Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK54015, D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
JACKSON, J.
INTRODUCTION
Beth M. appeals from an order denying her motion for monetary sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 against the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). We affirm the order.
FACTS
Four-year-old Alexis B. is the daughter of Beth M. (Mother). Alexis was first the subject of a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (section 300 petition) within a few days after her birth in 2003. Her circumstances came to the attention of DCFS when Mother tested positive for methamphetamine shortly before the birth. In those proceedings, Alexis’s maternal grandmother was granted legal guardianship of Alexis and Alexis’s case was transferred to Ventura County where her grandmother lived. Through a series of events not relevant here, Alexis again became the subject of dependency proceedings in Los Angeles County. DCFS filed a new section 300 petition on May 29, 2007 and Alexis was placed in foster care pending court proceedings to determine a permanent placement for her. At the time, Mother was incarcerated.
We granted Mother’s request to take judicial notice of the record in the prior appeal, No. B203835, filed on October 30, 2007, from the juvenile court’s denial of her petition for modification under section 388 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 453, 459.)
Visitation orders and information about Mother’s location were addressed at each hearing held during the time period relevant here. At the May 29, 2007 detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to provide reunification services and “[m]onitored visits for parents to be monitored by DCFS approved monitor. DCFS to facilitate visits for the parents at their places of incarceration.” The section 300 petition represented that Mother was incarcerated at the Century Regional Detention Facility in Lynwood.
On June 4, 2007, the juvenile court denied Mother’s request for liberalized visitation. The court stated, “Visits will be one time per week, monitored. Strictly monitored.” The minute order provided that “Mother to have at least one monitored visit per week while she is in custody; two times a week when mother is released.” While Mother appeared at the hearing, the DCFS report showed Mother was still incarcerated at the Century Regional Detention Facility.
At the July 10, 2007 jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared Alexis to be a dependent child of the court and ordered DCFS to provide permanent placement services. The court granted the parents weekly monitored visitation “while in prison if they are within a reasonable distance.”
The DCFS jurisdictional/dispositional report showed Mother was still incarcerated at the Century Regional Detention Facility. DCFS submitted last minute information for the court that Mother was currently hospitalized at USC Medical Center; she was admitted on July 6, 2007 and would remain there for approximately 10 days. The DCFS report also included a transcription of Mother’s talk with DCFS staff about her efforts to be relocated. Mother indicated that she had applied to a program for incarcerated parents in a facility where Alexis could come to live with her, that she would be sentenced for custody there in about a week, and would be immediately transferred to the program.
For the August 27, 2007 hearing, the DCFS report listed Mother’s location as the Century Regional Detention Facility but indicated that Mother informed DCFS of her acceptance into the Family Foundation Program in Santa Fe Springs due to her pregnancy, then in its seventh month. Mother remained in the county jail awaiting transition to the program. Mother’s counsel informed the court that Mother had moved to the Santa Fe Springs facility of the Family Foundation Program and that Mother requested that the court consider placing Alexis with her at the facility. The court’s minute order provided that all prior orders would remain in effect; it did not include a new visitation order.
Despite the visitation orders, Mother claimed she was not having visitation with Alexis. At a hearing on November 8, 2007, the juvenile court again specified that Mother was to have weekly monitored visits.
On December 7, 2007, Mother filed a motion for imposition of sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 due to DCFS’s failure to comply with the court’s orders for visitation. Mother had complained to her attorney that she had not seen Alexis since September. Prior to that time, she had not seen Alexis since May. She had spoken to Alexis by telephone several times. She had tried to arrange visitation through DCFS, but DCFS informed her that they would not transport Alexis to see her.
At the December 14, 2007 hearing on Mother’s motion, DCFS took the position that the court had ordered weekly “contact,” not necessarily visitation. The court responded: “It is intriguing because, you know, I pick my words very carefully and at the same time I do not know why I would say contact, but also say within a reasonable distance, because contact to me means either telephonic or face to face and within a reasonable distance has to do with what is feasible to do face to face.” DCFS’s counsel explained that because Mother was in a “quasi prison setting,” DCFS understood “that it be some combination of visitation.”
The court then asked if there was any reason for the court “not to modify [the visitation order] today from contact to visits.” Counsel responded, “Well I leave that to the court’s judgment, but I believe that the Department’s rationale for not making the contact, actual in person visits, it is inconvenient to get the child to the place where the mother is residing on a weekly basis.” Alexis was residing in Pasadena, while Mother was residing in Santa Fe Springs.
After discussion as to whether sanctions should be imposed, the juvenile court denied Mother’s motion. It did, however, modify its November 8, 2007 order “for the Mother to have at least weekly visits . . . while incarcerated within a reasonable distance. [¶] The court believes that Pasadena to Santa Fe Springs is reasonable . . . .”
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for sanctions against DCFS for failure to comply with the court’s orders for visitation issued during the period from May 29, 2007 through the date of her motion, December 6, 2007. We disagree.
In her opening brief, Mother briefly raises an issue about make-up visits. She contends that the juvenile court abused it’s discretion in not ordering make-up visits “in order to attempt to redress the harm that had already been caused to this family.” Mother brought her sanctions motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5. Her only request for make-up visits was made indirectly, as part of the declaration of Mother’s counsel in support of the motion. Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, however, gives the juvenile court discretion to impose only monetary sanctions. (In re Mark A. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1143.) The juvenile court therefore properly denied Mother’s request for make-up visits within the context of her motion for sanctions, and we need not address the issue.
A juvenile court may impose monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 (section 177.5) up to $1,500 for violation of a court order without good cause or substantial justification. (In re Mark A., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.30(b).) The legislative purpose in enacting section 177.5 was to “‘insure all parties are present and prepared for court appearances’ and ‘to help eliminate unnecessary delays in civil proceedings.’” (Seykora v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1080.)
Section 177.5 provides in pertinent part: “A judicial officer shall have the power to impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), notwithstanding any other provision of law, payable to the court, for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or substantial justification. . . . For the purposes of this section, the term ‘person’ includes a witness, a party, a party’s attorney, or both.”
The imposition of monetary sanctions under section 177.5 is within the discretion of the juvenile court. (In re Woodham (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 438, 443.) The court must exercise its discretion in a reasonable, and not arbitrary or capricious, manner in accord with one or more of the purposes of section 177.5. (Id. at p. 443 and fn. 7.) We will not disturb the court’s decision unless it exceeds the bounds of reason, considering all relevant circumstances, or otherwise manifests a miscarriage of justice. (Id. at p. 443.)
Imposing sanctions as Mother requested would not further any legislative purpose of section 177.5, given the circumstances in the instant case. (In re Woodham, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 443.) Mother does not claim and the record does not show that the alleged noncompliance by DCFS caused any unnecessary delay in the proceedings or resulted in any party missing or being unprepared for any hearings or other proceedings. (Seykora v. Superior Court, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1080.)
Additionally, there is evidence supporting a finding of confusion and uncertainty about the terms and conditions of visitation. Specifically, it appears DCFS had a question as to whether it was reasonable to transport Alexis from Pasadena to Santa Fe Springs for in-person visitation, or whether, in light of the distance involved, telephonic contact was adequate compliance with the juvenile court’s visitation orders. Such a finding would be inconsistent with a finding of a knowing violation of the orders by DCFS, as required by section 177.5. (Winikow v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 719, 726.) We note that both Mother’s counsel and counsel for DCFS expressed confusion about the terms of visitation orders at various points during the proceedings, supporting a finding that any noncompliance with the visitation orders was unintentional.
The juvenile court thus had a reasonable basis for determining that there was sufficient good cause and justification for any noncompliance by DCFS to negate the award of monetary sanctions pursuant to section 177.5. (Seykora v. Superior Court, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1080-1081.) Its denial of Mother’s motion for monetary sanctions therefore was reasonable and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. (In re Woodham, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 443.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., WOODS, J.