Opinion
No. COA13–320.
2013-08-6
In the Matter of A.G.T.
Hanna Frost Honeycutt, for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County Department of Social Services. Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent-appellant mother.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 11 January 2013 by Judge Andrea F. Dray in Buncombe County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 July 2013. Hanna Frost Honeycutt, for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County Department of Social Services. Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent-appellant mother.
Winston & Strawn LLP, by Eric M.D. Zion, for guardian ad litem.
ERVIN, Judge.
Respondent–Mother Valerie W. appeals from an order adopting a permanent plan for A.G.T. consisting of an award of custody to Respondent–Father Vincent T., awarding the custody of Adam to Respondent–Father, concluding that Adam could not be returned to Respondent–Mother's custody in the next six months, granting Respondent–Mother one hour of supervised visitation with Adam each week, and determining that there was no need for the holding of regular review hearings in the future. On appeal, Respondent–Mother argues that the trial court erred by awarding the custody of Adam to Respondent–Father and establishing custody of Adam with Respondent–Father as Adam's permanent plan, determining that Adam should not be placed in the custody of Respondent–Mother and authorizing DSS to refrain from making further efforts to reunite Adam with Respondent–Mother, limiting Respondent–Mother to supervised visitation with Adam, and failing to order the implementation of an adequately specific plan for Respondent–Mother's visitation with Adam. After careful consideration of Respondent–Mother's challenges to the trial court's order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's decision to adopt a permanent plan of custody with Respondent–Father and awarding custody to Respondent–Father is not supported by adequate findings of fact; that the trial court did not err by declining to award custody of Adam to Respondent–Mother, authorizing the cessation of efforts to reunify Adam with Respondent–Mother, or limiting Respondent–Mother to supervised visitation with Adam; that the trial court failed to adopt a sufficiently specific visitation plan for Respondent–Mother; and that this case should be remanded to the Buncombe County District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
A.G.T. will be referred to as Adam, a pseudonym used throughout the remainder of this opinion for ease of reading and to protect the juvenile's privacy.
I. Factual Background
On 21 April 2011, the Buncombe County Department of Social Services filed a juvenile petition alleging that Adam, who was, at that point, fifteen months old, was a neglected and dependent juvenile and obtained non-secure custody of Adam. On 6 October 2011, the court entered an order adjudicating Adam to be a neglected and dependent juvenile based, at least in part, on stipulations by Respondent–Father and Respondent–Mother. The stipulated findings in the 6 October 2011 order reflect that Adam had resided with Respondent–Mother until February of 2011, when she was arrested for ramming Respondent–Father's car with her car, which contained Adam and her four-month-old son. Subsequently, Respondent–Mother suffered a “mental health breakdown,” a development which resulted in the assertion of additional criminal charges and her commitment to a hospital in Winston–Salem. At that point, DSS placed Adam with Respondent–Father and his live-in girlfriend, Christina H. Adam remained in Respondent–Father's custody until he was charged with and arrested for assaulting an adult woman in Adam's presence, at which point Adam was taken into DSS custody.
Adam's sibling will be referred to as Jim, a pseudonym used throughout the remainder of this opinion for ease of reading and to protect the child's privacy.
The dispositional portion of the 6 October 2011 order included findings that the charges against Respondent–Father had been dismissed and that “the criminal charges were the only reason [Adam] was removed from his care. The [R]espondent[-F]ather has been cooperative with [the social worker] and is appropriate with the minor child.” After noting that Respondent–Father and Ms. H. had completed a case plan involving the child whom they had had together, the court further found that “[t]here are no safety concerns preventing [Adam] or [Trey] from returning to this home.” On the other hand, the court noted that Respondent–Mother was “receiving targeted case management support services through Family Preservation Services,” including individual therapy, medication monitoring, and intensive parenting skills training. Although Respondent–Mother had “gone to great lengths” to comply with these services, the court found that she had “significant deficits in coping and life management skills” and showed signs of “increasing frustration over the ambivalent status of the [pending juvenile] case.” Based upon these findings, the court kept Adam in DSS custody on the basis of Respondent–Mother's “mental health issues” and Respondent–Father's “pending felony drug charges.”
The child whom Respondent–Father had with Ms. H. will be referred to as Trey, a pseudonym used throughout the remainder of this opinion for ease of reading and to protect the juvenile's privacy.
On 3 January 2012, the court entered an order establishing a permanent plan of reunification for Adam. Among other things, the court found that both of Adam's parents were making progress working on their case plans and had successfully visited with Adam on a supervised basis. In addition, Respondent–Father and Ms. H. had been allowed an hour of unsupervised visitation with Adam, which had also gone well. The court noted the existence of reports indicating that Adam had exhibited behavioral problems in daycare following his visits with Respondent–Mother and that Adam was “happy, calm, and readjusts quickly back into the classroom after visits with the [R]espondent[-F]ather.” After making these findings, the court authorized unsupervised visitation by both of Adam's parents.
On 14 March 2012, subject to a 23 March 2012 amendment, the court entered a permanency planning review order which found that Adam's parents were continuing to make progress in addressing the conditions which had led to Adam's removal from their homes. According to the court, Respondent–Mother had shown “a marked improvement” in handling her Bipolar I Disorder symptoms and was “learn[ing] to utilize appropriate coping and emotion regulation skills.” Trey had been returned to the home of Respondent–Father and Ms. H. and was “doing well.” Both Respondent–Father and Respondent–Mother had been enjoying weekly, day-long unsupervised visits with Adam. As a result, the court approved overnight unsupervised visitations between both parents and Adam, with these unsupervised visits intended to lead to trial home placements.
On 7 September 2012, the court entered a permanency planning review order in which it found that Adam and Jim were in a trial home placement with Respondent–Mother and that Adam was staying with Respondent–Father and Ms. H. on weekends. The court noted that Adam had been referred for speech therapy by Child Developmental Services and expressed concern about the fact that his attendance at daycare was irregular due to Respondent–Mother's lack of reliable transportation. The court made reference to a report by Adam's play therapist to the effect that, although the child was “emotionally fine,” the environment in Respondent–Mother's home “is stressful and causes concern.” Similarly, a social worker reported “that often the minor children are hard for the [R]espondent[-M]other to handle.” In light of these determinations, the court ordered Adam's parents to attend and participate in mediation concerning Adam's placement schedule and ordered Respondent–Mother to “find dependable transportation to keep the minor child in daycare” and “concentrate more on learning parenting skills and less on socializing.”
The court continued the next permanency planning and review hearing on two occasions in light of the parents' mediation schedule and the necessity for appointing new counsel to represent Respondent–Father. Before the next scheduled hearing could take place, DSS terminated Adam's trial placement with Respondent–Mother and placed him with Respondent–Father given that “[R]espondent[-M]other [had] demonstrated [a] repeated pattern of just poor judgment and inability to foresee dangers/risk for the minor children.” In a report dated 27 August 2012, DSS provided the following explanation for its decision to terminate Adam's trial placement with Respondent–Mother:
... [Jim] was burned on a bar-be-que grill after [Respondent–Mother] admittedly left the child outside to return to the home for something out of the kitchen, [Adam] had access [to] [Respondent–Mother's] razor and shaved off part of his eyebrow, the minor children are reported to have uncommon sleep patterns at daycare and ... [Adam] is not able to meet the desired sessions with child development staff due to absences in daycare, child development staff observe [Adam] to have high levels of stress and anxiety ..., [Respondent–Mother's] Assertive Community Treatment Team (“ACTT”) report that the [R]espondent[-M]other has threatened staff members and refused to have contact with two of the three assigned support staff, ... and [Respondent–Mother] threatened to murder [the] Social Worker ... if the minor children were placed outside of her home.
At the time that a social worker came to retrieve the children on 20 August 2012, Respondent–Mother “cursed and threatened” the social worker and “tried to approach [her] aggressively [but] law enforcement held [Respondent–Mother] at bay.” Respondent–Mother refused to let the social worker take any of the children's toys or clothing with them. DSS reported that Respondent–Mother had been taken to Copestone for evaluation and that the Child and Family Team had concerns about Respondent–Mother's ability to parent her children without the intensive support services provided by ACTT. In addition, DSS informed the court that Respondent–Father was at risk of having his probation revoked and that he and Ms. H. were in the process of moving to a new residence.
In a letter dated 9 September 2012, the guardian ad litem reported the following observations regarding Respondent–Mother's visits with Adam and Jim:
... Each visit starts out hopefully but deteriorates quickly. The boys are thrilled to see mom and dive into her arms. She returns their enthusiasm and loves them.
The boys become frenzied in their play, throwing toys around, hitting each other. The visit gets out of hand very quickly. The respondent mother tries to control them with her limited parenting skills but too late. This behavior appears to be their norm from when they were living with her.
According to the guardian ad litem, “[t]his frenzied activity is observed only with their mother[;]” on the other hand, the guardian ad litem was of the opinion that Respondent–Father “does a good job of taking care of [Adam].”
The trial court held a permanency planning and review hearing on 16 October 2012. Although both parents attended the hearing, neither testified. At the hearing, Amy Huntsman, a social worker employed by DSS, informed the trial court that Respondent–Father had been discharged from probation after “following through with some services[.]” Both Ms. Huntsman and the guardian ad litem recommended that the trial court grant custody of Adam to Respondent–Father and that Respondent–Mother be allowed supervised visitation through her visitation coach. Although she did not testify herself, Respondent–Mother presented testimony from Wendy Kuykendall, her ACTT case manager, and from her in-home parenting skills educator.
On 11 January 2013, the trial court entered an order in which it incorporated the reports presented by DSS and the GAL, both of which recommended that Adam's permanent plan be established as reunification with Respondent–Father, into its findings of fact and made additional findings of fact. Based on its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that Adam's best interests would be served by changing the permanent plan to custody with Respondent–Father and granting custody of Adam to Respondent–Father. In addition, the trial court concluded that Adam could not be returned to Respondent–Mother's home within the next six months and awarded Respondent–Mother one hour of supervised visitation per week. The trial court released the parties' attorneys from any further obligation to represent their clients, relieved DSS of further responsibility for attempting to reunify Adam with Respondent–Mother, and ordered that no further reviews be held while retaining jurisdiction over the case and authorizing any party to file a motion seeking further review. Respondent–Mother noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's order.
II. Substantive Legal Analysis
A. Appropriateness of Granting Custody to Respondent–Father
In her first challenge to the trial court's order, Respondent–Mother argues that the trial court erred by determining that granting custody to Respondent–Father was in Adam's best interest and constituted the best plan for providing Adam with a safe, permanent home within a reasonable time. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–903(a) (requiring the trial court's dispositional decision “to be in the best interests of the juvenile”); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–907(c) (requiring a trial court's permanency planning order to include “specific findings as to the best plan of care to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time”). More specifically, Respondent–Mother asserts that the challenged determinations lack adequate support in the trial court's findings of fact and in the record evidence. Respondent–Mother's contention has merit, at least in part.
“The purpose of the permanency planning hearing [is] to develop a plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–907(a). At the conclusion of a permanency planning hearing, the trial court may “make any disposition authorized by [N.C. Gen.Stat. § ] 7B–903[,] including ... plac[ing] the child in the custody of either parent ... found by the court to be suitable and ... in the best interest of the juvenile.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–907(c). “ ‘Appellate review of a permanency planning order is limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings and [whether] the findings support the conclusions of law.’ “ In re E.K., 202 N.C.App. 309, 312, 688 S.E.2d 107, 109 (2010) (quoting In re J.C.S., 164 N.C.App. 96, 106, 595 S.E.2d 155, 161 (2004)) (alteration in original). “We review a trial court's determination as to the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion.” In re D.S.A., 181 N.C.App. 715, 720, 641 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2007).
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
As an initial matter, Respondent–Mother appears to argue that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that the custody of Adam should be awarded to Respondent–Father and that such an arrangement should constitute Adam's permanent plan. In seeking to persuade us of the merits of this contention, Respondent–Mother appears to analogize this case to proceedings in which this Court has overturned trial court orders for lack of evidentiary support when “the trial court entered an order based solely on the written reports of DSS and the guardian ad litem, prior court orders, and oral arguments by the attorneys involved in the case.” In re D.Y., 202 N.C.App. 140, 143, 688 S.E.2d 91, 93,disc. review denied,364 N.C. 129, ––– S.E.2d –––– (2010); see also In re D.L., 166 N.C.App. 574, 582–83, 603 S.E.2d 376, 382 (2004) (stating that “[t]he only ‘evidence’ offered by DSS was a summary prepared on 11 September 2002” and holding that “[t]he adoption of the DSS summary into the Order is insufficient to constitute competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of facts”). The legal principle upon which Respondent–Mother relies does not, however, apply in this case given that the record before the trial court contained, in addition to the reports presented by DSS and the guardian ad litem, the oral testimony of Ms. Huntsman and two of Respondent–Mother's service providers. As a result, the fact that the trial court relied on reports submitted by DSS and the guardian ad litem does not, without more, undermine the validity of its findings and conclusions given that the record also contains substantial oral testimony. In re R.A.H., 182 N.C.App. 52, 60, 641 S.E.2d 404, 409 (2007) (stating that “[s]uch reports constitute competent evidence, and the trial court properly relied upon them in reaching its finding of fact”).
In addition, the record contains sufficient evidence, if deemed credible and entitled to substantial weight, to support the trial court's determination that the custody of Adam should be awarded to Respondent–Father and that Adam's permanent plan should be his placement in Respondent–Father's custody. According to the guardian ad litem report, which was admitted into evidence without objection, Adam is happy in his placement with Respondent–Father and Respondent–Father does a good job of taking care of him. The guardian ad litem further noted that Respondent–Father is responsible for, and provides, the bulk of the parental care which Adam receives. According to Ms. Huntsman, Adam was doing well in Respondent–Father's care, had bonded with Respondent–Father, and, contrary to the situation which existed when Adam lived with Respondent–Mother, spoke frequently. According to Ms. Huntsman, Respondent–Father had the ability to care for Adam and was willing to ensure that Adam's needs are adequately met. Although Respondent–Father had, at one time, been in danger of having his probation revoked, Ms. Huntsman testified that, according to his probation officer, Respondent–Father had completed taking advantage of all required services, made all of the required monetary payments, and no longer stood accused of violating the terms and conditions of his probation. In addition to taking care of Adam, Respondent–Father is currently attending Haywood Community College and is involved with Job Corps. As a result, the record contains more than sufficient evidence, if believed and given weight, to support a determination that an award of the custody of Adam to Respondent–Father would be in Adam's best interests and that the best permanent plan for Adam would be his placement in the custody of Respondent–Father.
2. Sufficiency of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact
Secondly, Respondent–Mother contends that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support its determination that custody of Adam should be awarded to Respondent–Father and that Adam's permanent plan should be such an award of custody to Respondent–Father. In seeking to persuade us of the merits of this position, Respondent–Mother notes that an order placing a juvenile in the custody of a particular individual must contain findings of fact “support [ing] a conclusion that placement with the [person in question] was ... in the [child's] best interests.” In re E.Y ., 202 N.C.App. 309, 315, 688 S.E.2d 107, 111 (2010). In other words, as this Court has previously stated, “prior to returning a child to the custody of a parent from whose custody the child was originally taken, a trial court must find that the child will receive from that parent proper care and supervision in a safe home,” including making findings that “address[ ] the conduct that resulted in an adjudication of neglect.” In re H.S.F., 177 N.C.App. 193, 203, 628 S.E.2d 416, 422–23,disc. review denied,360 N.C. 534, 633 S.E.2d 817 (2006). Even if “the evidence and reports in this case might have supported the determination of the trial court,” “our statute requires the court to consider the [relevant statutory] factors and make relevant findings,” with a remand to the trial court for the entry of a new order containing appropriate findings and conclusions being the appropriate remedy in the event that the court commits such an error. In re Ledbetter, 158 N.C.App. 281, 286, 580 S.E.2d 392, 395 (2003).
According to well-established North Carolina law, a “trial court may not delegate its fact finding duty” to others and “should not broadly incorporate ... written reports from outside sources as its findings of fact.” In re J.S., 165 N.C.App. 509, 511, 598 S.E.2d 658, 660 (2004). As a result, a trial court fails to comply with applicable findings requirements by “stating a single evidentiary fact and adopting DSS and guardian ad litem reports.” In re Harton, 156 N.C.App. 655, 658, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003). On the other hand, a trial court does not commit prejudicial error if, in addition to incorporating DSS and guardian ad litem reports, it also makes “findings of fact ... sufficient to support its conclusion of law,” In re S.J.M., 184 N.C.App. 42, 54, 645 S.E.2d 798, 805 (2007), aff'd, 362 N.C. 230, 657 S.E.2d 354 (2008), which consist of more than a “bare finding that ‘the statements set forth’ in the reports ‘are true.’ “ In re A.S., 190 N.C.App. 679, 693, 661 S.E.2d 313, 322 (2008), aff'd, 363 N.C. 254, 675 S.E.2d 361 (2009). As a result, a “trial court properly incorporate[s] DSS and guardian ad litem reports” into an order if it also “ma[kes] findings of fact” “based on these reports” which are “sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate determination” and refrains from “rel[ying] on information from the reports that [it] then fail[s] to include as a finding of fact in [its] order.” In re L.B., 181 N.C.App. 174, 193, 639 S.E.2d 23, 33 (2007).
In its order, the trial court found that Adam had been “placed with [Respondent–Father] on August 20, 2012;” that both DSS and the guardian ad litem recommended that “custody of the minor child be awarded to” Respondent–Father; that “[i]t is in the best interest of the minor child that the court sanction[ ] the recommendations of [DSS and the guardian ad litem ] as specified above;” that “[i]t is in the best interest of the minor child that his custody is awarded to” Respondent–Father; that Respondent–Father “is capable of providing proper care and supervision for the minor child in a safe home,” so that “it is in the best interest of the minor child that the court award[ ] custody of the minor child to” Respondent–Father; that “[t]he best plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the minor child within a reasonable period of time is custody with” Respondent–Father; and that such a “plan is adequate, appropriate and in the best interests of the minor child.” As a result, the only findings contained in the trial court's order addressing issues relating to Respondent–Father amounted to determinations that Adam was currently placed with Respondent–Father, that DSS and the guardian ad litem had recommended that Respondent–Father be awarded custody of Adam, that such an award would be in Adam's best interests, that Respondent–Father was capable of properly caring for Adam, and that the best plan for achieving “a safe, permanent home” for Adam “within a reasonable period of time is custody with” Respondent–Father.
The fundamental problem with the trial court's findings with respect to the custody and permanency planning issues is that “best interest determinations are conclusions of law because they require the exercise of judgment.” In re Helms, 127 N.C.App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997); see also In re J.V., 198 N.C.App. 108, 117, 679 S.E.2d 843, 848 (2009) (holding that a “finding” that the children's “return to their own home would be contrary to their health, safety, welfare, and best interests” was a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact). Although the trial court certainly stated in its written order that Respondent–Father was capable of providing Adam with a safe, permanent home, such a statement is not, standing alone, sufficient to support a predictive determination that Respondent–Father would, in fact, provide such a home, that awarding custody of Adam to Respondent–Father would be in Adam's best interests, or that the permanent plan for Adam should consist of an award of custody to Respondent–Father. The remaining statements concerning Respondent–Father contained in the trial court's order are, in reality, conclusions of law which require support in the trial court's findings of fact and are insufficient to support the result reached by the trial court in the absence of such supportive findings. Simply put, the trial court never spelled out the factual basis for its determination that Adam would “receive ... proper care and supervision in a safe home” from Respondent–Father, “from whose custody [Adam] was originally taken,” H.S.F., 177 N.C.App. at 203, 628 S.E.2d at 422, or why an award of custody to Respondent–Father would be in Adam's best interest and should be adopted as his permanent plan. As a result, we conclude that the trial court's order lacks sufficient findings of fact to support its determination that Adam's best interests would be served by an award of custody to Respondent–Father or that the best permanent plan for Adam was such an arrangement.
Although the trial court made extensive findings of fact with respect to Respondent–Mother's deficiencies as a parent, such findings do not provide an affirmative justification for an award of custody to Respondent–Father or the adoption of a permanent plan consistent with such an award.
Admittedly, a considerable amount of information bearing on these subjects is included in the court's prior orders in this case and in the DSS and guardian ad litem reports which were incorporated by reference into the trial court's order. For example, the guardian ad litem report stated that Respondent–Father “does a good job of taking care of [Adam,]” that Adam “loves [Respondent–Father] and seems happy[,]” and that Respondent–Father and Ms. H.'s “home [is] neat and clean.” Similarly, the DSS report contains information concerning the situation which Respondent–Father faced at the time that the report was written. However, we cannot conclude that the trial court made adequate findings of fact to support its determinations with respect to the custody and permanent plan issues based on the information contained in these reports in light of the fact that a trial court simply may not “rel[y] on information from the reports that [it] then failed to include as a finding of fact in [its] order.” L.B., 181 N.C.App. at 193, 639 S.E.2d at 33. Moreover, the trial court did not incorporate any findings from prior orders into the order which is before us in this case either. Thus, the fact that the trial court incorporated the reports submitted by DSS and the guardian ad litem into its order and the fact that certain of the issues which the trial court should have addressed in its order were discussed in prior orders in this proceeding does not suffice to support a decision that the trial court made adequate findings of fact in the permanency planning order which Respondent–Mother has challenged on appeal. As a result, those portions of the trial court's order reflecting determinations that custody of Adam should be awarded to Respondent–Father and that the permanent plan for Adam should be custody with Respondent–Father are vacated and this case is remanded to the Buncombe County District Court for the entry of a new order containing adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing these custody and permanent planning issues.
B. Reunification with Respondent–Mother
Secondly, Respondent–Mother argues that the trial court erred by concluding that her mental health issues place Adam at a risk of future neglect, precluding Adam from returning to her home within the next six months and making further efforts to reunite Respondent–Mother and Adam an exercise in futility. More specifically, Respondent–Mother challenges sixteen of the trial court's findings of fact as either lacking in adequate evidentiary support or as, in reality, constituting conclusions of law rather than factual findings. We do not find this aspect of Respondent–Mother's challenge to the trial court's order to be meritorious.
As we have already noted, the findings of fact made in a permanency planning order are reviewed for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether they are supported by the evidentiary record. In re E.K., 202 N.C.App. at 312, 688 S.E.2d at 109. A trial court's conclusions of law will be upheld if they reflect a correct understanding of the applicable law and are supported by the trial court's findings of fact. Id. The mislabeling of a conclusion of law as a finding of fact is of no consequence for purposes of appellate review, provided that the result reached by the trial court is supported by other findings and conclusions and is legally correct. In re R.A.H., 182 N.C.App. at 60, 641 S.E.2d at 409. Finally, the existence of “erroneous findings [which are] unnecessary to the [trial court's ultimate] determination do not constitute reversible error” so long as the trial court's conclusions are legally correct and adequately supported by other findings. In re T.M., 180 N.C.App. 539, 547, 638 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2006).
A careful review of the record establishes that each of the critical findings of fact which Respondent–Mother has challenged in her brief are supported by the testimony received at the hearing and the written reports which were admitted into evidence. Although Respondent–Mother contends that Ms. Huntsman's testimony failed to detail or properly contextualize the incidents described in the DSS written report, we are not aware of any requirement that a witness elaborate upon the written evidence submitted at a permanency planning hearing. In addition, despite the fact that the witnesses presented on behalf of Respondent–Mother offered testimony that conflicted with certain of the statements contained in Ms. Huntman's testimony and in the related reports, such as the extent to which Respondent–Mother had refused to cooperate with more than one ACTT staff member, this Court does not second-guess the manner in which trial judges acting in a fact-finding capacity resolve conflicts in the evidence. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110–11, 316 S .E.2d 246, 252–53 (1984).
A significant number of Respondent–Mother's complaints about the trial court's findings involve matters of phrasing or the connotations which she ascribes to particular findings. For example, Respondent–Mother complains about the trial court's finding that she threatened to “murder” Ms. Huntsman on the grounds that the record reflects that she had merely intended to “kill” Ms. Huntsman. Although we believe that an intentional and premeditated killing may be fairly characterized as murder, the word choice reflected in the challenged finding of fact is supported by the DSS report and the testimony of Ms. Huntsman. Similarly, Respondent–Mother disputes the finding that she “has a significant history of mental illness[,]” arguing that the record does not show that she has “a significant history of untreated mental illness.” Aside from the fact that the challenged finding does not make any reference to the extent, if any, to which Respondent–Mother had undergone treatment for her mental difficulties, one of the witnesses proffered by Respondent–Mother testified that Respondent–Mother had received intensive mental health services when “she was a teenager,” a fact which suggests that any treatment which Respondent–Mother received had not eliminated the problems that she had been experiencing. As a result, the vast majority of the challenged findings of fact have adequate evidentiary support.
Admittedly, Respondent–Mother is correct in noting that the evidence does not support the trial court's statement that her mental health history included plural “hospitalizations,” since there was no evidence that Respondent–Mother had been hospitalized on any occasion other than in April 2011 and since Ms. Huntsman testified that Respondent–Mother had been released from Copestone following her August 2012 evaluation. When asked if Respondent–Mother had been hospitalized on more than one occasion, her case manager replied, “Probably. I can't say for sure. I don't have documentation in front of me.” As a result of the fact that the erroneous portion of the finding in question was not necessary to support a decision to uphold any of the trial court's conclusions of law pertaining to Respondent–Mother, however, we conclude that the trial court's erroneous use of the plural in describing the number of occasions on which Respondent–Mother had been hospitalized as the result of her mental illness did not prejudice Respondent–Mother's chances for a more favorable outcome before the trial court. T.M., 180 N.C.App. at 547, 638 S.E.2d at 240.
In addition, Respondent–Mother argues that certain of the statements that the trial court designated as findings of fact are, in reality, conclusions of law given that they address the standard for “neglect” as spelled out in the relevant provisions of the Juvenile Code. More specifically, Respondent–Mother argues that the following statements, which are described in the trial court's order as findings of fact, are really conclusions of law:
13. [Respondent–Mother] failed to provide proper supervision to [Adam] while in the in[-]home trial placement and this exposed [Adam] to a substantial risk of harm.
....
24.... In spite of the services provided by the in[-]home educator, [Respondent–Mother] has been unable to properly supervise the minor children or appropriately parent the minor children.
....
27. [Respondent–Mother's] mental health issues and anger management issues place her children at risk of neglect.
SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101(15) (defining a “neglected juvenile” as one who does not receive proper care or supervision). Regardless of whether the statements in question are properly classified as findings or conclusions, the determinations embodied in those statements are fully supported by the trial court's findings and by the record evidence. As the record reflects, Respondent–Mother left twenty-month-old Jim unattended in proximity to a hot grill while she was in her kitchen, so that the child was burned, and allowed two-and-a-half-year-old Adam to have access to a razor. The sleep patterns of both children exhibited signs of disruption while Adam and Jim were in Respondent–Mother's care. Adam developed high levels of stress and anxiety and suffered a two-month delay in receiving CDS services as the result of absences from daycare which occurred before he was taken from Respondent–Mother's residence. The guardian ad litem noted Respondent–Mother's inability to control the children's “frenzied” behavior during visitations. Finally, Respondent–Mother appears to have continuing anger management difficulties given that she threatened and failed to properly cooperate with her ACTT team and that she lunged for and threatened to kill Ms. Huntsman. As a result, the challenged “findings” discussed in this paragraph have adequate support in the record and the trial court's other findings.
Finally, Respondent–Mother objects to the trial court's determination that “[i]t is not possible for [Adam] to return to the home of [Respondent–Mother] immediately or within six months[.]” The applicable statutory language provides that a permanency planning order must include a finding concerning whether it is possible for a juvenile to return to a parent's home within the next six months only “if the juvenile is not returned home.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–907(b). “The word ‘home’ in the statute is clearly referring to the home from which the juvenile was removed.” In re J.M.D., 210 N.C.App. 420, 427, 708 S.E.2d 167, 172 (2011). As a result of the fact that Adam was removed from Respondent–Father's home in April of 2011, no findings under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–907(b) relating to Respondent–Mother were required.
Respondent–Mother's challenge to the trial court's finding that further efforts to reunify her with Adam would be futile or inconsistent with his need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time are equally unavailing. Such findings are required only when the court ceases reunification efforts in an “order placing a juvenile in the custody or placement responsibility of a county department of social services.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–507(b)(1). Here, the trial court granted custody of Adam to Respondent–Father and “released [DSS] from further responsibility in this matter, pending further order of this Court.” “Thus, [N.C. Gen.Stat. § ] 7B–507 was not applicable,” so that no findings addressing the issues delineated in that statutory provision were warranted. In re Padgett, 156 N.C.App. 644, 649, 577 S.E.2d 337, 341 (2003). Thus, none of Respondent–Mother's challenges to the findings and conclusions addressing the extent to which Adam could be returned to her home within six months or the extent to which DSS should continue to attempt to reunify Adam with Respondent–Mother have merit.
The trial court may, of course, need to address the issues discussed in the last two sections of this opinion in the event that it concludes on remand that custody of Adam should not be awarded to Respondent–Father or that the best permanent plan for Adam would not be an award of custody to Respondent–Father.
C. Trial Court's Dispositional Decision
Thirdly, Respondent–Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding custody of Adam to Respondent–Father while authorizing DSS to cease attempting to reunify her with Adam, establishing custody with Respondent–Father as Adam's permanent plan, and granting her just “one hour of supervised visitation per week at BCDSS.” See generally In re C.M., 183 N.C.App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007) (articulating abuse of discretion standard). In crafting an appropriate disposition, a trial court's sole concern should be the best interests of the child. In re Pittman, 149 N.C.App. 756, 766, 561 S.E.2d 560, 567 (2002). A trial court only abuses its discretion if its “ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re N.G., 186 N.C.App. 1, 10–11, 650 S.E.2d 45, 51 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As a result of our decision to vacate the trial court's decision awarding custody of Adam to Respondent–Father and determining that the best permanent plan for Adam was awarding his custody to Respondent–Father and to remand this case to the Buncombe County District Court for the making of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law and our decision that Respondent–Mother's mother's challenges to the trial court's decision that Adam could not be returned to Respondent–Mother's home within the next six months and that DSS should be authorized to cease attempting to reunite Adam with Respondent–Mother lack merits, we need not address any component of this aspect of Respondent–Mother's challenge to the trial court's order except the trial court's decision to award Respondent–Mother supervised, rather than unsupervised, visitation.
In addressing the visitation issue, the trial court found that an award of “[s]upervised visitation is in the best interest of [Adam] as it allows [him] to maintain a relationship with [Respondent–Mother] while ensuring his safety from harm.” In light of the incidents in July and August of 2012 which we have described above, we cannot say that the trial court's decision requiring that Respondent–Mother's visitation with Adam be supervised rather than unsupervised is manifestly unreasonable. Although Respondent–Mother is to be commended for the steps that she has taken to address her mental health issues and ensure that her emotions remain appropriately in check, she clearly continues to face challenges in properly fulfilling her role as Adam's mother. As a result, particularly given that the trial court's order expressly authorizes any party to file a motion seeking review of the existing custody and visitation arrangements, we conclude that the trial court did not commit an error of law by requiring Respondent–Mother to engage in supervised, rather than unsupervised, visitation.
D. Visitation Plan
Finally, Respondent–Mother argues that the trial court erred by failing to include an adequate visitation plan in its order as required by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–906(c)(6). More specifically, Respondent–Mother contends that the trial court erred by failing to designate a specific date and time of day at which her visits with Adam should take place, with these deficiencies in the trial court's order being of particular concern to Respondent–Mother given that, despite the fact that the trial court released DSS from further responsibility for attempting to reunify Adam with Respondent–Mother and determined that no further review hearings needed to be held, it still found that Respondent–Mother's visitation with Adam should be subject to DSS supervision. Respondent–Mother's argument has merit.
“An appropriate visitation plan must provide for a minimum outline of visitation, such as the time, place, and conditions under which visitation may be exercised.” In re E.C., 174 N.C.App. 517, 523, 621 S.E.2d 647, 652 (2005). As Respondent–Mother has demonstrated, the trial court's order fails to designate a day and time for her visits with Adam and does not clearly specify the role to be played by DSS in the visitation process. Although the record reflects that DSS had custody of Jim, that the parties agreed to allow the DSS visitation coach to coordinate Respondent–Mother's visits with Adam and Jim “so that the boys can spend some time together with their mother,” and that Respondent–Father had made a commitment to make Adam available for visits with Respondent–Mother at the appropriate times, we do not believe these understandings and commitments constitute an adequate substitute for the adoption of a specifically detailed visitation plan. As this Court has previously stated, “[t]he awarding of visitation of a child is an exercise of a judicial function, and a trial court may not delegate this function to the custodian of a child.” E.C., 174 N.C.App. at 522, 621 S.E.2d at 652. Thus, given that the trial court's order fails to address all of the issues which must be resolved in order to ensure that Respondent–Mother has an adequate opportunity to have supervised visitation with Adam, “[w]e vacate that portion of the [trial court's] order [addressing visitation-related issues] and remand [this case] to the trial court for proceedings regarding visitation consistent with this opinion.” Id. at 523, 621 S.E.2d at 652.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court did not err by determining that Adam could not be returned to Respondent–Mother's custody within the next six months, concluding that DSS should be authorized to cease attempting to reunite Adam with Respondent–Mother, and limiting Respondent–Mother to supervised visitation with Adam. However, we also conclude that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support awarding the custody of Adam to Respondent–Father and the adoption of a permanent plan consistent with such an award and that the trial court erred by failing to adopt a sufficiently specific visitation plan for Respondent–Mother. As a result, the trial court's order should be, and hereby is, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the Buncombe County District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED. Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).