Opinion
No. 340847
04-19-2018
In re ANGLIN, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Kalamazoo Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2016-000355-NA Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.
The trial court also entered an order terminating father's parental rights to the children; however, he is not a party to this appeal. --------
I. BASIC FACTS
In August 2016, a petition was filed seeking removal of the children from respondent's care due to domestic violence, substance abuse, and homelessness. An amended petition was filed in September 2016, alleging that respondent had used marijuana while she was the children's primary caretaker. In October 2016, respondent pleaded to jurisdiction, admitting that in September 2016 she used marijuana while being a primary caretaker of her children. Respondent was provided with a number of services as part of the reunification effort. However, the record reflects that her compliance with services was inconsistent, and in August 2017, petitioner filed an amended petition seeking termination of respondent's parental rights. Following the termination hearing, the court found clear and convincing evidence of statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights and found by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the children's best interests.
II. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent argues that the petitioner's reunification efforts were insufficient because it could have offered services that would accommodate her work schedule and because it should not have counted her as missing parenting time visits that were not scheduled due to lack of contact with her caseworker. She did not raise this issue below, so it is unpreserved. Unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).
B. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that services were inadequate for two reasons. First, her caseworker testified that some of respondent's attendance problems at counseling might have been avoided if she had been referred to outpatient counseling. Second, her caseworker testified that (1) he knew she had phone issues sometimes but (2) he still counted parenting-time visits as missed when he was unable to contact her to actually schedule the visits. We disagree that the failure to accommodate respondent's work schedule and her lack of a consistently reliable phone render the services provided in this case inadequate.
The record reflects that respondent was provided with numerous services to address the barriers to reunification. Those services included domestic violence and substance abuse counseling, a psychological assessment, gas cards, a substance abuse evaluation, drug screening, assistance with housing and employment, parenting time, and a parenting coach. Furthermore, respondent's caseworker testified that when respondent's phone was unreliable, e-mail was established as a second method of communication. The caseworker also testified that missed visits were counted against respondent because of her "lack of follow through on communicating with [petitioner] to schedule those visits because up until recently she was fairly consistent with attending her weekly visits." Consequently, the record does not support respondent's claim that she was denied reasonable reunification efforts.
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent next argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of her parental rights to the minor children was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), (g), and (j). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court's factual determination that statutory grounds exist for termination. MCR 3.977(K). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
B. ANALYSIS
At the termination hearing, respondent testified that she believed her parental rights had already been terminated, so in the period leading up to the termination hearing, she stopped attending her parenting-time visits. She also testified that during the same period she sometimes was without effective means of communication or transportation. On appeal, respondent contends that because she had a good faith belief that termination was a "done deal," the trial court should have not stopped reunification efforts and should have instead allowed her more time to benefit from services. The trial court, however, did not find respondent's testimony credible, finding that respondent was not confused about the status of her parental rights and had instead missed drug screens, had relapses, and was inconsistently participating in services throughout the case. The court's findings are supported by the record, and because we must give due regard to the trial court's ability to observe the witnesses, In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 296-297, we find no error in the court's rejection of respondent's explanation for why she failed to attend parenting time before the termination hearing.
Moreover, even if the trial court had found that respondent had a good-faith basis for missing parenting time in the period leading to termination, we would nevertheless affirm. The trial court found that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c), which provides that termination is proper if:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:The conditions leading to adjudication included problems with domestic violence, housing, and substance abuse. The record reflected that, more than 182 days after the initial dispositional hearing, respondent continued to have problems with housing and substance abuse. Despite being offered services, respondent was unable to find and maintain stable housing. The record reflects that in May 2017, she established housing with a cosigner. However, her caseworker testified that respondent was evicted from that residence because she was behind approximately $2,700 in rent. Before May 2017, mother resided at the YWCA, a friend's house, and her mother's house. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent testified that she was again living with the children's father—who had twice abused her during the course of the case.
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court's jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
Additionally, with regard to respondent's psychological needs, her caseworker testified that the services put in place by petitioner to help respondent reunify with her children included a substance abuse evaluation, drug screening, housing resources, and employment assistance referrals. More specifically, respondent's caseworker testified that respondent was referred to Elizabeth Upjohn Community Healing Center for substance abuse and mental health treatment in November 2016. Although respondent participated in two counseling sessions in July 2017 and three intensive outpatient therapy meetings in the last week of July 2017, she failed to have any contact with her therapist after August 3, 2017. In fact, respondent was given notice that she would need to reengage in services or her file would be closed because of her lack of participation and missed visits. Respondent also missed 9 of 11 drug screens since July 1, 2017, and tested positive for Xanax, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and tramadol throughout 2017. Furthermore, respondent admitted to not attending group sessions at the YWCA on Tuesday nights throughout March, April, and parts of May. Although she stated this was due to scheduled parenting-time visits on Tuesday, she admitted that she did not attend sessions even when she did not have a conflict. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err by finding termination proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c). Furthermore, the same evidence supports the court's decision to terminate with regard to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j).
IV. BEST INTERESTS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent finally argues that termination of her parental rights was not in the children's best interests. This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's determination of best interests. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).
B. ANALYSIS
"If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss Minors, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). "In deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, the court may consider the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). The trial court may also consider an unfavorable psychological evaluation, the child's age, continued involvement in domestic violence, and a parent's history. See In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 131; 777 NW2d 728 (2009). When considering best interest, the focus is on the child rather than the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87.
In this case, the trial court found that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests because "neither parent is able to care for the children anytime soon so keeping the children in limbo without permanency is just as damaging." The trial court also believed the children would be harmed if returned back to respondent, based on her failure to comply with services, continued substance abuse issues, and decision to move back in with the children's father, who had physically abused her on at least two occasions. The court found that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the children's father would not continue to abuse respondent, which could psychologically harm the children. The record also reflects that respondent lacks consistent, stable housing. Finally, although the children had a bond with respondent, there was also testimony that the children were doing well in their current placements, and that their caretakers were interested in adopting them. On the whole, we find the court did not err by finding termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron