Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court No. CK54870 of Los Angeles County. S. Patricia Spear, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Nancy Rabin Brucker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ZELON, J.
In this dependency proceeding, after a legal guardianship was established for the minor, the court terminated jurisdiction, issuing an order with respect to mother’s visitation. Mother challenges that order on this appeal, asserting that the order improperly delegated judicial authority to the guardian. We reverse and remand for the court to issue a new order with respect to certain aspects of the visitation.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter commenced in March 2004. Minor Alexander F. was detained from his mother, Jennifer F. and ordered suitably placed in July 2004. Maternal grandfather was appointed as legal guardian in December 2005.
The current appeal relates only to the order dated July 19, 2007 terminating jurisdiction. As a result, much of the factual history of the case is not relevant to our determination, and will not be detailed.
During the course of the proceedings, Mother raised numerous issues concerning Mother’s visitation, and appealed various orders. None of those appeals resulted in a decision by this court; the last appeal was dismissed as moot as a result of the entry of the order challenged here.
Mother’s first and second appeals in B182286 and B185091 were dismissed pursuant to In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952. Her third appeal in case number B196449 was dismissed by this court as moot on respondent’s motion. Her fourth and fifth appeals, filed in June 2007, were case number B199934, and her sixth appeal, filed in July 2007, was case B200833. These cases were consolidated under case number B199934. At this time, mother is pursuing only the current appeal.
This appeal is taken from the order of July 19, 2007. At that review hearing, the court terminated jurisdiction at the request of the Department; mother objected to the termination of jurisdiction and also requested the court, if it were to terminate, to order a specific visitation schedule in light of the history of problems concerning her visits with Alexander. After hearing argument by counsel, the court ordered as follows: “The court will order that jurisdiction be terminated with KIN-GAP funding. Mother may participate in weekly visits as she arranges with Grandpa, consistent with the best interest of the child. He’s free to allow her to have two visits or even three visits a week if it’s going well. There’s no upper limit as long as it’s going well and she doesn’t say things that upset the child and the child is doing well. [¶] That’s your job as Grandpa and legal guardian to make those decisions, and you’re free to exercise it by giving her the right to visit on a weekly basis by anyone you agree to be the monitor. If you agree to the man who used to be with Wraparound, fine. If you want to do it, fine. If you can’t do it and they’re not doing it or they won’t do it because I can’t make them do it and she has to pay, that’s kind of last resort, but hopefully we’ll be able to find people that are good, that can keep a good control of the situation so that Mom and Alex can spend time together.”
Mother timely appealed the order by notice of appeal dated July 25, 2007, asserting that the court improperly delegated excess authority to the guardian over her visitation rights.
DISCUSSION
Mother asserts that the court’s order improperly granted to the guardian the unfettered discretion to decide not only when, but whether, she could visit her son. She argues that Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4) requires a specific visitation order when a legal guardianship is ordered, citing 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(c), which provides: “The court shall also make an order for visitation with the parents or guardians unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
We agree that such an order is required. We also agree with mother that the court’s order includes no finding of detriment precluding visitation, and, as a result, that the guardian does not have the authority to terminate visitation absent a proper showing to the court of changed circumstances. “Because the trial court was required to make a visitation order unless it found that visitation was not in the children’s best interest, it could not delegate authority to the legal guardian to decide whether visitation would occur. [Citation.] The court may delegate authority to the legal guardian to decide the time, place, and manner in which visitation will take place. [Citation.] The visitation order in this case, like that at issue in In re Randalynne G., left every aspect of visitation, other than supervision, to the discretion of the legal guardian. As such, the order was an improper delegation of the judicial function and therefore an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (In re M.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 269, 274).
The Department agrees as well, and concedes that the visitation order must be reversed and the matter remanded to the juvenile court. While the Department disputes Mother’s reading of the order, and contends that the order did not give discretion to the guardian to terminate visitation entirely, we need not resolve that issue here. As the Department properly admits, the order is insufficiently specific with respect to the duration of the visits. We therefore reverse and remand the matter for the entry of a new order. Consistent with the statutory requirements, any new order must specify a minimum frequency and duration for Mother’s visits, leaving the details of compliance to the guardian as appropriate.
DISPOSITION
The court’s order is reversed and the matter remanded for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J. WOODS, J.