Opinion
No. 92-1889
Submitted November 10, 1992 —
Decided December 11, 1992.
ON REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness of the Supreme Court, No. 64.
Applicant, Erin Hardin Bower, attended Cleveland Marshall School of Law from 1987 through 1990. In early 1991, she applied to take the Ohio Bar Examination. As part of the application process, applicant was interviewed on March 6, 1991 by two members of the Joint Admissions Committee of the Cuyahoga County and Cleveland Bar Associations ("committee").
Following their meeting, both interviewers recommended that applicant be denied admission to the Bar. Both were troubled by applicant's stale character references and, based on applicant's responses to questioning, expressed concern over her mental fitness to practice law. Their impressions were incorporated into a formal report prepared by Mark Pryatel, committee chairman. The report, which was sent to applicant, listed the reasons for disapproval as "concern over current mental state" and "character ref[erences] date from some time."
Applicant timely appealed to the committee's appeal subcommittee, alleging, inter alia, that the committee's decision was partially based on disapproval of her fundamental religious beliefs. Applicant made this claim despite the lack of reference to her religious views in any documents arising from her March 6th interview.
Following its May 28, 1991 hearing, the subcommittee affirmed the initial recommendation. It, too, questioned applicant's mental fitness, citing: (1) her 1981 involuntary commitment to the Cambridge Mental Health and Developmental Center; (2) the lack of evidence of ongoing outpatient treatment; (3) her "[l]ong rambling answers given to specific questions"; and (4) her inability to "demonstrate cogent line of reasoning."
Applicant appealed the subcommittee's decision to the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness of the Supreme Court. On December 11, 1991, applicant's appeal was heard by a three-member panel appointed by the board. Committee member Craig A. Marvinney, who interviewed applicant originally, and Mark Pryatel both testified that applicant, not the committee or subcommittee, initiated the discussion on her religious beliefs, and both stated that those beliefs did not influence their decisions.
Several individuals testified on applicant's behalf, including the applicant herself. Their testimony portrayed applicant as someone who had overcome many obstacles — financial hardship, two failed marriages, single parenthood, and mental illness — to successfully complete college and law school. Additionally, Mary Pease, Executive Director of the Phoenix Society and applicant's current employer, described applicant as "extremely competent, bright and intelligent."
Applicant also presented two mental health experts, Drs. Deborah A. Koricke and Gary T. Pagano, both of whom had treated applicant in 1991. Clinical psychologist Koricke characterized applicant's situation as "very unusual," stating that she would not expect someone with applicant's prior mental history to withstand the rigors of law school. Koricke also opined, however, that high stress could trigger unclear or psychotic thinking in the future. Psychiatrist Pagano concurred in that opinion, diagnosing applicant as suffering from a "[p]robable personality disorder. Possibly paranoid personality disorder."
The panel concluded that the applicant had not established the requisite mental fitness to practice law in Ohio. The panel was especially troubled by applicant's lack of insight into her problems and her seemingly deliberate injection of the issue of her religious beliefs to cover her own shortcomings. The panel took due note of applicant's accomplishments in both completing her schooling and securing employment, but ultimately concluded:
"* * * [Applicant's] competence at certain times [in] performing certain tasks does not rebut the concern of the panel that applicant's psychological troubles may be manifested episodically to the detriment of her future clients and challenges. Applicant's fitness to practice law must be measured not against the specific tasks she has performed to date, but against the broad spectrum of duties, responsibilities, and challenges of a lawyer in private practice."
The board adopted the panel's findings of fact and agreed that applicant was presently unfit to practice law. The board recommended that her application for admission be denied and that she be permitted to reapply no sooner than for the July 1993 Ohio Bar Examination. The board also recommended that upon reapplication, she undergo further character and fitness review and demonstrate her character and fitness to practice law.
American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Kevin O'Neill and William Saks, for applicant.
Charles J. Lally, for Cleveland Bar Association.
Admission to the practice of law in Ohio requires the applicant:
"* * * [T]o establish by clear and convincing evidence the applicant's present character, fitness, and moral qualifications for admission to the practice of law in Ohio." Gov.Bar R. I(11)(C)(6).
After thorough review of the evidence, we find that applicant has not sustained her requisite burden of proof.
Applicant suggests that any unfavorable assessment of her mental fitness was not based on her current psychological state, but instead derived from events occurring over a decade ago. We, however, find it unnecessary to return to 1981 to find evidence of mental instability. We are particularly concerned by a 1991 incident involving a Cleveland attorney for whom applicant agreed to do research as part of the job application process. At some point during her endeavors, applicant became convinced that the attorney's proposed legal strategy was wrong. Applicant did not discuss the situation with the attorney, but instead wrote to the presiding trial judge and Attorney General with her suspicions. Applicant took this action despite an awareness of the possible prejudicial impact her accusations might have on the attorney or his client.
Equally disturbing is the follow-up letter that applicant sent to the Disciplinary Counsel of this court. There, applicant revealed her belief that the attorney for whom she did research "is not alive anymore, and that someone else is using his identity." She further suggested that the individual may be trying to sabotage the client's case in order to "stiff" applicant, but she did not explain why she would be targeted for such action. Applicant claimed to have suffered "severe emotional distress" because of the situation and was "too emotionally distraught to look for work."
When viewed together with the medical evidence, applicant's actions may be more than just atypical examples of thinking under stress that we consider normal in the practice of law. Drs. Pagano and Koricke agreed that stress could trigger confused thinking by applicant in the future. Dr. Koricke conceded that it would be a "tough call" as to whether applicant could mentally handle the rigors of the legal profession. We thus find that applicant has not demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, her fitness to practice law at this time.
Accordingly, we adopt the findings of fact and recommendation of the board. We hereby deny applicant's application to take the bar examination. Applicant may not reapply for admission sooner than for the July 1993 examination, with admission to be contingent upon further character and fitness review and a successful demonstration of her fitness to practice law.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.