Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. J516296, Yvonne Campos, Judge.
McDONALD, J.
Blanca L. appeals the court's orders at the 12-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21.) She contends the court erred when it did not return her son, Alejandro S., Jr., (Alejandro) to her physical custody and the court abused its discretion when it denied her request for a continuance of the 12-month review hearing. We affirm.
Unless otherwise indicated, further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Blanca L. and Alejandro S., Sr., (Father) are the parents of Alejandro, born May 1996. When Alejandro was nine months old, Blanca left him and his older sister (children) in the care of their maternal grandmother and joined Father in San Diego to find work. About seven months later, Blanca ended her relationship with Father and moved to Georgia. She agreed to allow Father to care for the children until she found a job and a home. Father later refused to allow her to have custody of the children. Blanca remained in telephone contact with the children but she did not keep her promises to visit them. Alejandro, from the age of three, lived with Father and his girlfriend, Catalina.
Alejandro's older sister was not involved in the dependency action.
In June 2006 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (a) alleging Alejandro suffered serious physical harm inflicted by Father. Father kicked Alejandro and struck him with a plastic chair and telephone cord, breaking his skin and leaving welts on his back. Alejandro said Father started hitting him when he was four years old. The Agency detained Alejandro in protective custody.
Blanca asked the social worker to place Alejandro in her care. She lived in Georgia with her boyfriend, Elfego, their two children, the children's grandmother, the grandmother's boyfriend and another family member. The social worker told Blanca the Agency needed more information about her current circumstances and her relationship with Alejandro before it could recommend placement with her.
In August the court sustained the section 300 petition and ordered an expedited evaluation of Blanca's home in Georgia under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). (Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq.) Father was arrested and incarcerated on charges of child cruelty. The Agency placed Alejandro with Catalina, who was caring for Alejandro's older sister and baby brother. The court continued the disposition hearing until October 27, 2006, to allow Georgia social services sufficient time to complete the ICPC evaluation of Blanca's home.
At the disposition hearing, the court found that Blanca was a nonoffending, noncustodial parent and considered placing Alejandro with her under section 361.2. Blanca did not have a criminal record and there were no concerns about the condition of her home. However, Elfego acknowledged he had a criminal history and refused to be fingerprinted. Blanca did not know the details of Elfego's criminal history. Georgia could not complete the ICPC evaluation and closed the case. The court found that Alejandro's placement with Blanca would be detrimental to him and denied Blanca's request for placement. Blanca appealed the court's decision, which this court affirmed on appeal. (In re Alejandro S. (Apr. 19, 2007, D049726) [nonpub. opn.].)
Blanca consistently kept in touch with Alejandro and his sister by telephone. The children visited Blanca over the winter holidays. Alejandro enjoyed the time he spent with his mother and wanted to visit her again. Blanca telephoned the social worker after the visit and again requested placement or, alternatively, additional visitation. Alejandro was in contact with Father, who had been released from jail in January 2007 and was working out of state.
The Agency submitted a second ICPC request for an evaluation of Blanca's home. In October 2007 the social worker informed Blanca that if members of Blanca's household refused to cooperate, the ICPC would be denied. Blanca said she was no longer living with Elfego. The social worker told Blanca that background checks, including fingerprinting, were required of all adults in Blanca's home.
The 12-month review hearing was held on November 2, 2007. The court admitted the Agency's reports into evidence. Blanca's attorney asked the court to continue the review hearing until the ICPC was completed. The parties stipulated that were Blanca to testify, she would testify that Elfego had moved out of her home. Her attorney informed the court that, for financial reasons, Blanca had new roommates. The roommates were willing to be fingerprinted; however, the ICPC process was not yet complete.
The court questioned whether there was good cause for a continuance. The Agency, Alejandro's counsel and Father opposed the continuance. The court denied Blanca's request. The court stated it did not have any evidence to support Blanca's assertions that her circumstances had changed and her home was safe for Alejandro. The court found that return to parental custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to Alejandro because he was afraid of Father and did not know his mother. The court determined there was a substantial possibility Alejandro would be returned to parental custody by the 18-month review date and set a hearing for December 19, 2007.
In her letter brief, Alejandro's appellate counsel states there has been a change of circumstances since the 12-month review hearing. A hearing on a supplemental petition is scheduled for May 19, 2008. (§ 387.) Alejandro's appellate counsel states she and Alejandro's trial counsel believe he will not be prejudiced by the outcome of this appellate proceeding. Accordingly, Alejandro's appellate counsel takes no position on his behalf in this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Blanca's Request To Continue The 12-Month Review Hearing
Blanca contends the court abused its discretion by denying her request to continue the 12-month review hearing. She asserts a continuance to allow the court to receive a completed ICPC report constitutes good cause. (In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1572 (John M.).) Blanca asserts she was prejudiced by the denial of her request because the burden to show the child could safely be returned to parental custody was then shifted to her from the Agency. (Compare § 366.21, subd. (f) with § 388 and Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1).) The Agency argues Blanca did not show good cause to delay the proceedings; therefore the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Blanca's motion for a continuance.
Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
The juvenile court may continue a dependency hearing only on a showing of good cause, and only for the time shown to be necessary. (§ 352, subd. (a); rule 5.550(a)(2).) The court may not grant a continuance that is contrary to the interests of the child. (Ibid.) Continuances are expressly discouraged in juvenile court. (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 179; Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1242.) "The court's denial of a request for a continuance will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.)
Here the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Blanca's request for a continuance. At the 12-month hearing, the Agency's recommendation to extend Father's reunification services was not contested and the court did not consider referring the case to a section 366.26 hearing. Alejandro retained a strong interest in possible reunification with Father. He was in a stable placement with Catalina, who had raised him since he was four years old.
Timelines are essential in dependency proceedings. (In re Joziah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 674.) The procedural posture of this case differs significantly from that in John M. In John M., this court concluded the trial court abused its discretion when it did not continue the disposition hearing to receive the ICPC home evaluation of the nonoffending, noncustodial parent. (In re John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1572.) Here Alejandro entered foster care on August 10, 2006. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); rule 5.502(9)(A).) The 12-month review hearing was not held until November 2, 2007, a few months before the 18-month review hearing. (§ 366.22, subd. (a) [the permanency review hearing shall occur within 18 months after the date the child was originally removed from parental custody].)
Further, the juvenile court may continue a dependency hearing only for the time shown to be necessary. (§ 352, subd. (a); rule 5.550(a)(2).) Blanca did not ask for a continuance to a certain date or provide the court with a reliable estimate of the time needed to complete the ICPC evaluation. (See, e.g., John M., supra, at p. 1572 [the estimated completion time was from one month to six weeks].) Considering the procedural posture of the case and Alejandro's interests in stability and reunification with Father, the court reasonably determined it was not in Alejandro's interests to delay the 12-month hearing. The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Blanca's motion for a continuance.
As a practical matter, Blanca cannot show prejudicial error here. The court set the 18-month review hearing for December 19, 2007, less than two months after the date of the 12-month review hearing. If Blanca's request had been granted the court would have heard the 12 and 18-month review hearings if not simultaneously, then almost concurrently. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) At the 18-month hearing the Agency retains the burden to prove return to parental custody is detrimental to the child. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)
II
Substantial Evidence Supports The Court's Detriment Finding
Blanca contends the court erred when it did not return Alejandro to her physical custody. She argues the court's detriment finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Blanca asserts she maintained consistent contact with Alejandro she did not have any criminal background, and Georgia social services found the condition of her home suitable. Blanca argues the Agency did not meet its burden to show the other adults living in her home posed a protective risk to Alejandro. She also contends there is no evidence to support the court's express finding of detriment, "[Alejandro] [d]oes not know mother."
The Agency argues Blanca's circumstances have not substantially changed since this court upheld the dispositional order denying Blanca's request for placement under section 361.2. The Agency contends the juvenile court does not have the authority to place a dependent child in a home with adults who do not submit to fingerprint clearance checks. (§ 361.4.) The Agency acknowledges noncustodial parents are excluded from section 361.4 requirements but asserts that, as a matter of public policy, section 361.4 applies to the other adults in the parent's household.
At the 12-month hearing, the court must return a dependent child to the physical custody of his or her parent unless the court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, the child's return to his or her parent would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker has the burden of establishing detriment. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).)
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, we review the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the finding or order. Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. We resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 564.)
We are not persuaded by the Agency's argument that the juvenile court is without authority to place a child with a parent if the other adults in the parent's household have not submitted to fingerprint clearance checks. At a status review hearing, absent a finding of detriment, the court is required to return a dependent child to the physical custody of the child's parent. (§§ 366.21, subd. (f); 366.22, subd. (a).) However, in determining detriment, the court may consider the presence of other adults in the home who have not had fingerprint clearance checks, and other relevant evidence. (Cf. John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1572 [A favorable ICPC report is not a prerequisite to the placement of a child with his or her parent if the evaluation and other evidence show the placement would not be detrimental to the child].) Here substantial evidence supports the court's detriment findings.
The court questioned whether Elfego had in fact moved out of the home. Elfego admitted he had a criminal history. The parties and the court did not have any information about Elfego's crime or crimes. He refused to submit to a fingerprint clearance check. Blanca had two children with Elfego. The court did not have information about the nature of their relationship or the intended duration of any separation. The court was not obliged to accept as true Blanca's uncorroborated testimony that Elfego was no longer living in her home. (Cf. People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 609; Pluth v. Smith (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 818, 823.) The court observed that Blanca's situation appeared to be in flux and there was no information about Blanca's alleged new roommates. Under these circumstances, the court could reasonably conclude there was a substantial protective risk to Alejandro in Blanca's home.
A detriment evaluation requires the court to weigh all relevant factors to determine whether the child would be at substantial risk of harm if returned to parental custody. (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.) Alejandro had not lived with Blanca since he was a baby, and "met" her for the first time when he was 10 years old. The court reasonably concluded Alejandro did not know his mother as a parent. Although Alejandro wanted to visit his mother and was not opposed to living with her, he missed Father and wanted him to come home. Alejandro was living with Catalina, who had acted as a parent to him (and his older sister) since he was three years old. Alejandro preferred to stay with Catalina. The record also supports findings that Alejandro's return to Blanca's physical custody would disrupt his schooling and his stable placement with Catalina, and interfere with his sibling relationships and Father's reunification efforts.
Considering the protective risks to Alejandro in Blanca's home and his interests in stability, continuity and reunification with Father, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court's detriment finding. The court did not err when it continued Alejandro's placement with Catalina and extended the reunification period to the 18-month review date.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., HALLER, J.