Opinion
No. 816 C.D. 2014
07-21-2015
In Re: Appeal of Marvin Krane From the Delaware County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes Folio # 14-00-00518-00 Municipality: Darby Borough Address: 314 Darby Terrace Assessment For The Year Beginning January 1, 2013 Property of: Marvin Krane Appeal of: William Penn School District
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
Marvin Krane (Taxpayer) initiated this matter by filing a Petition for Review of Assessment (Petition for Review) with the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court). Taxpayer's Petition for Review challenged the denial of his tax assessment appeal for tax year 2013 by the Delaware County Board of Assessment Appeals (Board). After Taxpayer filed his Petition for Review, the Board issued a revised tax assessment, reducing the assessed value of Taxpayer's property (Property). In response, Taxpayer unilaterally discontinued his appeal of the original tax assessment by filing a Praecipe to Withdraw Appeal (Praecipe to Withdraw). Thereafter, William Penn School District (School District) filed a Petition to Strike Praecipe to Withdraw Appeal (Petition to Strike), which the trial court denied by order dated April 8, 2014. On appeal, the School District argues that: (1) the trial court erred by denying its Petition to Strike and not striking Taxpayer's discontinuance of his original tax assessment appeal; and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to void the revised assessment for Taxpayer's Property and reinstate the original assessment for his Property. We now reverse.
This matter was argued seriately with: (1) In Re: Appeal of Maoying Yu from the Delaware County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes Folio #14-00-01186-00 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 812 C.D. 2014, filed July 21, 2015); (2) In Re: Appeal of Maoying Yu From the Delaware County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes Folio # 14-00-01985-00 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 813 C.D. 2014, filed July 21, 2015); (3) In Re: Appeal of Maoying Yu From the Delaware County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes Folio # 14-00-03785-00 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 814 C.D. 2014, filed July 21, 2015); (4) In Re: Appeal of Jeffrey M. Krane From the Delaware County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes Folio # 14-00-00036-00 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 815 C.D. 2014, filed July 21, 2015); (5) In Re: Appeal of Jeffrey M. Krane From the Delaware County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes Folio # 14-00-02005-00 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 817 C.D. 2014, filed July 21, 2015); and (6) In Re: Appeal of Jeffrey M. and Marvin Krane From the Delaware County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes Folio # 14-00-01185-00 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 818 C.D. 2014, filed July 21, 2015).
Taxpayer's Property, located at 314 Darby Terrace in Darby Borough, Pennsylvania, was initially assessed at $40,700 for the year beginning January 1, 2013. Following Taxpayer's appeal of his assessment to the Board, the Board denied his appeal on November 15, 2012, thereby maintaining the Property's assessment at $40,700 (Initial Decision). (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 30a.) Taxpayer, thereafter, filed his Petition for Review of the Board's Initial Decision with the trial court on December 17, 2012, and the School District timely intervened on January 9, 2013. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.)
In order to appeal the Initial Decision, Taxpayer was required to file an appeal from the decision within 30 days; however, because the last day to appeal, which was December 15, 2012, fell on a Saturday, Taxpayer had until Monday, December 17, 2012, to file an appeal with the trial court. See Section 1908 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1908 (providing that whenever last day of appeal period falls on Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, "such day shall be omitted from the computation").
On December 18, 2012, however, after Taxpayer had already filed his Petition for Review with the trial court, the Board issued a revision to its Initial Decision (Revised Decision). (R.R. at 35a.) Using strikethroughs and interlineations, the Board's Revised Decision, dated December 18, 2012, purported to reduce Taxpayer's assessment for 2013 to $19,440. Thereafter, on April 2, 2013, Taxpayer filed with the trial court's Office of Judicial Support, a Praecipe to Withdraw Appeal, indicating that the matter has been "Settled, Discontinued, and Ended." (R.R. at 15a.)
The School District filed its Petition to Strike on July 5, 2013. (R.R. at 18a.) Therein, the School District asserted that this case was discussed at the trial court's Call of the List held on March 22, 2013. The School District alleged that "[a]t the Call of the List, . . . Taxpayer's [c]ounsel stated that in view of the 'revised'" tax assessment, the Petition for Review would be withdrawn. (R.R. at 19a.) Moreover, as alleged in the Petition to Strike, the School District's Solicitor advised Taxpayer's counsel that the School District would not consent to the withdrawal, because the Revised Decision of the Board was void ab initio and the Board lost jurisdiction to take additional action after Taxpayer filed his Petition for Review.
The School District further alleged that Taxpayer withdrew his Petition for Review without seeking leave of the trial court or the School District's consent and without providing notice to the School District that he would discontinue his appeal. The School District averred that, because it believed the tax assessment appeal was still pending, it retained an expert to prepare an appraisal of the Property. The expert examined the Property on April 6, 2013, and released an appraisal report on April 19, 2013. (R.R. at 20a, 39a-49a.) The School District also alleged that it first learned that Taxpayer withdrew his appeal on June 19, 2013, after its counsel reviewed the docket. The School District asserted that Taxpayer has never advised it that the appeal was withdrawn, even though the School District provided Taxpayer with a copy of its appraisal report. (R.R. at 21a.)
On April 8, 2014, without hearing or oral argument, the trial court issued an order, denying the School District's Petition to Strike (April 8th Order). The School District filed a notice of appeal on May 8, 2014. After the School District filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal, the trial court issued an opinion in support of its April 8th Order. In its opinion, the trial court indicated that it denied the School District's Petition to Strike, because the School District failed to appeal the Board's Revised Decision: "Once the December 18, 2012 determination was entered, it was incumbent upon the School District or other taxing authorities to perfect an appeal. They failed to do so." (Trial Ct. Op. at 3.) Because the School District failed to appeal, the trial court reasoned that it would be "inequitable to force Taxpayer to litigate a determination with which he was apparently satisfied"—i.e., the Revised Decision. (Id. at 4.)
On appeal to this Court, the School District raises two principal arguments. First, the School District contends that the trial court failed to evaluate properly the prejudice to the School District caused by Taxpayer's withdrawal and the trial court's subsequent refusal to strike off the discontinuance. Specifically, the School District notes that Taxpayer withdrew his appeal without leave of court and without the consent of the School District. Moreover, the School District did not receive timely notice of the discontinuance. The School District incurred costs and fees preparing for the appeal, most of which accrued after Taxpayer filed his Praecipe to Withdraw and before the School District had notice of that withdrawal. The School District also accuses the trial court of condoning Taxpayer's "forum shopping." Second, the School District contends that the Revised Decision was not authorized under the Consolidated County Assessment Law (Assessment Law), 53 Pa. C.S. §§ 8801-8868. As an unauthorized act by the Board, the Revised Decision cannot serve as a basis for the trial court's refusal to strike the discontinuance in this case. The trial court's order, therefore, must be reversed and the matter remanded with direction to the trial court to set the assessed value for the Property.
"Our review in tax assessment matters is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or reached a conclusion not supported by substantial evidence." Herzog v. McKean Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 14 A.3d 193, 199 n.15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a petition to strike a discontinuance, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Fancsali ex rel. Fancsali v. Univ. Health Cntr. of Pittsburgh, 761 A.2d 1159, 1162 (Pa. 2000). An abuse of discretion occurs where (a) "the law is overridden or misapplied," or (b) "the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will." Commonwealth v. McAleer, 748 A.2d 670, 673 (Pa. 2000).
Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 229(c) "[t]he court, upon petition and after notice, may strike off a discontinuance in order to protect the rights of any party from unreasonable inconvenience, vexation, harassment, expense, or prejudice." "In determining whether to strike a discontinuance, 'the trial court must consider all facts and weigh equities. Further, the trial court must consider the benefits or injuries which may result to the respective sides if a discontinuance is granted.'" Pohl v. NGK Metals Corp., 936 A.2d 43, 47 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Foti v. Askinas, 639 A.2d 807, 808 (Pa. Super. 1994)), appeal denied, 952 A.2d 678 (Pa. 2008). Although the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable in tax assessment appeals, in the sense that they cannot be mandatorily imposed on the trial court or the parties, trial courts are vested with full authority to regulate the practice and procedure before them when a void exists. In re Appeal of the Borough of Churchill, 575 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. 1990). Here, the Consolidated County Assessment Law (Assessment Law), 53 Pa. C.S. §§ 8801-8868, is silent on the procedure to be used by a party who seeks to discontinue voluntarily a tax assessment appeal. In this case, Taxpayer filed a praecipe with the trial court to withdraw his appeal, without notice to the School District. When the School District filed its Petition to Strike, the trial court, exercising its discretion in the absence of any controlling procedure in the Assessment Law or in governing rule of procedure, accepted and considered the merits of the filing, looking to precedent applying Rule 229(c) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to fill the void. (Trial Ct. Op. at 3 (citing Pohl, 936 A.2d at 47).) This was an appropriate exercise of the trial court's discretion, and, under Borough of Churchill, it would be error for this Court to usurp the trial court's decision in this regard, especially where no party has raised any objection to the trial court proceeding in this fashion.
Taxpayer defends the trial court's decision. He maintains that once the Board issued the Revised Decision, his appeal of the Initial Decision became moot. The burden then shifted to the taxing authorities, including the School District, to challenge the Revised Decision. They failed to do so. With respect to the legality of the Revised Decision, Taxpayer argues that there is nothing in the Assessment Law that prohibits the Board from revising its decisions. Taxpayer also cites specifically to Section 8844(f) of the Assessment Law, contending that the intent of the Assessment Law was to provide the Board "wide latitude in issuing and amending Hearing Result notices when circumstances arise." (Taxpayer's Br. at 13.)
There is nothing in the record to indicate why the Board issued the Revised Decision. --------
These issues and the arguments advanced by the parties in this appeal are substantially the same as those set forth and disposed of by this Court in In Re: Appeal of Maoying Yu from the Delaware County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes Folio #14-00-01186-00 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 812 C.D. 2014, filed July 21, 2015). Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in that decision, the trial court's order is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instruction that the trial court strike Taxpayer's discontinuance of his appeal and proceed to determine the market value of the Property in accordance with the Assessment Law.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of July, 2015, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, entered in the above-captioned matter, is hereby REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the accompanying opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
DISSENTING OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI
For the reasons set forth in In Re: Appeal of Maoying Yu From the Delaware County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes Folio #14-00-01186-00, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 812 C.D. 2014, filed July 21, 2015), I respectfully dissent.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge Judges Leadbetter and McCullough join in this dissenting opinion.