Opinion
No. 12–P–137.
2012-06-8
ADOPTION OF AHMET.
By the Court (KAFKER, BROWN & VUONO, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Ahmet was six years old and living alone with his mother in squalid conditions when, on April 14, 2010, a Juvenile Court judge found that he was in need of care and protection, and awarded temporary custody to the Department of Children and Families (DCF or department).
For three years Ahmet had lived in almost complete seclusion with his mother in an apartment that lacked heat and running water. There was no stove or refrigerator and the rooms were filled with trash and rotting food. Ahmet had not received medical or dental care, did not attend school, and was malnourished. Although the mother did not belong to an organized religion, she adhered to strict religious beliefs that made her fearful of the outside world. This fear was imparted to Ahmet, who was afraid to go outside, or even to wear clothing.
After DCF obtained custody of Ahmet, the judge appointed an investigator and a social worker to work with the mother. Initially, the department focused on reunification. However, the department had changed Ahmet's goal to adoption before the trial on the merits of the department's petition. The mother attended the trial and testified that she wanted Ahmet returned to her care. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge found that the mother was currently unfit, that such unfitness was likely to continue into the indefinite future, and that the best interests of Ahmet would best be served by termination of the mother's parental rights. Because the judge found there was an “undeniable connection between [Ahmet] and Mother,” the judge also ordered that during the posttermination period (prior to adoption) Ahmet was entitled to visits with his mother at least once each month.
The judge also terminated the parental rights of the putative father, who is not a party to this appeal.
This visitation order, however, was later vacated. On December 13, 2011, the judge held a hearing on DCF's motion to reconsider the visitation order and on the mother's motions to reconsider termination of her parental rights and to clarify Ahmet's adoption plan. The judge issued additional findings of fact regarding the events that had transpired since the original decree was issued in May, 2011. Although the mother had missed only four visits with Ahmet during the entire year preceding the trial, the mother had visited Ahmet only once after her parental rights were terminated. By December, the mother had ceased all contact with DCF. At the hearing, DCF represented that the mother had left the area and was living in Wyoming. The mother's counsel did not dispute that the mother had left the area. The judge then concluded that mandatory posttermination and postadoption contact were no longer in Ahmet's best interests and such contact was left to the discretion of the adoptive parents. As to the mother's motions, the motion for reconsideration was denied and the motion to clarify resulted in the judge's rejection of the mother's proposal that her brother become Ahmet's legal guardian and the acceptance of the department's plan for adoption by Ahmet's foster parents with whom Ahmet had developed a close connection.
A worker at the shelter where the mother was living informed DCF that the mother was not contacting DCF because “her heart hurt too much to call.”
On appeal, the mother does not contest the judge's finding that she was currently unfit. Instead, she claims that the judge had no basis for concluding that termination of her parental rights was in Ahmet's best interests because there was no evidence that her unfitness was likely to continue into the future. After review of the record, we conclude that the judge's subsidiary findings of fact are amply supported and establish by clear and convincing evidence that the mother's unfitness to parent Ahmet was likely to continue. Moreover, the astonishing gains made by Ahmet in the care of his preadoptive parents provided an additional appropriate basis for the judge's decision, which we affirm.
The decision to terminate parental rights involves a two-step analysis. See Adoption of Mary, 414 Mass. 705, 710 (1993). Once a parent is found to be unfit, the judge must ascertain whether the parent's unfitness is such that it would be in the child's best interests to end all legal relations between the parent and the child. Ibid.
Although we have conducted our own independent review of the record, we commend the trial judge for the thoroughness of her findings and thoughtful discussion in a difficult case.
Because the mother concedes that she was unfit at the time Ahmet was removed from her care, we need not describe in detail the environment that led the department to intervene.
See note 2, supra. Furthermore, we reject the mother's challenge to the judge's finding that “[Ahmet] was ravenous when he was taken into care.” The social worker who removed Ahmet from the home reported that Ahmet ate two tuna fish sandwiches and a banana and that “[h]e is ravenous, every time I rattle a paper he is checking me for food.” Additionally, the pediatrician who examined Ahmet after he was removed from the mother's care reported that Ahmet was malnourished.
We note other evidence that supports the judge's decision to terminate. The mother did not comply with her service plan. She refused to be evaluated, did not attend counseling or parenting classes, and did not obtain suitable housing. Indeed, the mother was homeless at the time of the trial. The mother's steadfast refusal to be evaluated is particularly troublesome because it left the judge with no explanation as to why the mother had neglected Ahmet's needs in the first place. It also demonstrated that the mother could not put Ahmet's best interests before her own personal beliefs. See Adoption of Rhona, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 117, 126 (2005) (“Evidence of parents' refusal to cooperate with the department, including failure to maintain service plans and refusal of counseling programs, is relevant to the determination of [future] unfitness”).
The mother's assertion that she participated in counseling and was willing to be evaluated is not supported by the evidence. Although the mother met with a therapist on three occasions, she discontinued treatment due to a lack of insurance. The therapist's initial assessment was that the mother suffered from depression and posttraumatic stress disorder, and needed—at the very least—a strong advocate. With respect to finding another therapist or enrolling in parenting classes, the mother repeatedly refused to do so because, as she testified, “if a person does not believe in God, they cannot determine my, um, health and my mentally—mental whatever because ungodly people, they thinks that, um, people who serve God, they're mentally—like they have problems but they don't.” The mother also testified that she could not attend parenting classes “because of my faith and because I know how to raise [a] child.”
Moreover, contrary to the mother's assertion, the fact that she cleaned her apartment in the weeks following Ahmet's removal does not demonstrate that an evaluation was not required. The judge's determination that Ahmet could not return to the mother's care until the underlying issues that led her to raise him in seclusion were resolved, or at the very least identified, was supported by the evidence. See Adoption of Eduardo, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 278, 283 (2003) (“[I]t is not the existence of the mother's mental health issues that dictated the judge's conclusions, but rather the results of the mother's parenting and its actual and predicted effects on [the child]”).
In sum, Ahmet has a “right[ ] to a stable and safe environment.” Adoption of Olivia, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 670, 677 (2002). By all accounts, Ahmet has thrived under the care of his preadoptive family where he has learned to play outside, interact with other children, and eat until he is satisfied.
Decree affirmed.