Opinion
No. COA16-187
08-16-2016
IN THE MATTER OF: A.H., K.H.
Brooke Clark, for petitioner-appellee Robeson County Department of Social Services. Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent-appellant mother. Peter Wood, for respondent-appellant father. Poyner Spruill LLP, by Meghan B. Pridemore, for guardian ad litem.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Robeson County, Nos. 13 JT 333, 13 JT 334 Appeal by respondents-parents from orders entered 18 November 2015 by Judge J. Stanley Carmical in Robeson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 July 2016. Brooke Clark, for petitioner-appellee Robeson County Department of Social Services. Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent-appellant mother. Peter Wood, for respondent-appellant father. Poyner Spruill LLP, by Meghan B. Pridemore, for guardian ad litem. DIETZ, Judge.
Respondents appeal from orders terminating their parental rights to their minor children Amy and Kevin. Respondents' sole argument on appeal is that the trial court's orders do not contain sufficient findings of fact to support the court's conclusions of law, largely because the court "cut and pasted" its findings from allegations in the petition. As explained below, we reject this argument. The trial court's orders contain the necessary ultimate findings to support its conclusions, and those ultimate findings, combined with the court's evidentiary findings, demonstrate that the court's determination was the result of a reasoned decision-making process. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's challenged orders.
We use pseudonyms to protect the juveniles' identities.
Facts and Procedural History
Robeson County Department of Social Services became involved with Respondents on 28 June 2013 after receiving a report stating that Respondent-mother left the children, ages four years and six months, unattended in a hotel room while she was sitting in her car in the parking lot. DSS learned that the family lacked stable housing and had been evicted from their home on 7 May 2013. After talking with Respondents, DSS determined that services were required for the family. However, DSS was unable to locate the family from July 2013 to 22 October 2013, when the family was discovered at the Robeson County Courthouse. DSS took custody of the children on that date after Amy informed a social worker that she had not been washed in several days and that her mother was not taking care of her. On 23 October 2013, DSS filed petitions alleging that the juveniles were neglected.
On 5 November 2013, Respondents and DSS jointly developed a Family Services Case Plan. The objectives in the plan included that the parents obtain stable housing and undergo mental health and substance abuse assessments in order to determine necessary services.
On 15 January 2014, a scheduled adjudication and disposition hearing was continued after neither parent appeared for the hearing. That same day, DSS received a report that Respondent-mother was making Respondent-father panhandle for pills, and that Respondent-father would steal items and trade them for pills. The report also stated that Respondents got in fights, smoked "grass" and "crack," and argued about how they were going to get pills. The report alleged that Respondent-father had lied about the reason for missing a previous family visitation meeting, and that Respondents had actually been out looking for pills instead of visiting with their children.
On 12 March 2014, another scheduled adjudication and disposition hearing was continued after Respondent-mother left the courthouse before her case was called. On 7 May 2014, the trial court conducted an adjudication and disposition hearing. Respondent-mother was not present. The court adjudicated the children neglected, continued custody with DSS, and ordered a plan of reunification.
On 22 October 2014, the trial court held a permanency planning hearing, after which the court ordered the permanent plan be changed from reunification to adoption. Respondents were present in court that day but left before their case was called. On 19 December 2014, DSS filed petitions to terminate Respondents' parental rights, alleging as grounds (1) that Respondents willfully left the juveniles in foster care or placement outside of the home for more than twelve months without showing reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to the removal of the juveniles, and (2) that the juveniles had been placed in DSS's custody and Respondents, for a continuous period of six months preceding the filing of the petitions, had willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care of the juveniles although physically and financially able to do so. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), (3). After holding a hearing on the petitions, the trial court entered an adjudication order on 18 November 2015, finding that the grounds alleged in DSS's petitions existed to support termination of Respondents' parental rights to Amy. That order did not mention Kevin. The trial court also entered a disposition order that same day terminating Respondents' parental rights as to both Amy and Kevin.
Both parents timely appealed. After they filed their appeals, the trial court amended its order to include reference to both Amy and Kevin. The parties did not appeal that order, and it is, therefore, not before us. See Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 215-16, 660 S.E.2d 58, 62-63 (2008).
Analysis
Respondents' sole argument on appeal is that the trial court's findings are insufficient to support its conclusions, primarily because they are copied from filings by DSS and "simply restate the testimony given during the hearing" without making the necessary ultimate findings to support the court's conclusions. We disagree.
As an initial matter, this Court previously has held that there is nothing inherently improper about reusing the parties' own wording from their pleadings in a court order:
District Court judges have little or no support staff to assist with order preparation, so the judges have no choice but to rely upon counsel to assist in order preparation . . . . In light of this reality, it would impose an impossible burden on trial court judges if [the Court of Appeals] were to hold that any findings "cut-and-pasted" from a party's pleading automatically warranted reversal of the order. If a trial court, after carefully considering the evidence, finds that the facts are exactly as alleged in a party's pleading, there is nothing wrong with repeating those same words in an order. The purpose of trial court orders is to do justice, not foster creative writing.In re J.W., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 772 S.E.2d 249, 253 (2015). Thus, we review the trial court order not to check for copied language, but to determine if the trial court "through processes of logical reasoning, based on the evidentiary facts before it, found the ultimate facts necessary to dispose of the case." Id.
Finding grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) requires a two-part analysis by the trial court. In re O.C., 171 N.C. App. 457, 464, 615 S.E.2d 391, 396 (2005).
The trial court must determine by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that a child has been willfully left by the parent in foster care or placement outside the home for over twelve months, and, further, that as of the time of the hearing, as demonstrated by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, the parent has not made reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the child.Id. at 464-65, 615 S.E.2d at 396.
Here, the trial court made ample findings of fact regarding these factors. The court found that Amy and Kevin "were placed in the custody of [DSS]" on 22 October 2013; that it had ordered "legal and physical custody to remain with []DSS" upon its adjudication of neglect on 7 May 2014; that it likewise had ordered "[l]egal and physical custody of the children [to] remain with the agency" following a review hearing held on 13 August 2014; that it again "ordered that legal and physical custody of the children remain with the agency" at a permanency planning hearing on 22 October 2014; and that it yet again had reiterated its order of continued DSS custody at a subsequent permanency planning hearing on 19 November 2014. Finally, it found that DSS filed its petition to terminate Respondents' parental rights as to Amy and Kevin on 19 December 2014.
This Court has held "that 'for more than 12 months' in G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) means the duration of time beginning when the child was 'left' in foster care or placement outside the home pursuant to a court order, and ending when the motion or petition for termination of parental rights was filed." In re A.C.F., 176 N.C. App. 520, 527, 626 S.E.2d 729, 734 (2006) (emphasis omitted). The trial court's evidentiary findings, as documented above, plainly indicate that it found the children had been placed outside the home for more than twelve months for purposes of satisfying N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Specifically, the court found that both children were originally placed in DSS custody on 22 October 2013 and that the children remained in continuous DSS custody through 19 December 2014, the date DSS filed its petition to terminate Respondents' parental rights—a period of almost fourteen months.
The court also found the following:
527. . . . [T]he Court received testimony from Gordon Smith, a Licensed Clinical Addiction Specialist with Premier Behavioral. The Respondent parents were referred to Premier by [DSS], and obtained an initial assessment on February 7, 2014.
528. [Respondent-father] was to complete a 15 week treatment program, with three sessions being offered each week. Out of 45 sessions, [Respondent-father] only completed one session with Premier.
529. It was recommended that [Respondent-mother] complete weekly group sessions to address her substance abuse and mental health issues. [Respondent-mother's] first session was on June 7, 2014. She attended only six sessions out of approximately 18 months with Premier, with her last session being June 30, 2015.
530. The Court also accepted testimony from Anthony Pittman, a Licensed Clinical Addiction Specialist with TT&T Services.
531. [Respondent-mother] had a clinical assessment with TT&T on September 2, 2015. It was recommended that the Respondent mother be evaluated by mental health professionals for treatment.
532. [Respondent-mother] reported to TT&T [S]ervices on September 4, 2015 to see her physician and was prescribed medications.
533. Although it was recommended that [Respondent-
mother] attend therapy each week, she has only attended on three occasions from September 2, 2015 until October 19, 2015.
534. The Court further heard from A.D. Smith, a Substance Abuse Counselor with Southeastern Recovery, who provided services to [Respondent-father].
535. [Respondent-father] came in to Southeastern Recovery prior to June 26, 2015 to schedule an assessment and drug screen.
536. On June 26, 2015, [Respondent-father] completed an assessment and drug screen with Southeastern Recovery, at which time he tested positive for methadone and Percocet. [Respondent-father] admitted to buying the said medications "off the street".
537. It was recommended that [Respondent-father] attend treatment three times per week for a total of eight weeks.
538. Treatment sessions were arranged at nighttime, so that [Respondent-father] could continue working.
539. [Respondent-father] attended treatment at Southeastern Recovery on June 30, 2015, and failed to return for any further treatment. As a result, [Respondent-father] was discharged on July 17, 2015.
. . .
542. Although this action was initiated as improper supervision and unstable housing, the parents' underlying mental health and substance abuse issues were factors that led to [DSS]'s involvement. As such, it was imperative for the parents to receive proper treatment as recommended by their Family Services Case Plan and by the Respondents' treatment providers.
543. The Respondent parents willfully failed to complete any mental health or substance abuse treatment, begin parenting classes, and maintain stable housing, even though several attempts were made by the Petitioner to provide transportation and arrange for services and residential treatment for [Respondents].
These findings, and in particular Finding of Fact 543, which contains the court's ultimate findings, demonstrate that the trial court engaged in a reasoned process and, based on the evidentiary facts before it, found the ultimate facts necessary to dispose of the case. In re J.W., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 772 S.E.2d at 253. The findings demonstrate that Respondents suffered from serious substance abuse problems and were unable to provide a safe, stable home for their children. As a result, the children resided outside their care for more than twelve months and during that time Respondents did not engage in the treatment and therapy necessary to address the issues that led to the removal of their children from their care. In re O.C., 171 N.C. App. at 464-65, 615 S.E.2d at 396. In short, the trial court's findings satisfy the applicable statutory standard. Id.
We recognize Respondents' frustration with the fact that so many findings were copied from DSS's allegations. Respondent-mother, for example, notes that "termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy" and that "the trial court's duty to explain why [her] parental rights were terminated is not a perfunctory duty." In a perfect justice system, trial court judges would have the time and resources to carefully craft each order they enter in their own words. But that is simply not the justice system that we have. It has long been the practice in this State that lawyers representing parties in the case prepare the orders for trial judges. Those orders rarely are models of great legal writing.
Here, the order signed by the court may appear "perfunctory" in the sense that it contains a series of evidentiary facts copied directly from DSS's allegations and ultimate findings that do little more than apply the language of the statute to the facts in this case. But that is all the law requires the trial court to do. In re O.C., 171 N.C. App. at 464-65, 615 S.E.2d at 396. Accordingly, we reject Respondents' arguments and affirm the trial court's termination of parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Having concluded that at least one ground for termination of parental rights existed, we need not address the alternative ground for termination addressed by the trial court. In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93-94 (2004).
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's orders.
AFFIRMED.
Judges STEPHENS and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).