Opinion
No. 3-921 / 03-1779.
Filed January 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John G. Mullen, District Associate Judge.
J.S. appeals from the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Jack Schwartz, Rock Island, Illinois, for appellant.
D.H., Davenport, pro se father of A.K.L.
J.B., Davenport, pro se father of A.C.L.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Gerda Lane, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Catherine Alexander of Zamora, Taylor, Clark, Alexander Woods, Davenport, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Jennifer is the mother of Anthony, born in November 1994, and Alexandria, born in March 1996. Both children have medical problems. They have been diagnosed with failure to thrive. Anthony suffered from nutritional deficits and hearing loss. Alexandria has cystic fibrosis. She needs medical treatment and medication on a consistent basis. Jennifer was not meeting the children's medical needs, and they were removed from her care in April 2002.
The children were adjudicated to be children in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2), (e), (g), and (n) (Supp. 2001). Alexandria was also adjudicated under section 232.2(6)(c)(1). In the adjudicatory order the juvenile court found:
The children were previously adjudicated to be children in need of assistance from 1997 to 1999. The case was dismissed when Jennifer and the children moved to Texas.
There are chronic issues with the mother's inability, failure or refusal to provide care, supervision, shelter, medical care and safety for her children. The mother and her children were residing with her paramour who acts as if he is a very violent and dangerous man. He certainly is controlling, intimidating and threatening to the social workers and has big, vicious dogs which he uses to support his threats. The mother caters to his whims and desires and the social workers were unable to provide services or visit with the children. Since the children were removed, the mother has not consistently participated in services. She has not undertaken her urinalysis.
No progress in the case was made from the time of the adjudicatory hearing. Although Jennifer attended a few parenting sessions and sporadically attended visitation, she did not participate in any other services, such as a substance abuse evaluation or psychological evaluation.
There were concerns about substance abuse throughout the case. Jennifer had tested positive for cocaine when she was in a car accident in Texas in January 2001. Jennifer's paramour, Ron, has been convicted of possession of marijuana. In March 2003 Jennifer was charged with possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine.
The State filed a petition seeking to terminate Jennifer's parental rights in May 2003. At the time of the termination hearing, Jennifer and Ron had been evicted from their home and were living in a recreational vehicle. Jennifer had pled guilty to the drug charge and was awaiting sentencing. Jennifer's parental rights were terminated pursuant to sections 232.116(b), (e), and (f) (2003). The juvenile court found, "While the mother avows that she loves her children and wants what is best for them, she has failed to parent her children and has made no effort to do so over the past year."
The parental rights of the children's fathers were also terminated. The fathers had never been part of the children's lives and they are not parties to this appeal.
Jennifer appeals. She raises the following issues: (1) whether there was any type of reunification attempted between the mother and the children; (2) whether there were enough services provided to the mother; (3) whether there was a preponderance of the evidence; (4) whether the mother was given enough time and chances to fulfill the requirements imposed upon her; and (5) whether the mother had the adequate resources to be able to provide necessities and the required medical care and treatment to the children. These issues may be placed into two groups, those claiming insufficiency of the evidence and those claiming inadequacy of services.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of review in termination cases is de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Jennifer asserts there is insufficient evidence in the record to support termination of her parental rights. She believes she should be given more time to correct her parenting deficiencies. Jennifer points out that she was not given an opportunity to reunite with the children after their removal.
We note that patience with parents can soon translate into intolerable hardship for their children. In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). A child should not be forced to suffer in the limbo of parentless foster care. In re D.J.R., 454 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1990). "The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems." In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 494 (citing A.C., 415 N.W.2d at 613). It is simply not in the best interests of children to continue to keep them in temporary foster homes while the natural parents get their lives together. In re J.L.P., 349 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 1989).
We find there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the termination of Jennifer's parental rights. Jennifer did nothing to create an environment so the children could be returned to her care. She was still living with Ron, she did not have a home for the children, and she was facing possible prison time on drug charges. Furthermore, her lack of participation in services shows a lack of interest in her children. The children should not be forced to wait longer for permanency in their lives.
IV. Reasonable Efforts
Jennifer also claims the State did not engage in reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children. Reasonable services must be provided to attempt to reunite a family before the State can terminate parental rights. In re L.M.W., 518 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). The State has an obligation to make reasonable efforts, but it is the parent's responsibility to demand services if they are not offered prior to the termination hearing. In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
There was no evidence Jennifer requested additional or other services than those provided by the Department of Human Services. Jennifer did not participate in the services which were offered to her. We find the services were reasonable under the facts of this case.
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court terminating Jennifer's parental rights to Anthony and Alexandria. We conclude termination is in the best interests of the children.