However, a nolle prosequi will not toll the statutory speedy-trial period if the State uses it to cause delay or to avoid statutory limitations. In re A.F., 282 Ill. App. 3d 930, 932, 668 N.E.2d 1168, 1170 (1996), citing People v. Decatur, 191 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1038, 548 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1989). Thus, our inquiry is whether the State abused its power to use the nolle prosequi and whether the refiling of the charge was "vexatious, repetitious[,] or employed to manipulate the proceedings in order to evade or frustrate the purpose of the speedy-trial statute."

The State argues that our appellate court has already held that "[a]s with the Code of Criminal Procedure," the Juvenile Court Act's 120-day speedy-trial period "begins to run when either party makes a formal demand for trial." In re A.F., 282 Ill. App. 3d 930, 931-32 (1996). We do not find this statement convincing.

Generally, the unavailability of a witness or evidence is a valid reason to nol-pros a case and, therefore, tolls the speedy trial term. See People v. Martin, 183 Ill. App. 3d 442 (1989) (the unavailability of its key witness); People v. Stinnett, 166 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (1988) (the unavailability of its key witness); In re A.F., 282 Ill. App. 3d 930 (1996) (the unavailability of police witnesses); People v. Decatur, 191 Ill. App. 3d 1034 (1989) (unavailability of laboratory analysis). There has been a long history of Illinois cases standing for the proposition that, when a case is nol-prossed by the State, the statutory speedy trial period is tolled because the obligations of bail or recognizance have ended.

A nolle prosequi will not toll the "speedy-trial" period if the State uses it to cause delay or to avoid statutory limitations. In re A.F., 282 Ill. App.3d 930, 932, 668 N.E.2d 1168, 1170 (1996). Considerations change once the trial has begun.