resolved. This argument is overly simplistic and rejected. It is much more likely that A. L.'s behavioral and crying issues are resolving due to Ms. F's love and the security and the perceived permanence of that setting, than because Ms. L. began visiting again. In fact, Ms. F. noted in August 2015, that A. L. had pretty much stopped "using the crying tactic" to get what she wanted. Id. at p. 5, printed 9/25/2015. The Court further notes that in January 2016, Ms. L. went to China for three weeks to visit family, with no untoward effect on A. L., who remained happy in Ms. F's home. Petitioner's 7 in Evidence at p. 4.
Ms. L. testified at the dispositional hearing, that if it were necessary in order to have A. L. reunified with her, she would agree not to reunify with Mr. L. when he is released from his incarceration. The truthfulness of this statement is critical to any possible reunification between Ms. L. and A. L.. Evaluation of the evidence in the record shows that Ms. L's truthfulness on this issue is very questionable.
On cross examination, Ms. L. testified that "currently" she had no plan to reunify with Mr. L. Dr. Dimitri asked Ms. L. about her intentions with respect to any reunification with Mr. L. "Ms. L. reported having contact with Mr. L. in the past but said that she is not currently in contact with him. When asked concerning whether she imagines reuniting with Mr. L. upon his release from prison, Ms. L. was somewhat evasive, saying that her priority is to have [A. L.] in her care." Id. at 5. When the doctor pressed Ms. L. as to whether she expected things to go back to the way they were once Mr. L. was released from prison, i.e. implying a reunification of mother and father, Ms. L. "did not answer the question directly and stated that her priority is the subject child." Id.
In interviews with the caseworker, Ms. L. addressed the issue of reunification with Mr. L. On November 17, 2015, "Ms. L. informed CP that if A. L. was to return to her care that she would not let her husband near her if he was released because she feared that it would affect A. L. from returning to her care." Attorney for the Child 2 in Evidence at 1, printed 1/19/2016. On January 6, 2016, after explaining that she could not "blame" the father for Annie's death because she did not see him hurt the child, Ms. L. "informed CP that she would keep A. L. away from Mr. L. if released from prison. She explained that she did not want to risk loosing (sic) her daughter and if that was something the Court wanted then she would do so." Id. at 7.
This tepid capitulation to the strategic advice Ms. L. is clearly receiving inspires no confidence that it reflects Ms. L's true position. First, it is utterly contrary to Ms. L's position that Mr. L. is innocent, was a good father to Annie and would be a good father to A. L.. Second, the qualified manner in which she presents her position shows its bald-faced calculation. Ms. L. regularly visited Mr. L. in prison, at least until the Court's decision on the summary judgement motion on the current docket. When asked on cross examination when she had last visited, Ms. L. did not provide a date. Her new-found willingness to separate from Mr. L. lacks credibility and is rejected as quite self-serving.
Further, there is evidence in the caseworker's progress notes that the child is hoping to reunify with her mother and her father. On October 21, 2015, the caseworker interviewed A. L. at the foster home. A. L. told the caseworker, "that she was very happy that her mom was celebrating her birthday early. She told CP that she enjoys spending time with her mother they have fun together. She explained that her mother would bring her snacks, play games, watch tv, help her organize and talk together. She then stated that she missed her father and wished that she could see him again. A. L. explained that she felt very comfortable with Ms. F. and loved her very much. She told CP that Ms. F. treats her well and she's sweet but she stated that she wished she could live with her mother." Id. at 3, printed 11/4/2015. On December 31, 2015, during an interview with A. L. at Ms. F's home, "A. L. started talking about her father and stated that she missed him and didn't understand why she was not allowed to live with him. She then showed CP the different arts and crafts projects that her father used to give her when she was allowed to visit him. CP tried explaining to A. L. why visits were not allowed and she seemed to understand and asked CP when her dad would be "leaving" Washington." Id. at 6, printed 1/19/2016.
Mr. L. is currently incarcerated at a New York State Department of Correctional Services facility in Washington County. --------
According to the evidence presented and information from permanency hearings, A. L. has not visited with her father since he was sent to state prison after his sentencing on March 3, 2013. A. L. visits regularly with her mother, at least weekly for several hours, supervised at the foster home. It is noteworthy that A. L.'s statements concerning her wish to reside with her mother are often followed with a wish to visit with or live with her father. These statements are being made by a 7 year old girl whose last visit with her father was three years ago, when she was about 4 years old.
The child's statements are equally important in assessing the credibility of Ms. L's newly expressed intention not to reunite with Mr. L. when he is released from prison. Evaluating all of these half-hearted and strategically motivated assertions results in one conclusion: the mother's recent statements are part of a strategy designed to support a release of the child to her, and not a true change of heart. Ms. L. has never admitted that Mr. L. did anything wrong to hurt Annie; indeed she has affirmatively asserted in every forum that he did nothing to harm their older child. The child's statements suggest that during their visitation, Ms. L. is stoking the child's hope that she may live together with both of her parents. Ms. L's failure to acknowledge culpability for Annie's death and her lack of credibility in asserting her plan to separate from Mr. L. pose risks to A. L.. See, Matter of Amber L., 39 AD3d 651 (2nd Dept. 2007); Matter of Charlene Lashay J., 280 AD2d 320 (1st Dept. 2001).
"Clearly, siblings of a child killed by abuse are within the class of children the Legislature sought to protect in enacting social services law section 384-b, enhancing the protective purposes of article 10 of the Family Court Act. As one commentator has stated, "[i]t is logical and appropriate to assume that acts of abuse or neglect committed against one child in the household jeopardize all children similarly situated." Matter of Alijah C. et. al. 1 NY3d 375 at 379-380 quoting Sobie, 2003 Supp. Practice Commentary, McKinney's cons. Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct. Act Section 1012, 2004 Pocket Part at 98.
Ms. L., both by virtue of her failure to acknowledge the facts of Annie's death, by her continued support of Mr. L. and by the lack of credibility in her statements that she would plan separately from him, poses as much of a risk to A. L. today as she did the day that child was born. It is not in A. L.'s best interests to be returned to either of her parents. To the contrary, clear and convincing evidence provides that it is in A. L.'s best interests to achieve permanency by being adopted by her current foster parent, Ms. F. Therefore, the petition is granted, the parental rights of Mr. L. and Ms. L. are hereby terminated and care and custody of A. L. transferred to the agency and the Commissioner for purposes of consenting to her adoption. SETTLE ORDERS. Dated:Jamaica, New York May 10, 2016 Marybeth S. Richroath J.F.C.