Opinion
No. 04-16-00043-CV
12-21-2016
IN THE MATTER OF A.E.G.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 289th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015JUV00357
Honorable Daphne Previti Austin, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Jason Pulliam, Justice AFFIRMED
Appellant A.E.G. was charged by petition with delinquent conduct, specifically committing the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. A.E.G.'s motion to suppress statements made to police officers was denied on August 20, 2015. On November 30, 2015, A.E.G. entered a plea of true; and, on January 9, 2016, the trial court placed A.E.G. on community supervision for two years. A.E.G.'s sole issue on appeal is the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Because A.E.G. was not in custody at the time of the statements, we affirm the trial court's denial of A.E.G.'s motion to suppress.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.E.G., a thirteen-year-old male, was accused of committing aggravated sexual assault of G.G., a three-year-old child, at a McDonald's Restaurant in San Antonio, Texas. While G.G.'s mother was ordering food, G.G. was in the restaurant's jungle gym area where he encountered A.E.G. and A.E.G.'s sisters. When the food arrived, G.G. came to the table as requested, but refused to eat. G.G. told his mother that A.E.G. gave G.G. bugs to eat and that A.E.G. put his "tail and pacifier" in G.G.'s mouth. G.G.'s mother interpreted this to mean A.E.G. placed his penis into her son's mouth while in the jungle gym area.
Based on the allegations and the age of the individuals involved in this matter, the appellant and the complainant are referred to only by initials throughout this opinion. --------
G.G.'s mother called the San Antonio Police Department and officers reported to the scene. When the officers arrived, G.G.'s mother identified A.E.G. as the person who sexually assaulted her son. A.E.G. and one of his sisters were interviewed at the scene and A.E.G. was released to his mother. An investigation into the alleged sexual assault ensued.
A.E.G. was subsequently charged with one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Defense counsel timely filed a motion to suppress A.E.G.'s statements to detectives with the San Antonio Police Department. A pre-trial motion to suppress hearing was held on August 20, 2015. A.E.G. argued he was in custody and had not been taken before a magistrate prior to making the statements, thus precluding their admissibility under section 51.095 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.095 (West 2014) (allowing admission of a child's statement if it is made voluntarily and not elicited from a custodial police interrogation).
The State relied on the testimony of two witnesses.
A. Testimony before the Trial Court
1. Detective Elizabeth Fernandez
San Antonio Police Officer Elizabeth Fernandez, with the Special Victim's Unit, was the first witness called to testify. As part of the investigation, Detective Fernandez contacted A.E.G.'s mother and requested that she bring A.E.G. to the police station for a voluntary interview. A.E.G.'s mother agreed, and the interview took place on January 15, 2015. Upon their arrival, Detective Fernandez informed both A.E.G. and his mother that A.E.G. was there voluntarily, he was not under arrest, and he was free to stop talking at any time. Both A.E.G. and his mother confirmed they understood Detective Fernandez's explanation.
With the consent of A.E.G.'s mother, Detective Fernandez privately interviewed A.E.G. in a separate room. The interview was recorded and admitted into evidence. Detective Fernandez reminded A.E.G. that he was free to leave at any point. Detective Fernandez initially asked A.E.G. for background information about himself; she then directed the conversation toward the McDonald's incident.
A.E.G. told the officer what he remembered from the incident, but denied placing his penis in G.G.'s mouth. When Detective Fernandez explained there was video-surveillance of the incident, A.E.G. told Detective Fernandez that he no longer wanted to speak with her and wanted to end the interview. Detective Fernandez complied and immediately walked A.E.G. back to his mother in the waiting room.
In light of A.E.G.'s reactions and demeanor, Detective Fernandez requested the assistance of a fellow officer, Detective Robert Valadez. Based on A.E.G.'s age and his shy demeanor, Detective Valadez opined that A.E.G. may have been reluctant to speak with a female officer.
2. Detective Robert Valadez
Detective Robert Valadez, the State's second witness, testified that after Detective Fernandez briefed him on the case, he approached A.E.G. and his mother. Prior to requesting A.E.G.'s consent to a second interview, Detective Valadez again told A.E.G. that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at any time. A.E.G. reluctantly agreed to be interviewed a second time.
While walking to the interview room, A.E.G. inquired, "Do I have to talk if I don't want to?" Detective Valadez responded, "If you don't want to, no, but you have to . . . What I want to do is . . . I want to be able to explain what's going on here." Detective Valadez requested permission to continue with the interview and A.E.G. agreed. They spoke privately in a separate room while A.E.G.'s mother remained in the waiting room. The conversation was recorded and admitted into evidence.
Given the nature of the alleged offense, Detective Valadez questioned A.E.G. whether he understood the allegations lodged against him. Detective Valadez explained that another child accused A.E.G. of "doing something to the victim" in the McDonald's play area. Detective Valdez also questioned A.E.G. to determine whether A.E.G. was a victim of sexual abuse. A.E.G. denied being abused by anyone, but did relay "a dream" about someone molesting him.
Detective Valadez turned the conversation to the events at the McDonald's. Detective Valadez told A.E.G. about the video-recording of the play area and the DNA that was taken during the child's examination. A.E.G. acknowledged that he touched the child's penis and put the child's penis in his mouth. Shortly thereafter, A.E.G. told Detective Valadez that he did not want to talk anymore. The conversation ended and Detective Valadez walked A.E.G. back to his mother. Without questions or resistance from the detectives, A.E.G. and his mother left the police station.
B. Action by the Trial Court
In addition to the testimony of the two officers, the trial court also viewed the audio and video recordings of the conversations between both officers and A.E.G. The trial court denied A.E.G.'s motion to suppress.
On October 13, 2015, the trial court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Court finds [A.E.G.] was invited to the police station to provide a voluntary statement. [A.E.G.] was not in custody and was free to stop the interview and leave the police station, and in fact, did just that. [A.E.G.]'s custodial status never changed from being a voluntary statement to being a custodial interview. With that I rule that the requirements of [Texas Family Code section] 51.095 were followed and that any statements made by [A.E.G.] will be admissible at a trial on the merits.A.E.G. now appeals this order.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
A. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress on a bifurcated standard of review; we "'afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports.'" Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)); accord Martinez v. State, 131 S.W.3d 22, 31 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). A reviewing court must
give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court's rulings on those questions de novo.Wilson v. State, 442 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref'd) (citing Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); see also Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
B. Arguments of the Parties
A.E.G. argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress because he was in custody when he made the statements. Because A.E.G. was in custody, the officer was required to take him before a magistrate to be read the Miranda warnings. In support of this argument, A.E.G. asserts that Detectives Fernandez and Valadez continued to question him despite A.E.G.'s stating that he wanted to end the interview. A.E.G. contends that he tried to end the interview three times before the detectives finally complied with his requests. Thus, according to A.E.G., the continued questioning by the detectives would make any objective thirteen-year-old believe his freedom of movement was significantly restricted.
The State counters that A.E.G. was never in custody during the voluntary interview, and therefore, the detectives were not required to provide Miranda warnings and the trial court properly denied A.E.G.'s motion to suppress.
C. Custodial Status
Here, the trial court found A.E.G. was invited to the police station and that he provided his statements voluntarily. The trial court also found A.E.G. was free to discontinue the interview and leave the police station whenever he chose. These findings of fact are supported by the record, and therefore, we accept these facts as true. See State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Montanez, 195 S.W.3d at 106. However, because the trial court's conclusion regarding custodial status is a question of law, we review de novo the issue of whether A.E.G. was in custody when he made the statements. See Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; see also Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d at 811.
Custodial status is measured objectively. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In Dowthitt, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals suggested four scenarios wherein a person might be deemed in custody:
(1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,Id. at 255; accord State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Here, because A.E.G. was a child, his custodial status is viewed even more critically. "A child is in custody if, under the objective circumstances, a reasonable child of the same age would believe that his freedom of movement was significantly restricted." Delacerda v. State, 425 S.W.3d 367, 386 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd) (emphasis added); see also Meadoux v. State, 307 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009), aff'd, 325 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. 2010); Martinez, 131 S.W.3d at 32.
(2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave,
(3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and
(4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave.
"'In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)) (citing Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254). Simply because the interview occurred at a police station does not transform the interview into a custodial interrogation. Wilson, 442 S.W.3d at 784 (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1977)); Martinez, 131 S.W.3d at 33. Voluntary interviews at police stations are noncustodial. See Estrada, 313 S.W.3d at 295 (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122 (1983)).
We look at the entire record to determine whether A.E.G. was in custody at the time he made his statements to the officers. Based on the prior case law, we focus our attention on several factors:
(1) A.E.G. voluntarily came to the police station in response to Detective Fernandez's request;See Estrada, 313 S.W.3d at 294; see also Beheler, 463 U.S. 1122-25; Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493-96.
(2) Detective Fernandez immediately informed A.E.G. that he was not under arrest, interview was entirely voluntary, and that A.E.G. was free to leave at any time; these admonitions were repeated by Detective Valadez when he requested permission to speak with A.E.G.;
(3) When A.E.G. requested the interview with Detective Fernandez cease, the interview was stopped immediately; before additional questions were asked by Detective Valadez, the detective obtained additional consent to speak to A.E.G. and A.E.G. elected to speak to the officer; as before, when A.E.G. requested the interview cease, Detective Valadez stopped the interview;
(4) A.E.G. gave the incriminating statement shortly after he began speaking with Detective Valadez;
(5) After his interview with Detective Fernandez was concluded, A.E.G. was allowed to return to the front of the office and wait with his mother; when Detective Valadez requested permission to speak with A.E.G., he again told A.E.G. that he was free to leave and that he would leave at the end of the interview; A.E.G. did, in fact, leave at the end of the interview.
A.E.G. focuses specifically on one statement made during his exchange with Detective Valadez. As the detective and A.E.G. were walking to the interview room, A.E.G. asked the detective, "Do I have to talk if I don't want to?" The video was replayed for the trial court. We acknowledge that Detective Valadez's response might appear confusing when taken out of context, "If you don't want to, no, but you have to." We are required, however, to view all of the surrounding circumstances. There are also several instances on the video-recording where Detective Valadez specifically tells A.E.G. that A.E.G. do not have to speak to the detective. During his testimony, both attorneys asked Detective Valadez about the exchange.
I want[ed] him to clearly understand that he [did] not have to talk to me. He [could] leave at any time, and it[ was] strictly him voluntarily coming and talking to me.
Detective Valadez explained that one of his concerns was whether A.E.G. was a victim himself. We note that when A.E.G. told Detective Valadez that he did not want to talk any further, the detective testified that no further questions were asked and A.E.G. was escorted out of the interview room.
During the motion to suppress hearing, both parties questioned Detective Valadez about this statement. Although the statement arguably creates some confusion, Detective Valadez's subsequent assurances to A.E.G. should have clarified any mistaken belief A.E.G. held. See Wilson, 442 S.W.3d at 785 (rejecting argument that interview became custodial when detective said "[y]ou're going to get charged with it; there's no doubt about that" because it was phrased in future tense and detectives never suggested he was under arrest at that moment).
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination, and affording the deference required to the trial court's determination of facts, we conclude A.E.G.'s freedom of movement was not restrained to the degree associated with formal arrest and that A.E.G. was not in custody when the statements in question were given to the detectives. See Martinez, 131 S.W.3d at 32; accord Meadoux, 307 S.W.3d at 408.
CONCLUSION
Throughout A.E.G.'s interview, Detectives Fernandez and Valadez repeatedly assured A.E.G. that (1) he was not under arrest, (2) he was not required or forced to speak with them, and (3) he would be free to leave after the interview. A.E.G. was never handcuffed or physically restrained in any way. Therefore, looking at the facts objectively and in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we cannot say the trial court erred in determining A.E.G. was not in custody at the time the statements were provided and therefore, Texas Family Code section 51.059's requirement that a magistrate provide the Miranda warnings was not implicated. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.095(b).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of A.E.G.'s motion to suppress.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice